Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion - MacEwan Users Only

Colonescu, C., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion.
Metadata
TitleMarket segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion
Author(s)Colonescu, Constantin; Schmitt, Nicolas
Date2003
Keyword(s)markets, free trade, competition
DescriptionMoving from market segmentation to market integration (firms cannot discriminate among markets) is shown to have often anticompetitive effects in an infinitely repeated Cournot game. In particular, market integration between two countries leads both of them to experience anticompetitive effects when product markets are similar. The same conclusion holds when trade liberalization is modeled as a decrease in bilateral trade barriers followed by moving from market segmentation to market integration. The analysis also predicts that a less efficient country (like a country in transition) enjoys pro–competitive effects from market integration.
Peer ReviewedYes
Type of ItemJournal Articles
DOI10.1111/1467-9396.00376
Publication InformationColonescu, C., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion. Review of International Economics, 11(1): 175-192. doi:10.1111/1467-9396.00376
MacEwan Users Onlyhttps://library.macewan.ca/cgi-bin/SFX/url.pl/8EM
LanguageEnglish
RightsAll Rights Reserved