Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion

Colonescu, C., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00376

Title: Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion
Author(s) or Creator(s): Colonescu, Constantin
Schmitt, Nicolas
Date: 2003
Peer Reviewed?: Yes
Keywords: markets
free trade
competition
Description: Moving from market segmentation to market integration (firms cannot discriminate among markets) is shown to have often anticompetitive effects in an infinitely repeated Cournot game. In particular, market integration between two countries leads both of them to experience anticompetitive effects when product markets are similar. The same conclusion holds when trade liberalization is modeled as a decrease in bilateral trade barriers followed by moving from market segmentation to market integration. The analysis also predicts that a less efficient country (like a country in transition) enjoys pro–competitive effects from market integration.
Publication Information: Colonescu, C., & Schmitt, N. (2003). Market segmentation, market integration, and tacit collusion. Review of International Economics, 11(1): 175-192. doi:10.1111/1467-9396.00376
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00376
Type of Item: Journal Articles
Language: English
MacEwan Users Only: https://library.macewan.ca/cgi-bin/SFX/url.pl/8EM

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