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Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion - MacEwan Users Only
Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion - MacEwan Users Only
Colonescu, C., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion.
Metadata
Title
Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion
Author(s)
Colonescu, Constantin
; Schmitt, Nicolas
Date
2003
Keyword(s)
markets, free trade, competition
Description
Moving from market segmentation to market integration (firms cannot discriminate among markets) is shown to have often anticompetitive effects in an infinitely repeated Cournot game. In particular, market integration between two countries leads both of them to experience anticompetitive effects when product markets are similar. The same conclusion holds when trade liberalization is modeled as a decrease in bilateral trade barriers followed by moving from market segmentation to market integration. The analysis also predicts that a less efficient country (like a country in transition) enjoys pro–competitive effects from market integration.
Peer Reviewed
Yes
Type of Item
Journal Articles
DOI
10.1111/1467-9396.00376
Publication Information
Colonescu, C., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion. Review of International Economics, 11(1): 175-192. doi:10.1111/1467-9396.00376
MacEwan Users Only
https://library.macewan.ca/cgi-bin/SFX/url.pl/8EM
Language
English
Rights
All Rights Reserved
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