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Incentives, conditionality and collective action in payment for environmental services

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dc.contributor.authorKerr, John
dc.contributor.authorVardhan, Mamta
dc.contributor.authorJindal, Rohit
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-03
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-27T01:13:21Z
dc.date.available2022-05-27T01:13:21Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractAs payment for environmental services (PES) initiatives spread to collectively managed natural resources, questions arise because the incentive structures that might be appropriate for individually managed resources will not necessarily promote the collective action required to manage the commons. Theory suggests challenges for cash payments to promote collective action, and for alternative payment types to facilitate conditionality. Possible ways to reconcile this disconnect involve conceiving of PES more broadly through the use of multiple forms of payment including non-cash incentives and placing greater focus on building institutions for collective action than on strict conditionality.
dc.format.extent446.35 kb
dc.format.mimetypePDF
dc.identifier.citationKerr, John M., Mamta Vardhan, and Rohit Jindal. "Incentives, Conditionality and Collective Action in Payment for Environmental Services". International Journal of the Commons 8, no. 2 (2014): 595-616, http://www.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/ijc/article/view/438.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14078/191
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsAttribution (CC BY)
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectcommons
dc.subjectcollective action
dc.subjectconditionality
dc.subjectIndonesia
dc.subjectMexico
dc.subjectpayment for ecosystem services
dc.subjectpayment for environmental services
dc.titleIncentives, conditionality and collective action in payment for environmental servicesen
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.type

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