Modern Nationalism in India and the Philippines: Lessons for Building Nation-State Legitimacy

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Abstract: Why do some governments succeed in creating a greater sense of legitimacy for their nation-state than other governments? Although modernization was a part of their respective governments’ plans for both India and the Philippines upon independence, modern nationalism offers different routes to reach the objective. The Indian National Congress party under Jawaharlal Nehru went out of its way to gain as much support as it could among the masses and parts of the elites. Nehru’s plan was to use protectionism and let India’s economy develop until it was ready to compete globally, while trying to help women, the poor, and those most badly affected escape the worst excesses of capitalism. In other words, he offered something to all the classes of India. Even after Nehru’s death, his vision was more or less embraced by almost all of his successors. The same could not be said about the Philippines. It has been argued that landholding classes largely made up the small oligarchy that dominated the Philippines, and this group was only interested in benefitting itself. When the political parties were not competing democratically, there was something much worse in place, the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. This implies that the way nationalism develops pre- and post-independence radically influences development and legitimacy.

Keywords: Economics, Development, India, Indian National Congress, Marcos, Nationalism, Nehru, the Philippines

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1 Introduction

This essay seeks to answer the following question: “Why do some governments succeed in creating a greater sense of legitimacy for their nation-state than other governments?” A comparison between India and the Philippines may add to this dialogue. Both represent states that received their independence after anticolonial struggles. India declared its independence from the British on August 15, 1947. The Philippines had become independent from the United States a little over a year earlier, on July 4, 1946. Both were multicultural states with large (Muslim and other) minority populations. Hence, both states are examples of modern nationalism (which develops quite differently than the nationalism of Europe in the 18th, 19th and first half of the 20th century).

What has happened since then is surprising in terms of which government has more legitimacy among its own people. The Filipino people perceive their national government as lacking legitimacy which has pushed the Philippines into the top third of the Failed States Index Scores 2008 (Fund for Peace (FfP),
India, however, is among the half that is least likely to fail on the same index. This is a puzzle because of some of the scores on the other indicators being used by the Failed States Index (FSI) in their calculations of the likelihood of failure. One indicator is called the “Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia.” This measures, in part, the “history of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries (FfP, 2008).” Both India and the Philippines scored 7.0 out of 10 on this index. The higher the score, the more that minority group has grievances against the government or nation. By way of comparison, the score for Norway was 1.0 (the lowest possible score). Hence, both India and the Philippines were working with roughly the same amount of grievances from minority groups at independence. On another indicator, “Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines,” India scored at 8.9 and the Philippines at 7.6. Again, a higher score means more uneven economic development. So, everything else being equal, common sense dictates that people in India should be much less happy with their government. However, the indicator measuring “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State” shows the exact opposite. Again, the higher the score, the less legitimate the government in the eyes of the people. India scored 4.8, whereas the Philippines scored 8.3 (the global average is 6.4). Given the scores on the other indicators, this is, as noted, a puzzle.

There must be other factors at work that would allow India to be held in higher legitimacy by its own people. This essay will argue that nationalism took a different course in India compared to the Philippines. Although modernization was a part of the plans for both countries upon independence, modern nationalism offers different routes to reach the objective. The Indian National Congress (INC) party under Jawaharlal Nehru went out of its way to gain as much support as it could among both the masses and parts of the elites. His plan was to use protectionism and let India’s economy develop until it was ready to compete globally, while trying to help women and the poor escape the worst excesses of others. In other words, he offered something to all the classes of India. Even after Nehru’s death, his vision was more or less embraced by almost all of his successors (Kohli, 2004: 257-288). The same could not be said about the Philippines. As one scholar put it, “the political parties were dominated by a small oligarchy, largely drawn from the landholding class,” and this group was only interested in benefitting itself (SarDesai, 2010: 190). When the political parties were not competing democratically, there was something much worse in place, the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. This implies that the way nationalism develops pre- and post- independence radically influences development and legitimacy.

The purpose of this study is to show that the way modern nationalism progressed in India was very different from the Philippines, and this explains why the government in India enjoys a higher level of legitimacy than most governments around the world (or as some might phrase it, “India is a nation whereas the Philippines is a state”). In the next section, a literature review on modern nationalism will be provided. This will be followed by a delineation of a framework of analysis for modern nationalism. Third, the course that nationalism followed in the Philippines will be outlined. In the fourth section, nationalism as it unfolded in India will be charted. Finally, by the conclusion, the puzzle of why the Indian government enjoys more legitimacy than the Philippines government will be solved.

2 Literature review

The logical place to begin would be to define nationalism, especially as it pertains to developing countries. Bringing together the common elements of
self-styled nationalists, Anthony Smith defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy of a social group some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential nation” (Smith, 2005b: 30). So, nationalism in its most basic form is identifying with a social group in a (potential) nation-state. Smith differentiates developing countries by stating: “Most ‘anti-colonial’ nationalisms were ideological movements among ethnically heterogeneous populations thrown together by colonial administrations, … though they possessed no national basis, on the European model, these elites aimed to create one. Theirs were nations of intent” (Smith, 2001: 147, fn. 6). One more distinguishing characteristic of such nationalisms is that a distinction is made between the indigenous population and the colonial other (Smith, 2005a: 180). With this elaboration, it is possible to disentangle modern nationalism from the older one in Europe with which it is often conflated.

Benedict Anderson’s (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism is based largely on the processes of communication. His argument is that nationalism arose when three fundamental changes occurred: 1) the fading away of any script-language which supposedly was necessary to access religion (for example, Latin); 2) the loss over time of the belief that monarchs had divine status; and, 3) the non-acceptance of fate and giving up the idea that the origins of the world and humans are identical. This made it necessary for people to find new ways to relate to the world. In the words of Anderson: “Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways” (Anderson, 2006: 36). So, when people read novels or news, they began to feel themselves to be part of an “imagined community.” Anderson adds that the community to which people felt they belonged was strongly influenced by the vernacular spoken in their region. Although Anderson uses words like “national consciousness,” “nation-ness,” and “nationalist leaders,” it was never his intention to explain nationalism. His study only focuses on the pre-conditions likely to bring about nationalism.

John Plamenatz (1973), in “Two Types of Nationalism,” defines a western and an eastern nationalism. Plamenatz defines nationalism as: “… the desire to preserve or enhance a people’s national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened, or the desire to transform or even create it where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking. … Thus, nationalism is primarily a cultural phenomenon, though it can, and often does, take a political form” (Plamenatz, 1973: 23-24). Western (European) nationalism, on the one hand, usually takes a benign form. There is a commitment to liberal ideas that need to be brought to the fore with a redistribution of power among the populace. Once this happens, institutions come into existence to unify the people, culture, and economy. Eastern nationalism, on the other hand, often starts as an attempt to emulate this but something often gets lost in translation. It can be found among Slavs, Asians, Africans and Latin Americans. The colonized people see that they cannot compete with the colonial power. So, the colonial power becomes the other. The indigenous elite has to reinvent its past to make it more glorious and they also have to raise the abilities of their people to compete with the colonial powers. There is both a rejection of the intruder (but not of modernization) and the ways of ancestors, because these held their society back (although the latter provides a sense of identity). As Plamenatz puts it, “It is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates” (Plamenatz, 1973: 34). This particular tension is a common theme in many studies of modern nationalism.

John Breuilly (1993) in Nationalism and the State locates nationalism in modernization of the state, and in which politics can play a major role. In defining nationalism, Breuilly writes: “People do yearn for communal
membership, do have a strong sense of us and them, of territories as homelands, of belonging to culturally defined and bounded worlds which give their lives meaning. Ultimately much of this is beyond rational analysis and ... explanatory powers ... ” (Breuilly, 1993: 401). This being the case, Breuilly assumes a certain level of political development has been reached so that competition can take place for the hearts and minds of the people. One example would be a local elite competing with the colonial ruling apparatus. Thus, nationalism is a form of instrumentalism for sub-elites to achieve their objectives through political competition both before and after independence. He examines cases in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. For Breuilly, nationalism does not drive modernization. Rather, the two drive each other.

Lloyd Fallers (1961) uses a framework very similar to the one that will be developed at the end of this literature review in “Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism.” His starting point is that: “Nationalism is an ideological commitment to the pursuit of the unity, independence, and interests of a people who conceive of themselves as forming a community” (Fallers, 1961: 677). The ideologist’s task is “fraught with dilemmas: how to create in Africans a sense of self-esteem without encouraging tribalism; how to be modern without being Western; how to change rapidly without losing a sense of continuity and cultural wholeness” (Fallers, 1961: 678). Again, it is stigmatizing and emulating the other. In Uganda, the leadership went about creating a false history that portrayed the country being great in the past. There were still areas where they could learn from the Europeans, and they would learn in those areas. Then the Europeans would leave (Uganda gained independence in the year following the publication of Fallers’ article). Fallers concedes at the conclusion of the article that the transition between tradition and modernity is usually not so continuous, as it was in Uganda. However, anthropologists have an unprecedented opportunity to see culture in the making in Africa.

Partha Chatterjee’s (1986) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World – A Derivative Discourse is a Marxist rendering of nationalism for India. The starting point of the book is that the idea of nationalism originated in the West, and it informs understanding of the concept everywhere else. Thus, the type of modern nationalism that emerges in any particular location in the developing world is partly a derivative discourse of which items the local elites wish to borrow from a Western concept. Chatterjee writes that in India, the racism by the British against the locals led to the othering of the former. The local elite also tried to create an overarching set of traditions, symbols, myths and memories for a diverse population. There was the creation of a golden age of India, which was not entirely accurate. This is necessary to be able to recognize the material superiority of the West, while making the argument that the East is spiritually superior. Modern nationalism emerges as a way of finding a proper place for the local people and their country in the world.

Paul Kramer (2006) writes one of the most damning books about the United States, when he examines its behaviour in The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines. He focuses on the role of race-making in nationalism. He discusses how Filipino was literally invented by the Spanish. This, in turn, influenced how Filipinos thought about themselves and the Spanish. More than that, it influenced opinions Catholic Filipinos had of non-Catholic citizens. Most of the book is on how the Americans reinvented the Filipinos. As Kramer puts it: “The result of these struggles was a novel racial formation whose specific contours and texture emerged from a particular local convergence of transnational forces rather than the export of US racial idioms and institutions or the installation of generic colonial discourses” (p. 5). This unique road taken by the Philippines appears to have had an impact, at least in part, on nationalist feelings after independence.
This essay uses an integrative framework derived from the above and other sources dealing with modern nationalism. It then uses the framework to understand how nationalism can influence feelings about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a government. Thus, it extends analyses of nationalism to an area that is rarely studied in the field. Understanding how nationalism relates to legitimacy can be important for international security. This is because the citizens of failed or failing states might not have strong feelings about belonging to their state or the legitimacy of their government. If patterns emerge of how nationalism influences legitimacy, this is the first step in grasping how to make the world a safer place.

3 Unified framework of modern nationalism

The three stage process of modern nationalism as derived from this literature review will now be outlined. First, there is the ideological stage. In this stage, national consciousness starts to develop as intellectuals and other elites start to take an interest in their history and culture. This is usually done in the context of stigmatizing the colonial power as the other. Since the colonial power is more militarily and economically advanced, it also needs to be emulated. However, there is also a desire to keep elements of the local culture. So, a fictitious golden age is created to show that the local culture was great in the past. Then, a mixture of the traditional and modern are promoted as part of their ideology by some of the elites.

This leads to the second stage, political competition. There is competition between sub-elites at the local level. There is also competition between the local sub-elites on one side and the colonial power on the other. The objective of each of the sub-elites is to try to get their particular ideology accepted by wide tracts of the local population, or at least those with power. The most successful sub-elite(s) will be able to utilize this to pressure other sub-elites and the colonial power.

Finally, there is a modernization process that takes place as one of the ideologies becomes dominant. Ideologies differ across countries. Going beyond what the above authors are writing, in the real world, there seem to be four major patterns of modernization: 1) try to enter the international economy quickly and compete; 2) put protectionist policies in place for a period and liberalize as the economy grows and becomes stronger; 3) create an enclave economy where a small elite and comprador class benefit; and, 4) modernize on a domestic model where authoritarian rule is used to keep the country’s economy isolated and protected from the international system to varying degrees. Obviously, some of these methods are better than others. The particular method for every country will depend on the decisions of the sub-elites and the outcomes of their competitions to gain power.

4 Philippines

4.1 Stage 1 – Ideological

The people of the Philippines enjoy the unique distinction of being the first ones to successfully launch an anticolonial movement in Asia. This is surprising because it is thought the Filipinos came from Indonesia in the first centuries of the Christian era, where they were dispersed over thousands of islands and were not bound by a common language. For much of their history, loyalty rarely
transcended the barangay (boatload) group that arrived together or the pueblo (township) level (SarDesa, 2010: 137).

After the Spanish arrived in the 16th century, the conditions for a nationalist movement to emerge started to be put in place. The Spanish appeared as an imperial power, in competition with other European nations that had taken control of nearby areas. The arrival of the Spanish, however, was not welcomed by the Filipinos. No less than 30 uprisings, large and small, took place in opposition to the Spanish in the first three centuries of their rule. It would be these rebellions that would provide the roots for the development of a Filipino consciousness. In fact, as noted, one scholar states it was the arrival of the Spanish that led to the invention of the Filipino (Kramer, 2006: 35).

Spanish economic policy toward the Philippines underwent revisions from time to time. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the prohibition against commercial plantations was lifted. The growth of cash crops, like tobacco, indigo, hemp, and sugar was strongly encouraged. Manila was opened up to foreign shipping and this allowed Filipinos to meet Americans, Europeans and others. Eventually, these changes led to the rise of the ilustrados, a prosperous, export-oriented Filipino elite. This development would have a major impact on the way the nationalist movement in the Philippines would unfold from the second half of the nineteenth century onward (Stanley, 1974: 24-48).

International trade increased throughout the nineteenth century. In 1834, free trade policies were introduced. Export commodities like sugar and tobacco boomed. When the Suez canal was opened in 1869, Filipinos trade with Europe received a boost far greater than anything that came before. In terms of nationalist development, this meant there was increasing exposure of Filipinos to foreign traders, foreign goods, and foreign ideas. Younger members of rich, landowning, and entrepreneurial families absorbed these foreign exports and went abroad to see things for themselves (SarDesai, 2010: 138).

Although economic liberalization was taking place, that was not the case in the political sphere. Unlike Cuba and Puerto Rico, which had been granted representation in the Spanish Cortes (legislative assembly), the Philippines had been left out. From the 1830’s onward, the Philips had been the Spanish Empire’s great exception. The islands continued to be ruled by reactionary friar orders and a repressive politico-military state. The Spaniards defended this on primarily racial grounds. The argument being made was that the ostensibly Catholic natives, indios, were still superstitious, and the rest were savages (animists) and infidels (Muslims). By the end of the nineteenth century, the ilustrados were demanding political and legal institutions, and a presence at the Cortes (Kramer, 2006: 36-37).

Among the young people who went abroad, the most scholarly and articulate was Jose Rizal. He held many talents and during the course of his life he was a surgeon, linguist, poet, journalist, and novelist. He was born in Calamba to middle-class Catholic parents. Even at a young age, he recognized that the Dominican friars were keeping his fellow citizens in a state of economic oppression. One poem he wrote, before leaving for Spain at the age of eighteen to further his education, was titled “To the Philippine Youth.” In this, he exhorted young Filipinos to work for the glory of their motherland, the Philippines. That he was advocating a motherland other than Spain raised the ire of his Jesuit and friar educators (SarDesai, 2010: 136).

In reality, neither Rizal nor his fellow students were revolutionaries, their aim was reform. They felt that the Philippines was not ready to stand by itself and that it was necessary for the Spaniards to rule for quite some time. In his novel, Noli Me Tangere, Rizal appealed to Spain to end its discrimination and correct its abuses. He asked for the freedom of the press and, of course, representation at the Spanish Cortes. As Floro Quibuyen puts it:
Rizal’s vision was of the nation as an ethical community, a vision of an inclusive nation without borders, and not of a sovereign nation demarcated by territory and protected by the armature of a state. He was convinced that the road to national liberation, to freedom and justice, was not through the violent seizure of state power – wherein today’s slaves become tomorrow’s tyrants – but through local, grass-roots, community-oriented struggles in civil society. (Quibuyen, 2008: 10)

Rizal envisioned a Philippines for all the Filipinos, without anybody dominating.

All visions of ilustrado reform, however, were not the same. Writers in what came to be known as the Propaganda Movement sought recognition that both confirmed and undermined Spanish hierarchies. These writers both satirized Spanish racism and favourably held up Filipinos that fit certain standards. The view being put forward in these writings was that the Spaniards misrecognized the Filipinos for who they were: overseas Spaniards with educational and artistic achievements, who were loyal to Spain. These writings promoted a pacto de sangre, a blood compact, that bound the people of the islands up with the people of Spain. However, since political rights were predicated on socio-cultural features, certain Filipino peoples were excluded from an assimilated Philippines. Thus, the Propaganda Movement delimited who could be a true Filipino and this segregation, ultimately, would have major implications for how nationalism would develop in the Philippines (Kramer, 2006: 37).

Rizal eventually became disillusioned. His second novel, *El Filibusterismo*, advocated the use of violence to free Philippines from Spain. However, he would later form the Liga Filipina, which united the entire archipelago into one homogenous body, and was against violence and injustice, and instead encouraged education, commerce, and agriculture. Even though he did not call for armed insurrection against Spain, only two days after founding the league, Rizal was arrested and the nationalist leadership was taken over by a militant organization, the Katipunan. This organization felt that the only way to get independence was through violence. Unbeknownst to Rizal, he was made honorary chairman of the Katipunan, and it would not be the last time that Rizal would be adopted by those who wanted to use his name to further their objectives. Rizal had succeeded in creating a national consciousness among the Filipino people and came to symbolize that unity. After he was executed on December 30, 1896, the reaction of the people left no doubt of this. His writings helped to restore the dignity, self-respect, and pride of the Filipino people, and transform the Spaniards into the other (Quibuyen, 2008: 36-80).

4.2 Stage 2 – Political competition

Rizal’s martyrdom blazed a path for the nationalist movement, though not in the non-violent direction he would have preferred. The leaders of the Katipunan were intensely patriotic. The first leader, Andres Bonifacio, was eventually executed by his rival, Emilio Aguinaldo. The latter fought the Spanish to a stalemate that led to a peace pact with the Spanish authorities who promised to give monetary compensation to some of the families with Katipunan members and to implement political reforms to better represent Filipinos. However, only half the money was paid and none of the reforms were implemented (SarDesai, 2010: 141).

The situation changed dramatically within a couple of years. The Americans had defeated the Spanish in Cuba, and in 1899 ratified the Treaty of Paris which transferred sovereignty over Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the former. Aguinaldo had used the Spanish money promised in the peace pact to buy weapons and went back to fighting against the Spanish. He worked with the
Americans for a very short period, but soon the nationalist movement turned its
guns on them as well when they proved to be as colonial as the Spanish. The
Americans wanted to take over the Philippines for a variety of reasons. Part of it
was ideological — Manifest Destiny — for Anglo-Saxons to help civilize others;
and, part of it was hard politics, because the Philippines was adjacent to
countries that contained 850 million people. The Americans found the Filipinos
to be very tough fighters. In order to make it easier to attack the Filipinos, a
process of race-making took place. As the nationalists started using guerilla
warfare, the Americans proclaimed them to be of a lower civilization, that
higher-level civilizations do not adopt such tactics. This dehumanization
allowed the United States to use increasingly harsh measures in its fighting. It
has been estimated that one in seven Filipinos died by the time major fighting
stopped in 1902 (Kramer, 2006: 84-158).

The American objective in controlling the Philippines was to create an area
that would be favourable to American interests. However, they were facing a
very virulent form of nationalism that required more than American military
power. For the Americans to gain their objective, they required a strategy on
two dimensions: cultural and political. By the time the Americans left in 1946, it
seems they had succeeded in weeding out the nationalist sentiments. The
leadership of the newly-independent country was indeed quite pro-American.
Each of the dimensions will be looked at in turn (Quibuyen, 2008: 312-313).

First, the American’s tried to win over Filipino hearts and minds on a
cultural dimension, some might say they needed to fabricate a culture that
would be hegemonic. In order to do this, the United States put forward the idea
they were there to help the Philippines develop by providing the Filipinos the
skills they would need to be successful. Then, when the Filipinos were ready,
the Americans would leave. The United States did this in part by invoking the
spirit of Rizal, who was greatly revered in the Philippines after his death. The
Americans argued that Rizal had looked neither for independence nor advocated
armed rebellion. He was looking for economic and other improvements by
working within the system. The Americans added he was opposed to
Aguinaldo’s militarm because ultimately this was not good for the Philippines.
Additionally, the Americans claimed they recognized that the Spaniards had
behaved unjustly, but the Americans were not going to do the same thing. In
sum, the Americans made the argument they were doing everything within the
spirit of what Rizal, the country’s greatest genius, was trying to do (Quibuyen,

They buttressed this with a political dimension by the co-optation of so-
called nationalists and supposed nationalist parties. The pro-independence
Nacionalista Party and its leadership, Manuel Quezon, Sergio Osmena and
Manuel Roxas were the target of the United States. They were willing to work
on American terms for Philippine independence. Thus, they would end up being
beneficiaries of American largesse. It has been argued that the beginning of the
fading-away of the old-style nationalism began with the founding of the
Nacionalista Party in 1907. This was the time that Osmena became the speaker
of the colonial power’s Philippine Assembly and Quezon became the resident
commissioner to the United States. Indeed, Quezon would become the president
of the Philippine Commonwealth nearly four decades later. Upon assumption,
he would thank the Americans for all their assistance. Roxas would become the
first president of an independent Philippines in 1946. Although he and his
friends bolted from the Nacionalista Party just before the inaugural elections to
form the Liberal Party, his pro-American views did not change after assuming
office. Over the course of nearly a half-century, the Americans had successfully
weaned the Filipinos off of the Spanish and got them moving in a more pro-
American direction (Quibuyen, 2008: 312-323).
The United States, on the surface, really did look like it was trying to create a Philippines that could govern itself. Over the course of American rule on the islands, nearly the entire colonial bureaucracy became Philippinized. Numerous political and economic agreements were made, including a free-trade agreement and the ability of Filipino labour to enter the United States freely. There was a dramatic shock to this system in the 1930’s with the Great Depression. In 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed. This would grant the Commonwealth of the Philippines full independence in 1946. It also called for the drafting of a constitution. The foreign policy, tariffs, and money would remain under the control of the United States for a ten-year provisional period. Additionally, tariffs on Philippine exports to the United States would be raised from 5% in 1941 to 25% in 1946. Other changes to the economic relationship would follow after independence (Kramer, 2006: 347-431).

Before proceeding, a few words on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II are necessary. On March 11, 1942, General MacArthur was forced to flee the Philippines. That same year, Quezon set up a government in exile in Washington. He died before the Philippines were liberated in 1945. His vice-president, Osmena, became the new leader (who would eventually lose the election to Roxas). As noted, on July 4, 1946, the Philippines became the first colony in Asia to be freed of Western rule (“Japanese Occupation of the Philippines,” 2013).

4.3 Stage 3 – Modernization

The Philippines became a functioning democracy for a quarter of a century after independence. Two political parties, the Nacionalistas and the Liberals, dominated with six different presidents being elected. None of the presidents were ever reelected. Large scale defections from one party to the other took place from time-to-time, it was even deemed respectable in some situations. Hence, this was democracy on a Filipino model (SarDesai, 2010: 190).

A small oligarchy dominated the two major parties, made up largely of the landholding class. As was the case over the previous 150-200 years, a small group of people held positions of power. The model of modernization they chose for the Philippines should not be surprising given the history of collaboration and being loyal to small groups. They chose to create an enclave economy where a small elite and comprador class benefit. In the words of one scholar: “ … this group controlled appointments, distributed the spoils of office among relatives and friends, and exploited the unlimited opportunities for corruption and self-gratification through control of licenses, leases, and foreign exchange permits” (SarDesai, 2010: 190). Given this situation, it is not reasonable to expect a sense of legitimacy to grow among the general population towards the government. Indeed, the Philippines has been a state, but not a place that generates strong feelings of nation. This situation has continued more or less with every government (with one notable exception), democratic or autocratic, since independence.

As noted, Roxas was elected the first president of an independent Philippines. The Americans were very supportive of his candidacy because of his strong anti-communist credentials. The United States gave the Philippines more than a half billion dollars for war rehabilitation. Most of it went to rehabilitating the pocketbooks of the ruling oligarchy. In exchange for the aid, Americans were given a chance to do business at parity with locals in the Philippines. Nominal, both Roxas and his successor, Elpidio Quirino, offered land reform and other items to help the poor. In 1950, the United States gave an additional US$ 250 billion in aid. Almost none of the benefits made it to the average Filipino. Instead, the land reform, tax reform, minimum wage laws, and
aid were exploited by the backers of the government; namely big landlords, and American and Filipino entrepreneurs (SarDesai, 2010: 191-192).

Opposition from Hukbalahap guerillas, a communist insurgency, increased greatly throughout this time. Ramon Magsaysay, as the new defence minister, was given the task of dealing with them. He was successful and because of this was elected president in 1953. He was the only leader who had some success in more evenly redistributing the wealth. He established the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) in 1954, with the function to resettle dissidents and landless farmers. It was actually a very effective tool at getting communist guerillas to lay down their weapons. In fact, only a few hardcore remnants were left of the Huks by the mid-1950’s. In 1954, under his rule, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Land Reform Act, and Creation of Agricultural Credit Cooperative Financing Administration were passed. In 1957, he died in a plane crash. Two million people attended the populist’s funeral. His successors, Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal did not continue his legacy and went back to the old corrupt ways. Magsaysay was probably the country’s best hope to move off of the enclave path of modernization. After his death, the communist and Islamic insurgencies quickly gained strength ("Ramon Magsaysay," 2013).

In 1965, business as usual continued with the election of Ferdinand Marcos. In the early 1970’s, he was worried he was going to lose the next election to Senator Benigno Aquino. So, on September 23, 1972, Marcos proclaimed martial law. This was the first time the military was consulted about political actions that were taken. Marcos succeeded in antagonizing the press, labour, the church, and various insurgent groups around the country. The economy was ruined during his reign. There was massive corruption, and wasteful spending on hotels, monuments, and palaces. Government funds were siphoned off into private bank accounts of the Marcos family. The budget deficit went from 16.4 million pesos in 1965 to 7.946 billion pesos in 1985. Inflation and devaluation of the currency were the outcomes, as might be expected. On August 21, 1983, Marcos had Aquino assassinated. This brought enough international pressure on him that he was forced to hold an election in February 1986. He claimed victory over Corazon Aquino, Benigno’s widow, but it was very obvious the election was rigged. As the insurgencies became stronger, the United States became alarmed. It eventually offered Marcos, his family, and some of his closest cronies an opportunity to live in exile in the US. The offer was eventually accepted, and Corazon Aquino became the new president in February 1986. She was a member of the oligarchy, and although some political reforms passed while she was in power, there was virtually no change in the economy in terms of the corruption and other negative items. The situation might have gotten a little worse for the average Filipino after she left, but it is not dramatically different (SarDesai, 2010: 193-206).

In sum, the Philippines has remained an enclave economy where only the rich and the compradors benefit for the most part. This is probably the biggest reason why the Philippine government has so little legitimacy among its own people. In democracies, there is usually much more legitimacy as the failed state index shows (FIP, 2008). Until this situation changes, it is likely that the Philippines will remain more state than nation.

5 India

5.1 Stage 1 – Ideological

India has the distinction of being the world’s largest democracy. The people who live there now are the descendants of those who have been coming to the
subcontinent for tens of thousands of years. This study will describe the formation of nationalism beginning from the eighteenth century, when the East India Company (EIC) first arrived from Britain. Like the Philippines, there was no sense of nationalism in India. In fact, the land of India had big states, but also many smaller princely states. It was to these local states where the loyalty of people lay. The masses, for the most part, did not care who ruled over them as one ruler was seen as much like another (Wolpert, 2009: 3-12; and, Panikkar, 2007: 1-18).

When the British first arrived the elites thought it was a commercial endeavour they were dealing with. They did not recognize the territorial ambitions that underlay the EIC. Additionally, their military technology could not compete with the English. By the time the local leaders figured out the threat they were facing, it was too late. They could not adjust in time to effectively deal with it (Pannikar, 2007: 1-18).

The British, like the Spanish and Americans in the Philippines, thought they were on a mission to civilize India. As with the Philippines, a class emerged in India that gained from the benefits of doing business with the British. They would dress like the British, read the same great works, and aspire to attend the best British universities. As was the case with the Philippines, it would be this class that would eventually learn about nationalism and lead India to freedom.

The first War of Independence, in 1857, took place among members of the EIC army, which was manned by Indian soldiers. The soldiers in these armies had normally stayed in their local areas. However, as the EIC expanded its business, the troops faced the increasing possibility of being stationed in other parts of India or even outside the country altogether. Unlike British nationals, the Indians in the EIC would not get extra pay while having to live away from their families for extended periods. Additionally, the EIC had started using a new kind of cartridge which required the soldiers to bite it before loading. There seemed to be something greasy on the part the soldiers had to bite into. The Hindu soldiers were worried that it was beef tallow. The Muslim soldiers were worried it was pork lard. Additionally, the justice system within the army favoured the British soldier over the Indian in terms of appeals and punishment. These conditions led to a revolt by the Indian soldiers. The British called it the Indian Mutiny and the regular British army was sent in to put the rebellion down in 1857. The following year, the EIC was disbanded (“Indian Rebellion of 1857,” 2013). This was the beginning of national consciousness for many Indians and also the start of the othering of the British.

Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, national consciousness started to develop among the Indian elite. In 1909, Mahatma Gandhi wrote Hind Swaraj in which he criticized the negative aspects of capitalism. He felt that it made money into a God, and that competition led to severe hardships among segments of the population. Gandhi was trying to understand why Indians would want to follow such a system, and why they had lost to the British in war. He eventually came to the conclusion that it was the Indian culture that was holding them back. He felt the Indian culture had many valuable attributes, greatly superior of capitalism; namely the moral and spiritual traditions of India. However, Indians had been seduced by a little silver and the promise of modern civilization; this would have to change, otherwise they would always remain a subject nation. Hence, national consciousness had now passed all the way to the elites. Not only were the British being othered, the traditional Indian culture was thought to be superior in many ways to the British culture that subjugated morality and politics to economics (Chatterjee, 1986: 85-93).

However, others in the Indian elite recognized that India would have no choice but to take on some of the trappings of capitalism and modern civilization if it wanted to remain a competitive nation on the world stage. Nehru, the principal political architect of the new India, felt that nationalism...
needed to be given more economic and social content, to get beyond cultural differences. In fact, social justice could not be found for all in the old because it is antiquated and incapable of dynamism. However, if Nehru ever said something like that directly, he would have lost a great deal of support. So, he had to try to show that traditional India had many things in common with the West. The British could help them learn a few more things and leave afterward. In *Discovery of India*, written while imprisoned by the British, Nehru argues that the outlook of ancient Greece was more similar to ancient India than to modern Europe: “They all had the same broad, tolerant, pagan outlook, joy in life and in the surprising beauty and infinite variety of nature, love of art, and the wisdom that comes from the accumulated experiences of an old race” (Nehru, 1946: 143). Later on, he adds: “When the British came to India, though technologically somewhat backward, she was still among the advanced commercial nations of the world. Technical changes would undoubtedly have come and changed India as they had changed some Western countries” (Nehru, 1946: 518). This had to be balanced by making the British the *other*, and giving them a reason to leave. He said the British had halted India’s development: “Industrial growth was checked, and as a consequence social growth was also arrested. The normal power relationships could not adjust themselves and find an equilibrium, as all power was concentrated in the alien authority, which based itself on force and encouraged groups and classes which had ceased to have any real significance” (Nehru, 1946: 518). Thus, national consciousness had reached Nehru and, through his works and Gandhi’s, more and more Indians.

5.2 Stage 2 – Political competition

In terms of political competition before independence, Nehru had to deal with Mohammed Ali Jinnah (who would eventually found Pakistan) and the British. Both Nehru and Jinnah had belonged to the Indian National Congress (INC) party at one time. Jinnah had been trying to gain a greater role for himself and the Muslims of India in the INC. With the birth of Indian national consciousness, Muslim consciousness also awakened. The Muslim League (ML) was created in 1906. Jinnah wanted to work with the INC and Nehru. Initially, the two parties had signed the Lucknow Pact, which promised a certain percentage of seats should go to Muslims in different regions. Then, in 1937, Jinnah asked for coalition governments and ministries for the ML. Jinnah though that was the only way to have real power. Otherwise, the ML would be little more than a pressure group. Nehru thought Jinnah was asking for too much because Hindus constituted a far greater proportion of the population; so, he could not agree to this. This was the beginning of the end of INC-ML unity (Wolpert, 2009: 288-345).

Both Nehru and Jinnah were trying to curry favour with the British. When World War I broke out, India found itself automatically at war thanks to the British declaration. Nehru and Jinnah fully supported the British, hoping India would get its independence whenever the war ended. After the war ended in 1918, the Indians were bitterly disappointed when the British would not let them go free. This would profoundly affect the course of events during the next war. When World War II broke out, the INC refused to give support to the British. In fact, they held protests against the war. By contrast the Muslim League verbally supported the war. There were also Muslim soldiers in the Indian Army, at home and abroad, and this strengthened Jinnah’s hand with the British. By the end of the war, Jinnah did not just want to have some ministries; he wanted to have his own country. The British would give him one in 1947. It could be argued, on the one hand, that those that wanted a united India, like Nehru were the losers in the decision to create Pakistan. On the other hand, the British
finally did give their blessing to an independent India, which came into being on August 15, 1947. In the smaller India, however, it might have been easier to implement the kind of platform that Nehru wanted (Wolpert, 2009: 298-369).

It was during Nehru’s rule from 1947 to 1964 that the major features still associated with the country took root. His time was viewed as the crucible of modern India. It was in this era that a stable democracy took hold. And, it was during this time that a statist model for economic development would emerge hegemonic (Kohli, 2004: 259).

Nehru’s rhetoric for political consumption was that of a socialist, but he had started working with businesses even before independence. At independence, India was very much an agrarian society. Large private industry only made up seven or eight percent of GDP. The INC was trying to gain broad-based legitimacy, so it was prepared to work with the vast majority of groups in India, including businesses (Markovits, 1985). Not only did the INC bring together a variety of elites, it also started numerous links between the elites and the masses (Kothari, 1970). Perhaps, Nehru had learned his lesson from Jinnah. He was trying to make as broad a coalition as possible so that other political parties would have difficulty competing with him.

Upon taking power, Nehru had difficult decisions to make. The INC could be a popular ruling party or it could facilitate socialist development. If the INC wanted to build political support, it could cultivate relationships with the highest, landowning elites. Because of the nature of Indian culture, they would have sway over the peasants who stayed on their land. This was a quick way to build support, and this is what the INC did. The party obtained long chains of patronage that extended throughout the country. In this way, it ensured support for a few decades. But, it had to give up its ambitions of land redistribution and heavily taxing the agrarian sector. In fact, this mirrored the relationship that the colonial government had with property-owning elites and afforded the British good relations with businesses. Nehru did not have the exact same groups as the British, but the pattern of linkages between the rulers and the ruled was very similar. As might be expected, the party was eventually taken over by society’s elite (Kohli, 2004: 261-262).

In being both nationalists and socialists, the INC had a problem with mobilizing private capital. In relying on various elites regionally and rurally, the state fragmented its power. It also made it impossible for the INC to keep its promise of egalitarian development to the poor. Nehru and the INC might have meant well, but they were no revolutionaries. Barrington Moore put it most aptly when he described Nehru as the gentle betrayer of the masses (Moore, 1966).

5.3 Stage 3 – Modernization

The strategy adopted by the INC, and one that was followed by successive Indian governments, was to put protectionist policies in place for a period and liberalize as the economy merits. Economically, Nehru’s achievements were not noteworthy, though some industrialization did occur, and this allowed a small group of entrepreneurs to move the country forward (presumably the forerunners of those that would lead India to great economic growth by the 21st century). There was also a significant amount of technically trained manpower. Conversely, the agrarian economy had not increased noticeably. By neglecting to invest in better irrigation and higher use of other agricultural inputs, there was little prospect of rapid increases in food production to feed a rapidly growing population. Internal demand for commercial goods was still quite small. Savings had not grown much and were still low. The health and educational conditions of the working population were poor quality. The government spent little money on these items. Although the government nominally had a progressive income
tax in place, its ability to collect was limited (again, favouring the rich). Hence, the government’s main source of income was indirect taxes. Thus, basically, any growth that was taking place in the economy was inefficient (Kohli, 2004: 265-266).

There were notable social achievements under Nehru. In 1955, the Untouchability (Offenses) Act was passed. This was designed to stop discrimination against untouchables, and even provided for university and civil service quotas. The same year, the Hindu Marriage Act gave Hindu women the right of divorce and raised the age for marriage. In 1956, the Hindu Succession Act gave female children the same claims to inherit property as males. In 1956 and 1957, 40 percent of the 92 million women with the right to vote did so (Wolpert, 2009: 386-387). Undoubtedly, these measures played a large role in getting the INC re-elected, and giving Nehru the opportunity to forward its platform.

The INC also did not always serve its business allies well. The socialist side of Nehru’s government enacted numerous regulations to control business. The state itemized what private businesses could not do, and raised barriers to enforce its will. Over the course of time, this led to corruption and an inefficient allocation of private sector resources. Overall, there were some advances in what business was able to accomplish, but the INC policies seemed to contain great folly. Average annual percentage growth in GDP per capita between 1950 and 2000 was 2.3 percent (Kohli, 2004: 267, 24). In trying to build such a large coalition, the government was not able to implement its own plans and held back the development of the country. However, these limited attempts at socialism and the social achievements under Nehru did endear him to the population. It left the vast majority of people feeling a conscious identity and sense of belonging to India. Additionally, although Nehru had socialist policies, he also had protectionist ones. Eventually, in the 21st century, Indian companies would successfully compete with the rest of the world.

After Nehru’s death, his policies took a slight turn to the left. First, he was succeeded by Lal Bahadur Shastri for a very short period (he died in Tashkent while negotiating the end of the 1965 War with President Ayub Khan of Pakistan). Then, Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, took over from 1966 to 1977, and then one more time from 1980 to 1984 (when she was assassinated). She recognized that the poor had become much poorer because of INC policies. In a shrewd move, she made “poverty alleviation” a central component of her platform. Those that opposed this were labelled enemies of the poor. As might be predicted, she became a hero of the downtrodden. She also dismissed politicians in her party and bureaucrats that she deemed troublesome. Like her father, she was doing whatever she thought was necessary to maintain power. There are two possible interpretations of Gandhi’s rule. One is she maintained strong Indian nationalism, and tried to help out businesses with protectionism and the poor with her socialism. The other is that she missed economic opportunities to push India’s economy forward. Other countries like South Korea and Brazil were growing dramatically at this time (Kohli, 2004: 270-277).

After Gandhi’s assassination, Nehru’s vision of letting Indian companies develop through the judicious application of protectionism and then compete on the global stage came to fruition. The Hindu-nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) was not particularly impressed with the economic growth that had taken place under Nehru or Gandhi. When they came to power in the late 1990’s, they adopted a more pro-business attitude that led to the creation of industrial parks, software parks, and a communications infrastructure. The result has been spectacular economic growth in the 21st century. These decisions have paid off handsomely, both in economic terms and in terms of leaving people with good feelings about the country they belong to (Kohli, 2004: 277-288).
6 Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to determine how the way nationalism unfolds in a country can influence the feelings of legitimacy that citizens might have toward their governments. From the cases of the Philippines and India, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the method that a state chooses in modernizing can dramatically affect people’s sense of belonging and legitimacy. Second, concomitant with this is the idea that the method chosen for modernization can be influenced by the colonial power that left. Finally, if there is strong leadership with a vision on what is necessary to make the state successful, then the colonial power might not matter. Each point will be discussed in turn.

The method of modernization can shape a citizen’s sense of belonging to a country, and thereby feelings about government legitimacy. If the country modernizes through an enclave economy where a small ruling elite and comprador class benefit, then government legitimacy is seen to dramatically decrease. This was the case in the Philippines, where a small oligarchy gains all the benefits of being connected to the rest of the world through trade. Most of the people have to struggle very hard just to make enough money to eat every day. The masses feel left out and unfairly treated. If the situation gets bad enough, they will join extremist groups to fight the government.

It seems one of the best ways to modernize is to protect your nascent industries until they are strong enough to compete globally. At that point, liberalization becomes possible. That is the path followed by India. However, the reason why nationalism is as strong as it is in India goes beyond protectionism. In the initial stage of independence, most countries are quite poor. India was no exception. The government went out of its way with socialist policies to help the poor. Although this probably did hurt growth for a period, it was the best way to keep the social peace until the state’s industries were strong enough to compete internationally.

Second, the colonial power that leaves also influences how nationalism plays out. In the case of the Philippines, the country might have gotten their independence from Spain. Rizal seemed like he was on the verge of leading his people to freedom when the Spaniards lost the Spanish War to the Americans. In turn, the Philippines was given as a prize to the Americans as one of the spoils of victory. Both the Spanish and the Americans were prepared to work with a small group to control the islands. When the Americans left, it seems they could have done much more to help with the development of the Philippines. Instead, they forced the Philippines to accept extremely unfair trade agreements designed to help businesses from the USA. This might still have been mitigated to a degree if the reparations they paid had been distributed more evenly to the people. Instead, the US did not follow up to see how its funds were being utilized. Only a privileged group benefitted, and this, in turn, became one of the factors that lowered the legitimacy of the rulers.

Perhaps, the best way to describe what happened in India was that there was little grace in the giving by the British. True, they could have left after World War I. But, they did leave after World War II. They were thankful to the people who did not go out of their way to oppose them, so Jinnah got his Pakistan. Additionally, many Indians were in the army helping the British fight the Axis Powers. Perhaps, this was one of the reasons why the British did not try to impose unfair trade conditions on either the Indians or Pakistanis as the Raj ended. This might or might not have stopped a small ruling elite and comprador class from gaining control. It was much better than what the Americans did.

Finally, strong leadership can make all the difference in creating a sense of belonging among the masses of a country. Perhaps, Gramsci (Worth, 2005) might be useful to further understanding in this regard. He spoke about a passive
revolution being in place when neither the Bourgeoisie nor Proletariat are strong enough to impose themselves on the other side. He said that in Asiatic states quite often the passive revolution can become altered based on the strategies of the leaders. According to Gramsci, this transformation takes one of two forms. A strong leader can take over. This is called Caesarism. This can be either good or bad. If the leader is thinking about doing good things for his country, he can be positive economic influence, like Park Chung Hee in South Korea. The opposite is the strongman who is only out for the benefit of himself, family and friends. Unfortunately for the Philippines, this is the kind of leader that Fernando Marcos turned out to be. His rule increased the illegitimacy of Filipino governments. The insurgencies started acting up and the Americans had to put a lot of pressure on him to leave. Someone like Magsaysay might have been the exact opposite. He worked within the Philippine’s democratic structure and had ideas about what was good for the country. He is the type of person that seems willing to use any means necessary to do what is best and be successful. Although he was not a classic case of Gramsci’s Caesarism, he did good for his country.

Gramsci also spoke about passive revolutions ending due to transformismo (Worth, 2005: 28-30). This is where one group tries to make as big a coalition as it can to increase its chances of gaining power or influence. Nehru is a classic example of this type of leader. He worked with the rich and the poor to get his country moving in the right direction. Although it took India a very long time to get to economic take-off, it seems to be there now. The governments have kept their legitimacy along the way for the most part, and Indians seem quite proud to be Indians.

In conclusion, there is enough preliminary evidence that nationalism influences feelings of legitimacy. However, more research is necessary to see if the results of this study are generalizable. Once this is established, the findings might point to actions that can be taken to increase feelings of belonging and government legitimacy. They might even point to ways to make a more secure world, a very important objective indeed.

References


