MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS DECISIONS:

BANGLA DESH 1971

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the Bangla Desh Crisis by building upon previous works that have applied microeconomic theory to international relations. One of the most innovative lines of inquiry from the realist school is to study international relations through analogy with microeconomic theory. Although used to analyze conflict, war, and the workings of the international system, a strict application of microeconomic theory to interstate crises is rare. This thesis will endeavour to contribute to this linkage.
RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude examinera la Crise du Bar.gla Desh en utilisant d'autres travaux qui ont employé la théorie de la microéconomie pour analyser les relations internationales. Une des méthodes de l'approche réaliste pour étudier les relations internationales est de faire des analogies en employant la théorie de la microéconomie. Bien que cette théorie a été utilisée pour comprendre des conflits, des guerres, et le système politique international, elle était rarement employée pour faire l'analyse de crises inter-états. Cette thèse essaiera d'appliquer cette méthode pour étudier ce sujet.
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This thesis bears the indelible imprint of each person listed above. Needless to say, I accept full responsibility for any omissions or errors in fact or interpretation still extant.
I would like to dedicate this thesis to Adult Children of Dysfunctional Families. I make this dedication to Adult Children because I am one of them. To other Adult Children, I would like to share the following brief words from Arthur Schopenhauer: “To overcome difficulties is to experience the full delight of existence.”
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PART 1: MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS DECISIONS
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This study is designed to assess the utility of microeconomic theory in the analysis of foreign policy decisions made in crisis situations. Five specific decisions are examined:

1) attempt to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution to a crisis;
2) attempt to secure U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis;
3) attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from major powers;
4) mobilization of military forces; and
5) deciding the point at which to start taking steps to defuse a crisis.

In a larger sense, this thesis attempts to test the efficacy of microeconomic theory in the analysis of international relations.

The scholar who borrows from another discipline can utilize several elements that might prove beneficial. One is data. "Nisolar as any element from economics has permeated political science, probably the most influential has been economic data. G.N.P. and G.N.P. per capita have been useful, albeit very crude, measures of national power and well-being. Another is concepts. Of the economic concepts that have been used by political scientists, utility theory and game theory have had the greatest impact. Third is the methodology of other disciplines. Systems analysis has been a major source of economic input to political science. Thus, the understanding of several facets of political science have been broadened by economics.

Certain economic precepts will be employed in this thesis. The tenets of microeconomic theory will be applied to foreign policy crisis decisions. It should be stated at the outset that this thesis does not concern "political economy." In the area of political economy, such matters as the interrelationship between political and economic development, the economic roots of imperialism, tariff and trade policy are discussed. This study is concerned with the application of microeconomic theory to international relations in order to understand the formulation of specific decisions in crisis situations.

The starting point is the thesis that there are similarities between economic markets and international political systems. Reasoning by analogy is useful where it is possible to move from a domain for which theory is well developed, such as economic markets, to one where it is not, such as international political systems. Such reasoning is only permissible if the domains are
structurally similar. Economic markets and international political systems do possess certain similarities. The market, in a decentralized economy, is created by the actions of persons and firms whose aims are to maximize their own internally-defined interests by whatever means at their disposal. From this coaction emerges a structure (the market) which constrains and affects all of them. International political systems are similarly formed through the coaction of autonomous political units. In the contemporary era, the primary political unit is the nation-state. International political systems constrain the actions of the states within them just as the market constrains the actions of individual firms.

At the micro level, there also are similarities between firms in the economic market and nation-states in the international system. Firms compete with each other. They interpenetrate, merge, and purchase one another. Firms are affected by actions of “nonfirm” actors. Nation-states, too, interpenetrate, merge, and purchase one another. They also compete in the international system and sometimes are affected by “non-state” actors (such as multinational corporations). It is the interaction of nation-states that forms the structure of the international political system.

Although the backgrounds, political systems, cultures, etc. of states differ, states perform, or try to perform, similar tasks. From the largest to the smallest, nearly all states are involved in matters of education, culture and the arts, economic regulation, etc. There are agencies in each state to make, execute, and interpret laws. Each state has some means to defend itself. Thus, the functions that states perform are similar. In microeconomic terms, states are like firms that make up an industry. An industry is constituted when a group of firms produce a well-defined product or a closely related set of products. Although the backgrounds and decision-making processes of firms may differ within an industry, each firm is similar in the kind of commodity it produces.

An important differentiating factor among states at the international level is capability. At the domestic political level, there is an ordered hierarchy. Institutions and agencies are the units of the domestic system. These units stand in relations of super- and sub-ordination with one another. Some are given the authority to command while others must obey. In hierarchical political systems, units are differentiated both functionally and by relative capability. The international system, by contrast, is decentralized and anarchic. Formal super- and sub-ordinate relations have not developed. The units of the international system, nation-states, differ not in the kinds of functions they perform but in how well they perform those functions. Thus, relative capability plays a major role in differentiating one state from another. The parallel to
microeconomic theory is again present. Firms within an industry are differentiated not by the kinds of functions they perform but by their capability in performing those functions.10

Nation-states in the international political system are like firms in an oligopolistic industry.11 As in an oligopoly, a few nations control most of the system's capability. The microeconomic theory for industries that are oligopolies (to be discussed later), therefore, will be used in the analysis of the specific decisions under consideration.

An oligopoly12 is characterized by two features. First, firms have the freedom of entry into and exit from the market-place, except where there are strict legal prohibitions. When economists speak of an industry's market, they do not mean one global market. Typically, an industry sells many different products in many different markets. Second, firms have some control over the price of the products they sell. This is because of the phenomenon of product differentiation. That is, a firm in an oligopoly sells a product, or a group of products, that is significantly differentiated from those of its competitors so that the ability of the consumer to substitute is curtailed to some extent. For example, one firm's soap might be like another firm's soap but differences in chemical composition, smell, softness, etc. can be of great importance to the customer.13 Thus, aside from capability, firms also are differentiated by: varying levels of ability to erect barriers to stop other firms from entering their markets; the various types of products they sell, and how competitive their products are in the market-place.

Microeconomic theory about firms in an oligopoly can be related to nation-states involved in foreign policy cases in the following way. As firms have relatively free entry into and exit from their arena of competition (the market), nations can enter freely into competition with other nations. Each state can decide for itself whether or not to use force. Each state can threaten war. As in an oligopoly, where there is product differentiation, no two nations are exactly alike in what they have to offer—welfare systems, health-care, judicial systems, police, military forces, etc.14 Some firms have a degree of control over the price of a product because of a competitive advantage (due to product differentiation) over the product of other firms. In the context of a crisis, nations with greater capability can have some control over the manner in which a crisis terminates (the "price" of settlement). The weaker nation is not able to create a product which can compete with the stronger nation's product.15 Thus, aside from capability, states also are differentiated by: varying ability to create obstacles to military intervention by other members of the system; different kinds of services and amenities available to their citizens; and in the context of a crisis, their relative capability to resolve a dispute.
This study will focus on capability as the exclusive differentiating factor among states. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project's definition of capability, for reasons to be discussed later, will be used in this work. The ICB Project defines capability as the total potential power available to a country from six types of resources: human (size of population); geographic (territorial size); economic (most notably, GNP); diplomatic (alliance relationships with major powers); military (military expenditure); and nuclear capability. Capability, defined in this manner, reflects other factors which differentiate states. Measured in this way, capability indicates the ability of a state to create obstacles to military intervention by other members of the system. The GNP component of capability, as will be indicated later, reflects the different kinds of services and amenities available to the citizens of a state. In the context of relative capability, the likelihood of a successful outcome in a crisis with another nation can be ascertained.

This study seeks to answer the following question: If decisions have an effect on the outbreak of war, will a state's relative capability influence its decisions? There are four key concepts in this study. These are 1) foreign policy crisis; 2) capability; 3) crisis decisions; and 4) international war. These concepts will be discussed in Chapter 3.

This chapter has introduced the utility of borrowing theoretical concepts from microeconomic theory in the study of political science. Chapter 2 provides a survey of the relevant conceptual and empirical literature. The first part of Chapter 2 outlines various paradigms that have been used to study international relations. Then the superiority of one of these paradigms—realism—in the study of crises and wars is advanced. Attempts at theory-building arising from the realist paradigm are presented. Works which have applied microeconomic theory to international politics also are discussed. This chapter concludes with a brief survey of the literature on the Bangla Desh Crisis.

The research design is presented in Chapter 3. In the first part, each of the key concepts are defined and elaborated. Then, a model to delineate the relationship between the key concepts is presented. This is followed by a discussion of decision-making rules used by firms in an oligopoly. These rules are then related to specific foreign policy crisis decisions of states in order to derive a set of testable hypotheses. The final part of the chapter discusses the methodology used to test the hypotheses.

The second part of this study tests and evaluates the hypotheses (developed in Chapter 3) by conducting a comparative study of Pakistan and India during the Bangla Desh Crisis of 1971. The Bangla Desh Crisis has been chosen for study because it was one of the most severe and
important crises in the Third World in the modern era in terms of changes brought about to the international political system and the South Asian subsystem. The South Asian subsystem was radically altered. Before the Bangla Desh Crisis, Pakistan, while not considered India's equal, was seen as a reasonably effective counter to Indian power in the region. At the conclusion of the Bangla Desh Crisis, India was the superpower of South Asia. Pakistan was dismembered; and a new actor, Bangla Desh, entered the global system. The political contours of contemporary South Asia were set at the conclusion of the Bangla Desh Crisis.

Pakistani and Indian behavior during the Bangla Desh Crisis is examined in Chapter 4. This chapter begins by setting the international context of the crisis and delineating which of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are to be tested for Pakistan and which are to be tested for India. Then, a detailed narrative of events—the decision flow (this social science tool is discussed further in Chapter 3)—is presented for the Bangla Desh Crisis. The primary purpose of the decision flow is to uncover the data about Pakistani and Indian behavior in order to test the hypotheses that were developed in the previous chapter.

In Chapter 5, evidence from the decision flow is used to evaluate the validity of each of the hypotheses being tested. Supporting evidence, if any, is presented. If the decision flow does not provide evidence in support of a hypothesis, then an attempt is made to discover the reason. Thus, this chapter evaluates the application of microeconomic theory to specific decisions made by India and Pakistan during the Bangla Desh Crisis on a hypothesis-by-hypothesis basis.

The concluding chapter summarizes the overall findings on the application of microeconomic theory to the study of specific decisions made during the Bangla Desh Crisis. A preliminary evaluation of microeconomic theory in the study of foreign policy crisis decisions is rendered. Finally, further ramifications of the findings for the study of crisis, foreign policy, and the use of microeconomic theory in the analysis of international relations are explored.
CHAPTER 2: SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

At present, there is a variety of contending paradigms in the analysis of international relations. A paradigm is defined here as a set of assumptions concerning the nature of the state, of political behavior, and of relations among nations which inform a philosophical disposition toward the world. Four of the most important and influential paradigms are: 1) realism; 2) liberalism; 3) Marxism; and 4) international regimes. This study falls within the realist school. The rationale for selecting the realist paradigm will be discussed later in this chapter. At this point, a brief outline of each paradigm will be presented.

The realist paradigm can be traced back over 2,000 years to Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*. In this classic work, the three most fundamental assumptions of the realist school are evident. First is state-centrism; the premise that territorially-organized entities (city-states 2400 years ago or nation-states in the contemporary era) are the most important actors in international politics. Second is a power assumption, with two corollaries: i) states seek power (which includes the capability to influence other states and the resources to exercise power); and ii) states calculate their interests in terms of power. Third, there is a rationality assumption: states are viewed as unitary, rational actors which carefully calculate the costs of alternative courses of action and seek to maximize their interests; but they do so under conditions of uncertainty and partial information. Thucydides held that the growth in Athens' power raised an alarm in Sparta. This made war between Athens and Sparta inevitable. Thus, for Thucydides, power realities are fundamental in the explanation of state behavior.

David Truman's *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* provides an excellent discussion of the liberal paradigm. Truman is highly critical of the notion that the state is an autonomous actor driven by its own need for power. Governmental institutions, according to the liberal school, are confined to the role of processing inputs and outputs. Thus, the state is not viewed as an autonomous actor but, rather, as a set of formal structures. Truman also is critical of the notion of 'national interests.' The liberal paradigm postulates that government policies are not manifestations of an all-inclusive national interest. Rather, such policies are a reflection of the interests of groups which have power in society. The most active role of a government, according to Truman, is to maintain equity—that is, to allow all groups an equal opportunity to have an input—in the formulation of policy. Truman concedes that, theoretically, public policy can be corrupted by the influence of a particular private actor. He discounts such an occurrence because of the presence of cross-cutting cleavages and (what he calls) latent groups which adhere to certain basic values such as civil liberties.
Scholars in the Marxist tradition can be divided into two schools: instrumental and structural. The instrumental Marxist position is taken by Harold Laski in *The State in Theory and Practice*. Instrumental Marxism, like liberalism, does not view the state as an autonomous actor. Laski argues that the system of government is dominated by those who possess economic power at the time. Thus, instrumental Marxism does not recognize the concept of national interest. According to Laski, the interests of the government are synonymous with the economic interests of the classes dominating society. Thus, both liberals and instrumental Marxists view governmental institutions as passive recipients of societal pressure. For liberals, power might be exercised by any group of individuals. For instrumental Marxists, power lies in the dominant economic class.

Structural Marxism takes a slightly different approach, as evident in James O'Connor's *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*. The role of the state, in the structural Marxist paradigm, is to deal with political and economic contradictions that are inherent in a capitalist system. Economically, the capitalist system is not seen as tending towards equilibrium. Instead, long-term profit is expected to decline because, according to structural Marxism, profit can only be secured through the exploitation of labour, but the long-term equilibrium ratio of labour to capital is reduced due to technological innovation. This leads to economic concentration as weaker firms are driven out of the market. The continued increase in concentration produces political and social tensions. The state acts to mitigate these social and political pressures. Thus, according to structural Marxists, the state poses as a representative of all the people. If the state were to follow the explicit preferences of powerful capitalist forces, the stability of the whole system would be weakened. Compromises, such as higher social welfare payments, are necessary even if they are opposed by the dominant economic class. Structural Marxists argue that such policies are effective in dividing potential opposition from the oppressed class and act to protect the existing structure of economic relationships. In terms of international relations, O'Connor argues that the contradictions of capitalism lead to pressure for an aggressive foreign policy since external activity can offer opportunities for new investment, sales, and profit. According to O'Connor, the purpose of both direct military intervention and foreign assistance is to keep client states within the capitalist order. Thus, structural Marxists, like realists, argue that the state is relatively autonomous; but, ultimately, it is associated with the interests of a particular class.

The international regimes paradigm is explicated in Stephen Krasner's *International Regimes*. Krasner defines international regimes as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures in a given issue area around which actor expectations converge. Thus,
international regimes are conceptualized as intervening variables which stand between basic
causal factors on the one hand and behavior and outcomes on the other. This paradigm emerged
within the field of international political economy to analyze the formation and functioning of
regimes like Bretton Woods, the I.M.F., the World Bank, O.P.E.C., etc. The starting point of the
international regimes paradigm is that the realist school leaves too much unexplained. This
paradigm posits that there are many other actors besides states in the international system.
Furthermore, the motivations of states, even if they can be described as the pursuit of self-
interest, can often be complex. The underlying theme of the international regimes paradigm is
that the world has become increasingly interdependent (especially economically) and, thus,
international regimes can (through incentives and opportunities) profoundly influence state
policy.11

This completes the brief presentation of the four paradigms. Now the rationale for
selecting the realist paradigm as the basis of analysis in this study will be discussed. Put simply,
empirical studies indicate that state behavior during a crisis situation is better explained by the
realist paradigm than by any other (the evidence will be presented later in this chapter). What is
the case for realism?

Proponents of realism acknowledge that liberal and marxist paradigms are correct in
asserting that states are not unitary, purposive actors. Realists stress, however, that state
behavior varies more with differences in capability than with differences in governmental form or
domestic structure of property relations. Internal political pressures or ideological preferences
weigh less heavily than the pressures of a competitive world. Downplaying the role of domestic
politics, realists contend that it is the structural features of the international system which constrain
and powerfully influence state behavior.12 Scholars in the realist tradition recognize that the
assumptions of realism are not always consistent with actual circumstances. These assumptions
are viewed, however, as being useful in the construction of systemic theones and testable
hypotheses.13

Several empirical studies support the realist position. The evidence indicates that: 1)the
way a crisis is triggered for a state is strongly influenced by its relative capability, a systemic
characteristic; 2) state behavior during a crisis reciprocates, in large measure, its adversary's or
adversaries' behavior, suggesting that a state's behavior is strongly influenced by its environment;
and 3) war-initiating behavior is strongly influenced by a state's relative capability. In sum, empirical
studies indicate that foreign policy crisis decisions are not primarily a function of societal or group

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pressures but are shaped predominantly by two systemic characteristics: i) relative capability; and ii) a state's interaction with its adversary.

The I.C.B. Project, with aggregate data on 627 foreign policy crises (which occurred within 278 international crises) between 1929 and 1979, provides empirical evidence that a crisis trigger is a function of that state's relative capability. Triggers are classified into four broad categories: non-violent; internal challenge; non-violent military; and violent military. A power status ranking is assigned to each state: small power; middle power; great power, and superpower. A comparison of superpowers with non-superpowers is instructive. According to I.C.B. findings, 47.5% of the crises for superpowers are triggered by non-violent events compared to 34.5% for all other states. In those cases where violence sets off a crisis for a superpower, 58% are triggered by indirect violence (that is, acts aimed at an ally or a friendly state). This compares to 20% indirect violent military triggers for non-superpowers. These figures suggest that a state will consider the likely response before undertaking a foreign policy act which will initiate a crisis. Thus, it seems that a systemic factor—specifically, relative capability—strongly affects certain foreign policy decisions.

Two studies, one by Jeffrey Milstein, the other by Lewis Richardson, indicated that state behavior during a crisis or war reciprocates, to a large extent, the behavior of its adversary(ies). Milstein examines the impact of American and Soviet influence on the Arab-Israel conflict between 1948 and 1969. Through content analysis of newspapers, he counted the number of weeks that each side engaged in various types of hostile action: alert; declaration of emergency; troop movement; mobilization; attack on installations; attack on civilians; encounter between guerrilla forces; and encounter between government forces. Milstein then correlated the activities of individual Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) with Israel within each action-type using various time lags. High correlations were not evident for all pairs of states for all action-types. Guerrilla encounters and encounters between government forces, however, produced consistently high r's (of between .56 and .82) for the Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel pairings.

In Richardson's study, published in 1960, a histogram is constructed to show the relationship between dyads of nations on the one hand and the number of years of peace within those dyads on the other. This histogram is monotonically decreasing. There is a decrease in the frequency of retaliations as intervals of peace increase which, according to Richardson, suggest that a slow process of forgetting and forgiving is going on. That is, the longer peace exists between two enemies, the less likely it is that they will fight each other again. The inputs
and provocations from the environment can be very important in shaping the behavior of a state. Richardson's, and also Milstein's, study bring attention to the fact that a state's conduct often corresponds to the actions of its opponent(s).

Patrick James' study, Crisis and War, best illustrates how a state's relative capability affects its foreign policy behavior as the likelihood of war increases in a crisis situation. James tested expected utility theory. After expected utility theory was revised—to overcome conceptual problems with the theory as originally formulated—expected utility usually reflected relative capability. That is, those states with positive expected utility also held greater relative capability in the vast majority of instances; and those states with negative expected utility possessed lesser capability in almost all cases. James found that 55.7% of 132 international crises were initiated by countries with zero or negative expected utility. According to James, a state which challenges the status quo normally follows a very aggressive policy until its behavior is reciprocated by its opponent(s). At this point, the perception of the likelihood of war increases significantly for the challenger. In 94.1% of crises initiated by a state with zero or negative expected utility, there was no war. This result, according to James, is due to the fact that the challenger recognizes it is not likely to prevail in a war and, therefore, starts to act in a more conciliatory manner (behavior which is reciprocated by its opponent(s) in almost all cases). Thus, almost always, the situation reverts to the status quo ante. In those cases where war occurred: 71.4% of the wars were initiated by states with positive expected utility; and 21.5% were initiated by states with zero expected utility. Thus, 92.9% of wars were initiated by states with non-negative expected utility. It is not clear why a challenger undertakes an aggressive foreign policy at the start of the crisis, that is, whether it is due to domestic or systemic factors. In any event, James' research demonstrates that even if such a policy is due to domestic factors, at times, systemic factors can force a state not only to modify policy but also to reverse it.

James also tested the relationship between form of government, on the one hand, and initiation of crises and wars on the other. He found no relationship. Thus, he concluded that expected utility is far more important than the form of government in determining behavior during a crisis or war.

Realists also do not accept the arguments put forward by proponents of the international regimes paradigm. They recognize that international regimes, especially international economic regimes, can—and do—influence state policy. For realists, however, regimes are only one small step removed from underlying economic and power relationships. They argue that, if a state decides that it is in its national interests to go to war, membership in an international economic
regime would have only a minimal constraining effect on that state's policy. Furthermore, realists contend that, in the post-World War II period, security rested not in an international security regime but on the balance of power between the superpowers. Thus, regimes are viewed as being epiphenomenal.\textsuperscript{22}

The realist position is supported by two empirical studies, one by Bruce M. Russett, the other by Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher. Forty conflicts in the post-World War II period were examined in the Russett study. He sought to determine whether nations in the same trading group are more likely or less likely to fight with each other. Russett found that a state is more than twice as likely to fight other states within its own trading group than nations which belong to different groups or to none.\textsuperscript{23}

The Finlayson-Zacher study examined the record of the United Nations in resolving over 100 crises and wars between 1945 and 1977. According to them, there were U.N. resolutions calling for a halt to the threat or act of force in less than 20\% of the cases. Of these, success, which is defined as compliance by the parties soon after the U.N. directive was issued, was achieved in only about half of the cases.\textsuperscript{24} Even proponents of the international regimes paradigm acknowledge that, recent discussions of transnationalism notwithstanding, states are unquestionably the most powerful actors in the international system because they have a far greater ability to act than do international regimes.\textsuperscript{25}

The four paradigms discussed above have provided the foundation for numerous theories of international relations. Theories explain the relationship between laws. A law is a consistently observed regularity among variables: if 'x', then 'y', where 'x' stands for one or more independent variables and 'y' denotes the dependent variable. A hypothesis which is repeatedly tested and supported by evidence becomes a law.\textsuperscript{26} Since realism constitutes the central tradition in this study, only attempts at theory-building from this paradigm will be discussed. Two scholars in particular have profoundly influenced this study: Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. The contribution of each will be examined in turn.

The publication in 1948 of Morgenthau's \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace}\textsuperscript{27} marked the crystallization of the realist perspective in the study of international relations. Morgenthau sought to use realism to create what he called a 'science' of international politics. He was aware that political realism was at odds with the dominant American political tradition—liberalism—and, thus, would come under attack; when this happened its status as a science would make it easier to defend. In the postwar period, the brilliance of lead realists...
(including Morgenthau) and the exigencies of the Cold War allowed realism to achieve dominance in the study of international politics. Morgenthau, because of the role he played in transforming the mode of inquiry into international relations, has been referred to as the founding father of this field of study.28

In Politics Among Nations, the fundamental realist precepts of rationality, national interest, and power were used in an attempt to: 1) detect and understand the forces which determine international relations; and, after showing how these forces affect international relations, 2) making the findings applicable to the world of 1948 in order to ensure a peaceful future. Morgenthau implicitly employed the rationality assumption. He contended that a state's foreign policy depends on its circumstances and that nations do follow logical policies. Morgenthau went on to argue that international politics can be characterized as a struggle for power and is best understood by assuming that statesmen think and act in terms of national interest (which is defined as power). Thus, Morgenthau employed a state-centric assumption. For Morgenthau, power is based upon tangible as well as intangible assets. It is both a means to an end—insofar as a state uses power for the attainment of objectives—and an end in itself—insofar as a state is constantly trying to increase the amount of power at its disposal.

The struggle for power is influenced by balance of power politics, international law, international morality, and world public opinion. Morgenthau used historical cases to illustrate the manner in which these factors have affected international relations. Having thus outlined the major forces which affect international relations, Morgenthau then discussed various methods to bring about and maintain peace in the mid-twentieth century. His main suggestion was to use diplomacy to create an international society that would want to maintain peace. In retrospect, the main value of Politics Among Nations has been to delineate the general principles of international relations.

Waltz's Theory of International Politics represents a major progression in the development of theory from the realist paradigm. Waltz was primarily concerned with explaining the workings of the international system. Being dissatisfied with theories in political science, he employed a theoretical line of inquiry which analyzes international relations through analogy with microeconomic market theory. Using the concepts of state-centrism, national interests, and relative capability, Waltz explained recurrent patterns of behavior by states in the international system by drawing parallels with the behavior of firms in the market of decentralized economies.
Waltz's use of microeconomic theory led him to a state-centric approach. According to microeconomic theory, the market is defined by its constituent firms. In the same way, Waltz argued, the international system is defined by the states which are its components. States are the primary, although by no means the only, political units within the system according to Waltz.36

Continuing to develop the linkage between microeconomic and political concepts, Waltz put forward the argument that the attempt by firms to "maximize profits" is paralleled by the attempt of states to "maximize national interests." Unlike Morgenthau, Waltz did not define national interest strictly in terms of power. Instead, he argued that, in an anarchic system, the minimum, and primary, aim of each state is to maintain its own position in the system. This aim is not always served by trying to maximize power. For Waltz, power is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Waltz contends that, if a state constantly tried to maximize power, its behavior would not be rational because such conduct would very likely lead to a reaction (for example, a pre-emptive strike) on the part of other states. National interests beyond the primary aim of security, in Waltz's formulation, are dependent on a state's relative capability. Thus, as a state's relative capability changes, its national interests also change.

It is in terms of relative capability that Waltz differentiated states. This is consistent with Waltz's attempt to develop a systemic explanation of international politics. The key distinguishing feature of a systemic theory is that the internal attributes of actors are not treated as variables but rather as given by assumption. "Relative capability" is a systemic characteristic for Waltz, as opposed to "capability," a unit characteristic. The relative capability of a state can only be measured in relation to that of other states.38

Waltz explicitly stated that the rationality assumption is not necessary for the theory he was attempting to develop. This is because, according to Waltz, states act in more or less sensible ways.39 It should be noted, however, that if a state pursues national interests, which implies a preference-ordering of the potential policies which can be pursued, and acts in a sensible manner, which implies some sort of cost/benefit analysis before the implementation of decisions, then an implicit assumption of rationality is being made.

Waltz created a very innovative and parsimonious framework from which to theorize about the workings of the international system. The concepts of national interests and relative capability permitted Waltz to deduce overall patterns of behavior that can be expected to occur at the systemic level—for example, Waltz expected that balances of power will repeatedly form. Since Waltz relied on the theory of the market—as opposed to the theory of the firm—he was unwilling to
predict the foreign policy of any specific state. In the final four chapters of *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz employed his structural theory to explain coalitional patterns, economic interdependence, military relationships, and the role of great powers in maintaining world order. Thus, Waltz’s theory systemizes realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international relations.

There have been a number of other attempts to apply the tenets of microeconomic theory to the analysis of international politics. Some of the more prominent works developing this linkage are those by Kenneth Boulding, Bruce M. Russett, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita.

One of the earliest works to apply economic theory to international relations was Boulding’s *Conflict and Defence: A General Theory*. Boulding took as his starting point the fact that conflict is found almost everywhere—in, among other areas, interpersonal relations, industrial relations, international relations, the animal world, and even in geography where, for example, there is endless conflict of one land use against another. Boulding is an economist. He, more than the other scholars being discussed, rigorously applied economic theories and models to explain conflict in other areas. In his modeling of international conflict, Boulding was among the first to outline similarities between competition among firms and competition among states.

Another early work applying microeconomic theory to international relations was the Russett-edited *Economic Theories of International Politics*. Microeconomic theory in this work was used to broaden the understanding of alliances, the international system, and how foreign policy can be affected by domestic characteristics which, for Russett, still operate within systemic constraints. Russett preceded each chapter with a chapter summary. In these, Russett made explicit analogies between the economic concepts and their political science counterparts. Russett’s work represents one of the most exacting efforts to analogize from economics to political science.

An especially innovative approach to the study of war in recent years is found in Bueno de Mesquita’s *The War Trap*. There he developed a theory of war based on expected utility. Unlike the other writings, however, Bueno de Mesquita’s work is not based on the theory of the market or the theory of the firm. Rather, he used the expected utility theory of the consumer as his point of departure. His most important contribution has been in developing, and successfully testing, a set of hypotheses on the initiation and outbreak of war.
This study will apply microeconomic theory to the Bangla Desh Crisis of 1971. The literature available on the Bangla Desh Crisis is voluminous. There are three books, however, which merit attention.

One of the earliest works is the two-volume Bangla Desh Documents issued by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Indian government in 1972 (shortly after the termination of the crisis). This publication contains newspaper stories covering the Bangla Desh Crisis from its inception to its conclusion. The transcriptions of some press conferences and radio broadcasts also are included in this publication. There also are a few works which analyze why the crisis occurred and why the crisis followed the course that it did. Although the Bangla Desh Documents is somewhat biased, it is a useful compendium of information for any scholar interested in this topic.46

This work was followed in 1975 by Robert Jackson's South Asian Crisis. Jackson used the Bangla Desh Documents to provide an intelligent analysis of the Bangla Desh Crisis. His work is a comprehensive study of the motivations of the actions of those actors directly involved in the crisis (Pakistan, India, and the provisional Bangla Desh government) and the major powers (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the P.R.C.) Jackson was very thorough in his coverage of the events during the Bangla Desh Crisis, especially the 14 Day War about which he presented a detailed account of events on the battlefield and in political circles.47

It was not until 1990 that Richard Sisson's and Leo Rose's War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh was published. This book is a significant advance on previous research concerning this crisis. Sisson and Rose interviewed persons who were the leaders of India and Pakistan during the crisis. (The leaders of those fighting for an independent Bangla Desh had been assassinated by the time the interviews were conducted.) Sisson and Rose, however, did manage to interview some academics and others who had worked closely with the Provisional Government of Bangla Desh during the crisis and used these interviews along with previous research to make a very cogent analysis of the Bangla Desh Crisis.48

This study will analyze the Bangla Desh Crisis by building upon previous works that have applied microeconomic theory to the study of international relations. Empirical evidence indicated a realist approach was necessary. One of the most innovative lines of inquiry from the realist school is to study international relations through analogy with microeconomic theory. Although such a line of inquiry has been used to study conflict, war, and the workings of the international
system, a strict application of microeconomic theory to the analysis of crises is rare. This study will endeavour to contribute further to this linkage.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

This study focuses on the relationship between the five specific decisions cited above and relative capability. This chapter explains how this will be done. Accordingly, it has been divided into four sections. The first defines each of the key concepts. Other definitions of these concepts are also considered in order to provide a comparative framework. In the second section, a model is presented to facilitate inquiry into the relationship between the five specific decisions and relative capability. The relationships among the variables are discussed. In the third section, the manner in which microeconomic theory is applied to foreign policy crisis decisions is set forth. This section begins by presenting the theory of the firm in an oligopoly. Then, the similarities between the international political system and oligopolistic competition are discussed. Hypotheses, derived from microeconomic theory, are then formulated for states in crisis situations. In the fourth section of this chapter, the methodology and design of this study are presented. The hypotheses developed in the previous section are to be tested with the data generated by a decision flow for Pakistani and Indian decisions during the Bangla Desh Crisis. Thus, the use of a decision flow as a mode of inquiry is discussed at a theoretical level. Following this, there is a discussion of the conditions under which the model and hypotheses being tested are to apply. Finally, the rationale for employing the comparative study method in this thesis is discussed.

CONCEPTS

There are four key concepts in this study. These are: 1) foreign policy crisis; 2) capability; 3) crisis decisions; and 4) international war. Each of these concepts will now be discussed.

In this study, crisis is examined at the state level. A crisis that is viewed from the perspective of an individual state is a foreign policy crisis. This can be differentiated from an international crisis in which crisis is viewed from the international system perspective. In this study, the foreign policy crisis perspective is used because it is the state that, within systemic constraints, makes decisions in crisis situations.

The definition of crisis used in this study is that of Michael Brecher, which underpins the I.C.B. Project. Brecher defined a crisis as occurring when there is a change in a state's internal or external environment leading to three necessary and sufficient conditions among a state's decision-makers. 1) a perception of a threat to basic values; 2) a perception of finite time in which to respond to the threat; and 3) a perception of high probability of war before a resolution of the
threat. A foreign policy crisis, according to Hermann, is a situation that: 1) threatens high-priority goals; 2) leaves a short time for response; and 3) surprises members of the decision-making body. Brecher's definition builds upon, but differs significantly from, Hermann's definition.

Brecher's definition is considered superior for several reasons. First, decision-makers often are not surprised by situational changes--e.g., the building of the Berlin Wall did not surprise U.S. decision-makers; the closing of the Straits of Tiran did not surprise Israeli decision-makers--but crisis situations have developed afterwards. Further research led Hermann to conclude that surprise was not a necessary condition for crisis. Second, Brecher's use of finite time for response is more valid than short time: some crises have lasted several months (e.g., the Berlin Wall, Bangladesh, etc.). The time for response cannot be delayed indefinitely but it does not have to be short. Third, Brecher's definition allows foreign policy crises to originate from within the domestic environment of a crisis actor. In sum, Brecher's definition appears to be more valid and reliable. Thus, it is being utilized in this study.

The second concept is capability. In this study, the I.C.B. definition of capability--a composite of six types of resources: human; geographic; economic; diplomatic; military; and nuclear--is being used. In assessing the capability of a state in a crisis situation, a score is assigned for each resource. The total of the six scores gives the measurement of a state's capability, a procedure to be elaborated below. This can be compared with two other widely used indices of capability--that of: 1) J. David Singer and his associates in the Correlates of War (C.O.W.) Project; and 2) A.F.K. Organski.

The C.O.W. Project measures the overall capability of a nation through three major variables: industrial capability (measured by energy consumption and iron and steel production), military capability (measured by military expenditures and the number of men under arms), and demographic capability (measured by total population and the number of inhabitants in cities of 20,000 or more). The value of each indicator is added up for each state in the system deemed to be critical and a percentage share of the total is apportioned to each state. Each country's percentage value of each indicator is added up and divided by six (the number of indicators). The resulting figures for each country represent its percentage share of the system's capability.

The I.C.B. definition of capability is viewed as superior to that of the C.O.W. Project because of two glaring omissions in the latter. The C.O.W. Project does not measure either
geography or nuclear capability. Geographic area is a significant indicator of a state's capability that remains constant for most states over time. People, resources, and military capability are required to govern and hold a territory. Furthermore, in the event of war, a state possessing a large area is more capable of conducting a defence in-depth. This might dissuade would-be aggressors from initiating an attack. Thus, a large territory might serve as a deterrent. The I.C.B. definition also is more valid for the twentieth century: nuclear capability has become a crucial factor in the power relationships between states.

It is true that C.O.W. measures certain indicators of capability that I.C.B. overlooks. However, I.C.B. uses indicators—notably G.N.P., military expenditures, and population—which measure, in part, each of the major variables of the C.O.W. Project. Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater detail below, G.N.P. has an extremely high correlation with the overall C.O.W. index of capability. It is likely, therefore, that any data measured by C.O.W. also is reflected, in large part, in the I.C.B.'s measurements.

Some scholars, among them Organski, postulate that complex indices are not necessary to measure a state's capability. Organski and his associates argue that G.N.P. reflects the level of technology, capital intensity, education, external security, and other measures of power capability available to a society. Using the same countries for the same years as the C.O.W. Project, Organski and his associates report that G.N.P. and the C.O.W. index are highly correlated with a coefficient of determination of 0.86.

The major drawback with Organski's method is the problem associated with a single indicator. If several indicators are used, any aberrations on one indicator can be modified by the scores on the others. When one indicator is used, however, there is a greater possibility that the capability of a country might not be accurately represented. There are three arguments put forward by Organski on the virtues of using G.N.P. as the sole indicator of capability. First, information on G.N.P. is more readily available and reliable than the information required to construct more complex indices. Second, because G.N.P. information is more accessible and reliable, G.N.P. is theoretically a more valid measure of capability. Whereas these arguments can be made against the C.O.W. Project, which relies keenly on 19th century data, a great deal more information is available in this century that I.C.B. researchers were able to utilize. Even though data on G.N.P. might still be more readily available, especially after the 1930's when such records started to be kept, it is not more valid as a measure of capability. Although Organski obtained a very high correlation of the C.O.W. index with G.N.P., there are large discrepancies when each measure of the percentage share held by the great powers are examined.
The differences between the two measures, furthermore, become considerably larger when the ratios of the composite capability scores and G.N.P. are compared. These are the numbers (of the balance of power) that would be used in determining the relative capability of states. The third argument put forward by Organski is that G.N.P. is more parsimonious and easier to implement from the user's point when a large number of cases is being examined. G.N.P. might be more parsimonious but, as Organski concedes, a measurement which does not perform satisfactorily should not be chosen. It is for these reasons that the I.C.B. definition of capability, which incorporates G.N.P. as a very important indicator of capability but uses several other indicators as well, is being used in this study.

The I.C.B. Project refined the concept of capability to include relative capability. For each actor-case, that is, foreign policy crisis, a power discrepancy score is assigned. Power discrepancy is calculated by adding the capability score of a state to the power available to that state from "tight" alliance partners (if any), on one side, in comparison with the power available to the state's principal adversary(ies) on the other. These are calculated at the start of the crisis for the actors being studied. Five categories of power discrepancy (P.D.) have been created (the number in brackets is the percentage of actors in the 1929-79 dataset that fall into that category): high-negative P.D., -42 to -12 (10%); low-negative P.D., -11 to -2 (33%); no P.D., -1 to +1 (24%); low-positive P.D., +2 to +22 (23%); high-positive P.D., +23 to +65 (10%). This level of differentiation in relative capability is beyond the scope of this work. In this thesis, hypotheses are developed for two categories of relative capability: 1) states with (both high and low) negative power discrepancy have lower capability relative to their adversary(ies); 2) states with (both high and low) positive power discrepancy have higher capability relative to their adversary(ies). The no power discrepancy category of the I.C.B. Project is not used in the formulation of hypotheses.

The third concept of this study is foreign policy crisis decision. An a priori selection of decisions was necessary because of the limited scope of this study. Five decisions have been chosen for investigation: 1) attempt to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution of a crisis; 2) attempt to secure U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis; 3) attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers; 4) mobilization of military forces; and 5) deciding the point at which to start taking steps to defuse a crisis. These decisions have been taken from I.C.B. case studies. There are three reasons for the choice of these five decisions. First, most decisions made in crisis situations can be categorized as one of these five decisions. Second, these decisions are perceived to be among the most important by the decision-makers themselves. Third, all leaders in crisis situations have an opportunity to make these decisions
regardless of whether or not they make them. For example, a state's leaders might try to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution or these leaders might choose not to do so.

There have been a number of efforts to delineate and analyze specific decisions in international relations. Examples of such research would include: the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (C.O.P.D.A.B.); Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (C.R.E.O.N.); and the World Event/Interaction Survey (W.E.I.S.). This research, however, deals with the foreign policy of nations and not with foreign policy crisis situations. One attempt to examine foreign policy events in conflict situations is the Computer-Aided System to Handle Information on Local Conflicts (C.A.S.C.O.N.) experiment. A state's specific decisions, however, are not the focus of analysis but rather is factors which might have an effect on the outbreak of war. These factors are viewed from the international system perspective and state-level specific decisions remain outside the scope of the C.A.S.C.O.N. study. The C.A.S.C.O.N. experiment's procedures for generalizing from one case study to other cases, however, are very useful. A C.A.S.C.O.N. factor specific to the India-P.R.C. case, by way of example, is: Chinese advances in N.E.F.A. (in 1962) threaten Indian control of Assam's territory and oilfields. This factor can be generalized to the following: Economic resource area of one side threatened by advances of the other side. Similar methods to generalize foreign policy crisis decisions in one case study to others are used in this thesis.

The fourth concept is international war. One of the most widely-accepted definitions of international war, and the one that will be used in this study, is that of the C.O.W. Project. The main components of the C.O.W. definition are: 1) combat-related fatalities of 1,000 or more must occur; and 2) participants must be nation-states. To be considered a war participant, a state must suffer a minimum of 100 combat-related fatalities and/or have 1,000 or more of its men in combat in the theatre of operations. A civil insurrection can become an international war if a nation-state intervenes as a war participant on the side of the insurgents.

Prior to the C.O.W. Project, the most valuable research on international war was conducted by Quincy Wright and Lewis Richardson. In *A Study of War*, Wright presented a list of 278 wars between 1480 and 1940. He classified each war into one of four categories: 1) balance of power wars; 2) civil wars; 3) defensive wars; and 4) imperialistic wars. Civil wars apart, Wright might term wars classified in the other categories as international wars if they met the following criteria: 1) hostilities involved members of the family of nations (states); 2) the conflict was legally recognized as a war; and, in hostilities of considerable but lesser magnitude, 3) the political consequences flowing from the event were important. On the other hand, in Wright's
framework, if over 50,000 troops were involved in the conflict, it was automatically considered a war and the previous three criteria were discarded. A Study of War was a major advance on previous research but, as Richardson points out in Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, opposing belligerents have often disagreed on what is legal, and the importance of results is a matter of opinion. Thus, Richardson used only the criterion of 317 deaths or more on both sides for a conflict to be considered a war. He argued that conflicts in which there were fewer than 317 fatalities were often insurrections, revolts, and riots which had different causes than international wars. Some of Richardson's ideas influenced later works by Wright. In the second edition of A Study of War, which added wars in the 1945 to 1965 period, Wright adopted the 317 death threshold as a defining characteristic of war (while maintaining the other criteria listed above). Wright's rationale for employing the threshold is similar to that of Richardson.

The C.O.W. Project built on the foundations of Wright and Richardson to construct a more comprehensive framework for studying war. Each of them used a fatality threshold as a defining characteristic of war. Unlike C.O.W., however, neither Wright nor Richardson differentiated between battle fatalities and civilian deaths. Thus, the C.O.W. definition is more valid and reliable. Furthermore, Wright and Richardson rarely differentiated deaths on a state-by-state basis. Thus, the exact level of involvement by a state in a conflict is not always clear. Furthermore, although Richardson recognized international war as being qualitatively different from other types of conflict, which might lead to differences in behavior by the participants, he differentiated conflicts solely by the 317 deaths threshold. The C.O.W. definition is being employed in this study because it is more rigorous in its theoretical and methodological articulation than either Wright's or Richardson's definition.

In concluding the discussion on the concept of war it should be noted that there is a degree of arbitrariness in the selection of any particular death threshold for a conflict to be considered a war. It does not seem logical to suppose that 317 fatalities is a better threshold than 316 fatalities or that 1,000 deaths make a better threshold than 950. For that matter, there is no intrinsic reason that either a 317- or a 1,000- fatality threshold is a more valid criterion than the other. Most scholars studying war would probably agree, however, that both thresholds are more reasonable than ten or twenty fatalities.

MODEL

Scientific inquiry can be greatly assisted through the use of a model. A clarification of the relationship and the direction of causality among variables can be gained through the use of a
Aside from clarifying relationships, models also serve the function of simplifying reality. Such simplification can sometimes be crucial in order to gain an understanding of complex matters. For example, it would be very difficult to find one's way in a strange city that was very large. A map would be useful. A map is a model of a city. Obviously, a map is not as detailed or as complex as a large city. A map, however, will give a general overall pattern of the city and help a person get from Point A to Point B. In fact, it would be better to have a map than to have an entire city available for examination in certain situations. One such situation would be in trying to get from one street to another. In a city, a person could spend hours looking for the street in question without any idea about where it might be. A city available for examination would be too complex for such an undertaking. A map would be able to provide the location of the street in question within minutes. In this instance, it would be easier to gain an understanding of the street-system of a city from a model (the map) than the city itself. In the same way, models in the social sciences simplify reality in order for the scholar to gain a better understanding of reality.

Model 1 (see Figure 1) will be the basis of analysis of this study. This model is designed to illustrate how relative capability affects specific decisions made by a single country (designated as State A) in a crisis situation. The effect of relative capability on specific decisions arises from the fact, and the recognition, that making certain decisions will increase the likelihood of war. Therefore, if a state is relatively weaker than its adversary it is not likely to make decisions that increase the possibility of war.

In Model 1, the independent variable is the perception of crisis among decision-makers. At t₁, the decision-makers of State A perceive a crisis. It is not necessary, however, for the decision-makers of the adversary(ies) of State A also to perceive a crisis.³³ The norm, however, is that more than one state's decision-makers perceive a foreign policy crisis before State A's crisis is resolved.

The relative capability of State A, compared to that of its adversary(ies), is the first intervening variable. After the perception of crisis (t₁) sets in, the relative capability of a country acts as a prism (t₂) which has an effect on the specific decisions (at t₃) made by that country's leaders. Although the focus of this model is on the specific decisions of a single country, the concept of relative capability is viewed from the perspective of "sides." More than one state can be on a single side in a crisis. In this manner, the effect of "tight" alliances on the relative capability of State A and its adversary(ies) is taken into account. The importance of alliances is based on the idea that the distribution of power between two sides can be shifted if an outside power becomes a tight alliance partner of one of the sides. This change in relative capability could have an effect
MODEL 1

PERCEPTION OF CRISIS AMONG DECISION-MAKERS OF STATE 'A'

RELATIVE CAPABILITY PRISM

ADVERSARY OR ADVERSARIES OF STATE 'A'

FIGURE 1

STATE A's DECISIONS

DCSN. 1  DCSVN. 2  DCSVN. 3  DCSVN. 4  DCSVN. 5

OUTCOME

WAR
OR
NON-WAR RESOLUTION

ADVERSARY'S OR ADVERSARIES' DECISIONS

DCSN. 1  DCSVN. 2  DCSVN. 3  DCSVN. 4  DCSVN. 5

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1-1
INTERVENING VARIABLE 1-2
INTERVENING VARIABLE 1-3
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1-4
on the decisions made by each side. Thus, Model 1 examines the decisions of a single state within the context of other states that are directly involved in a crisis.

The concept of relative capability is a social science tool. It allows the social scientist to discern which state is stronger in a given situation. It is not being asserted that decision-makers use the same method to calculate relative capability. The evidence, as noted in the previous chapter, indicates, however, that the relative capability of a state in a crisis has an effect on leadership decisions. Thus, relative capability is reflected in behavior.

It should be noted that there is no cause-and-effect relationship between the perception of crisis among a state's decision-makers and its relative capability. On its own, relative capability does not cause a perception of crisis. Nor does the perception of crisis have an effect on a state's relative capability. That is why there are no causal arrows in the relationship between these variables.

The second intervening variable in Model 1 is foreign policy crisis decision (at t3). As interaction between adversaries--states or coalitions--becomes more hostile, one or more of the five decisions might be taken. These decisions can increase the intensity of violence so that a crisis escalates to war. The five specific decisions are arranged within a rectangle denoting that other decisions are being made but the ones being examined are the most important ones. The double arrows linking the five specific decisions of State A to each other indicates that making a certain decision affects other decisions made by State A. The same situation of one decision affecting other decisions also exists for State A's adversary or adversaries. The rectangle of State A's decisions is connected by a double arrow with the rectangle of State A's adversary or adversaries. This denotes that decisions made by one party have an effect on the decisions made by the other party.

The five types of decision have an effect on the dependent variable: war. If the decision-makers of State A choose to make one of these decisions (for example, attempt to secure U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis), this will have an effect on whether there is a war or non-war resolution to the crisis. War has no effect on the other variables but is affected, directly, by the second intervening variable and indirectly, by the first intervening variable and the independent variable.

It should be emphasized that this model has been designed to analyze foreign policy crisis decisions. Thus, decision-makers must have a prior perception of crisis in order for this
model's "rules" to apply. A state may initiate a war without being overly concerned about a response from its adversary(ies). The relationship between microeconomic theory and the international political system being developed in this thesis is designed to examine the decisions of states in crisis. The analysis of states which initiate wars without perceiving a crisis is beyond the scope of this study.

THEORY

Although economic markets and international political systems are similar, they are not identical. Thus the possibility of a false analogy can be raised.35 No two situations, however, are strictly identical--there are always differences if only in terms of time and place. In the absence of better data and models, analogy from another discipline might be useful for heuristic (or "suggestive") purposes. That is, the main value of analogy is to suggest reasonable hypotheses which can be tested empirically. Such testing by replicable procedures will determine the validity of the analogy.36

The question might arise: why is micro-, not macro-, economic theory being employed in this study? Microeconomic theory is concerned with the interaction of firms in a market which (unless there is government involvement) is an anarchic system. Since the international political system is anarchic, microeconomic theory can be (and has been) used to analyze the behavior of states. Macroeconomic theory deals with system-wide economic variables like supply, income, and demand at the national level. A macro theory of international politics would include system-wide aggregates like: number of global deaths in war; amount of global defence spending; amount of world G.N.P., etc.. Although it is possible to use macrotheory, it is primarily microeconomic theory which has been used in the analysis of international relations.37 Since this study examines crisis at the state--and not the systemic--level, it is microeconomic theory which is being utilized as the basis of analysis.

Microeconomic theory starts with three central assumptions about firms: first, and foremost, that firms make decisions with one goal, namely, the maximization of profit; second, that each firm behaves as a unitary actor; thus, the question of how a particular decision is reached is ignored; and, third, that firms make rational and consistent decisions; that is, firms have preference orderings for the decisions they make. Economists acknowledge that these assumptions might not accurately explain the way some firms behave in the real world, but they are considered a very good approximation of reality.38
As noted, there are similarities between the international political system and an oligopolistic industry. At present there is no complete theory to explain the behavior of firms in an oligopoly. There are, however, three rules for these firms.

Economists posit one rule as unique to an oligopoly: each firm's price and output decisions depend on how it thinks its competitors will react to those decisions. A firm might consider lowering prices slightly. This could increase its market-share and, thereby, the firm's profits, provided the cost of producing the added output was less than the revenue generated by the new sales. The firm in question, however, would ponder how its competitors would react to a unilateral price cut. Since all industries which are oligopolies are not the same—that is, the number and size of firms varies from one industry to another—a complete theory or set of rules that explain how these types of firms behave has never been developed. However, this rule—that a firm perceives its own decisions as having an effect on the actions of other firms—provides a guiding principle for studying the behavior of firms in an oligopoly.

Microeconomic theory lays down two rules for profit maximization. These rules apply to all firms (including those in an oligopoly). The first rule is that: total revenue from selling a product must equal or exceed the total variable cost of producing it—otherwise, the firm should not produce at all. The total cost of a product is made up of its total fixed cost and its total variable cost. The total fixed cost is the overhead cost. It does not change as the quantity of the commodity being produced changes. The total variable cost varies directly with the quantity of the commodity produced. For example, if a firm produces armaments, the cost of the plant is the total fixed cost because it does not change with the quantity produced. If the firm wanted to double its production of armaments by increasing the operating hours of the plant, the total variable cost would increase because of the cost of using more labour, material, electricity, etc.. As the total variable cost rises, the total cost of producing the commodity rises. The total amount received by the firm is its total revenue. As long the total revenue is greater than the total variable cost, the firm is seen as being profitable. The total fixed cost is seen as a sunk cost that cannot be used for other purposes.

The second rule of profit maximization is that, if it is worthwhile to produce, the firm should produce where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Marginal revenue is the increase in a firm's total revenue due to an increase in sales by one unit. Marginal cost is the increase in total cost due to an increase in the rate of production by one unit. The law of diminishing returns states that marginal cost must exceed marginal revenue at some point. A firm's profit will continue to be
lowered with every unit of a commodity produced where marginal cost is greater than marginal revenue.44

This thesis explores the question of whether the three above rules can help explain the behavior of states in crises. Rule 1 is that the price and output decisions of a firm are influenced by how it thinks its competitors will react to those decisions. In terms of a foreign policy crisis, this is the equivalent of saying that decisions made by a state are influenced by the perceptions its leaders hold of the reaction those decisions are likely to bring about in other states. It is an explicit part of Model 1 that decisions made by State A affect the decisions made by its adversary(ies). There is an implicit assumption that the leadership of each state involved in a crisis situation expects its decisions to have an impact on their adversary(ies).

Rule 2 is that a firm for which total revenue does not equal or exceed total variable cost should not produce. In an oligopoly, which means that there are at least two firms in competition with each other, Rule 2 can be restated as follows: any firm for which total revenue does not equal or exceed total variable cost should withdraw from the competition. Since this thesis will examine decisions while crises are still in progress, total revenue and total variable cost will be viewed from the perspective of expected total revenue and expected total variable cost.45 The behavior of states, in the James study, with zero or negative expected utility which initiate crises indicates that the possibility of war is the key to explaining specific decisions in crisis situations. All countries in crises, regardless of whether they have positive or negative power discrepancy, or even if all sides have equal capability, will expect to bear some physical, human, and social costs if war breaks out. However, states with positive expected utility—i.e., usually those countries with greater capability than their adversaries—are more likely to expect terms of settlement that are favourable to them (the expected "total revenue" in microeconomic terms) at the end of a war than states with zero or negative expected utility. That is why: 1) those states with zero or negative expected utility change from an aggressive foreign policy to a more conciliatory one—essentially withdrawing from a competition that they are likely to lose—once the prospect of war is raised; and 2) far more wars are initiated by those with positive expected utility than other states.46

Rule 3 is that a firm should produce at the level where marginal revenue equals marginal cost—assuming it is worthwhile to produce at all. It should be noted that this study is not concerned with calculating each incremental gain (marginal revenue) from each action (which incurs a marginal cost on those undertaking the action).47 Instead, due to the limited scope of this study, Rule 3 will be used only to ascertain whether microeconomic theory can be used to determine the point at which a state will start taking steps to defuse a crisis. Because foreign
policy crises are dynamic situations, marginal revenue and marginal cost are viewed from the perspective of expected marginal revenue and expected marginal cost. As applied to termination of foreign policy crises, Rule 3 is the equivalent of saying: i) if a state’s decision-makers perceive that the expected cost (the expected “marginal cost” in microeconomic terms) of going to war outweighs the expected benefit (the expected “marginal revenue” in microeconomic terms), then that state will try to defuse the crisis by attempting to withdraw from the competition or, if that is not possible, try to maintain (or restore) the political, territorial, and economic status quo ante; and ii) if a state’s decision-makers perceive the expected benefits of going to war outweigh the expected costs, then that state will try to change the international system through political, economic, and/or territorial expansion until the expected costs of further change are equal to or greater than the expected benefits.48

Rules 1 to 3 will be used to develop hypotheses which relate a state’s relative capability to the five specific decisions being examined in this study. This will be done later. At this point, the assumptions on which this study and each hypothesis are based will be clearly delineated.

There are three central assumptions in this thesis. The first is that states behave as unitary actors. In reality, as with firms, states are not unitary actors.49 This study takes the realist position that an assumption in theory is helpful in determining whether reality tends to be consistent with what might be expected from the theory. Thus, this assumption, and the ones that follow, are useful in building theory and their legitimacy should be judged by that alone.50

The second assumption of this thesis is that states act to maximize “national interests.” As noted, this is different from “maximizing power.” The maximizing of national interests, unlike “maximizing power,” is consistent with Rule 1 (a firm’s decisions in an oligopoly are affected by how it thinks its competitors will react to those decisions). Interests in a crisis can range from preserving to strengthening the state. The primary aim of the state is to maintain its own position in the system. Only after this goal is achieved can a state pursue other objectives.51 The possibility of the use of force and a state’s own relative capability will determine which policies best serve a state’s interests.

The third assumption is that states make rational and consistent decisions. All states follow some sort of policy in their foreign affairs. Thus, states will prefer to make some decisions over others. In some areas, there is a strong ordering of state preferences. In other areas, the ordering might be weaker.52 The rationality assumption is, of course, not descriptively accurate.
It is utilized as a baseline (which can be tested against actual facts) thereby making a theory of international politics possible. 53

The link between state behavior and system structure is forged by the latter two assumptions. By holding the maximization of national interests and the rationality assumption as constants, it is possible to develop testable hypotheses which attribute variations in state behavior to variations of the international system. This work focuses on changes in state behavior due to variations in relative capability (a systemic feature); that is, the differences in the decisions made between those actors with a negative power discrepancy and those with a positive power discrepancy are studied. Five hypotheses, one for each decision being examined, have been developed from microeconomic theory:

**HYPOTHESIS A:** States with negative power discrepancy (P.O.) are more likely than states with positive power discrepancy to attempt to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution to a crisis.

The rationale underlying this hypothesis is that:
- states with negative P.O. are less likely to expect favourable terms of settlement (the expected "total revenue" at the end of a war);
- therefore, these states would prefer negotiation to the use of force;
- states with negative P.O. also might want to send out conciliatory signals with the objective of invoking similar responses from the other side;
- states with positive P.O. have less impetus to negotiate because they are more likely to expect favourable terms of settlement at the conclusion of a war;
- therefore, states with positive P.O. would be less inclined to negotiate than countries with negative P.O.

**HYPOTHESIS B:** States with negative power discrepancy are more likely than states with positive power discrepancy to attempt to secure U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis.

The rationale underlying this hypothesis is that:
- states with negative P.O. are less likely to expect favourable terms of settlement at the conclusion of a war;
- therefore, these states would prefer mediation or intervention to forestall a possible military engagement;
- states with positive P.O. would lose leverage which could be used to gain a preferred solution if there is mediation or intervention by the U.N.;
- therefore, states with positive P.O. would be less inclined than countries with negative P.O. to attempt to gain U.N. intervention.
HYPOTHESIS C: States with negative power discrepancy are more likely than states with positive power discrepancy to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

The rationale underlying this hypothesis is that:
- states with negative P.D. are less likely to expect favourable terms of settlement at the conclusion of a war,
- therefore, these states will have great incentive to gain as much assistance as they can for possible military engagement;
- although states with positive P.D. might also attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments, they will have less incentive to do so;
- therefore, states with positive P.D. will be less inclined than countries with negative P.D. to gain or reaffirm military commitments.

HYPOTHESIS D: States with positive power discrepancy are more likely than states with negative power discrepancy to mobilize military forces.

The rationale underlying this hypothesis is that:
- states with negative P.D. are less likely to expect war to yield favourable terms of settlement at its conclusion;
- therefore, being concerned about possible reactions from the other side, states with negative P.D. would have little incentive to undertake actions which might provoke the other side to military escalation;
- states with positive P.D. might not wish to bear the costs of war but since political or other benefits might result from military threats or war, these states would have less of an inhibition to mobilize.

HYPOTHESIS E: States with positive power discrepancy are more likely (than states with negative power discrepancy) to seek to change the international system until the expected costs of further political, territorial, and/or economic expansion are greater than the expected benefits whereas states with negative power discrepancy are more likely (than states with positive power discrepancy) to try to maintain (or restore) the political, territorial, and economic status quo ante.

The rationale underlying this hypothesis is that:
- states with positive P.D. are more likely to expect favourable terms of settlement at the conclusion of a war;
- therefore, states with positive P.D. are less likely to attempt to defuse a crisis until: i) war breaks out and the full benefits which accrue from the war are realized; or, ii) the situation changes so that the costs of continuing a crisis or war no longer outweigh the benefits;
- states with negative P.D. are more likely to prefer a return to the situation previous to the time that a crisis (in which it finds itself) started rather than continuing a crisis (and risking a war) in which the expected costs outweigh the expected benefits.

The above 5 hypotheses outline the expected relationship between (positive and negative) power discrepancy and specific decisions according to microeconomic theory.
These hypotheses will now be reworked specifically in terms of both relatively weaker and relatively stronger states. Ten hypotheses are derived from the five above:

HYPOTHESIS 1: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution to a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 2: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to secure U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 3: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

HYPOTHESIS 4: A weaker crisis actor will not mobilize its military forces.

HYPOTHESIS 5: A weaker crisis actor will try to maintain (or restore) the political, territorial, and economic status quo ante.

HYPOTHESIS 6: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to avoid any contact with the adversary which might lead to a peaceful resolution of a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 7: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to block or circumvent U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 8: A stronger crisis actor will not attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

HYPOTHESIS 9: A stronger crisis actor will mobilize its military forces.

HYPOTHESIS 10: A stronger crisis actor will seek to change the international system until the expected costs of further political, territorial and/or economic expansion are equal to or greater than expected benefits (at which point, the behavior of stronger states can be expected to no longer be supportive of Hypotheses 6, 7, 8, and 9 because the rationale underlying each of these four hypotheses is based, in part, on benefits outweighing costs for the stronger state).

These hypotheses will be tested in the next chapter by examining Pakistani and Indian behavior during the Bangla Desh Crisis.

Hypotheses 1 through 10, and the model presented earlier, are designed to be tested under certain conditions. Specifically, the hypotheses and the model are to be tested during the "crisis period" of a crisis. The "crisis period" is discussed in greater detail below.

METHODOLOGY

An integral part of the I.C.B. Project’s methodology utilized in case studies—the "decision flow"—will be used to test the above hypotheses. The decision flow constructed in the next chapter is based on Brecher’s model of crisis. Brecher’s model permits analysis of the manner in
which a changing context affects an individual state's decisions in a crisis. The I.C.B. model of
crisis has three stages (or periods). Initially, there is the pre-crisis period (t1). This period begins
with an event (or cluster of events) which leads to a conspicuous increase in the perception of
value threat by the senior decision-maker(s) of the state under inquiry. The pre-crisis period is
followed by the crisis period (t2). The crisis period also begins with a trigger event or cluster of
events. This leads to the perception by the state's decision-maker(s) of all three conditions
necessary for a crisis: a greatly increased perceived threat to basic values; an awareness that
decisions are being made under time constraints; and an image of a high probability of war at
some point before the issue is resolved. (The I.C.B. "crisis period" should not be confused with
the "crisis." The "crisis period" is one of three periods that make up a "crisis.") The crisis period is
followed by the post-crisis period (t3). The post crisis period commences with an observable
decline in one or more of the three perceptual conditions necessary for crisis (threat to values,
time pressure for response, and war probability). A foreign policy crisis terminates when the three
perceptual conditions have returned to non-crisis norms. The decision flow is a structured
narrative of events. It examines the background of the decisions that are made and illuminates the
interaction of the crisis actors that are the main focus of the decision flow and also other actors
involved in the crisis from the beginning of a crisis (the start of the pre-crisis period) to its
conclusion (the termination of the post-crisis period).

The hypotheses and the model presented above have been designed to be tested
during the crisis period. The relationship between the five specific decisions and war cannot be
analyzed by examining the post-crisis period. Usually, before a crisis reaches this stage, a high
likelihood of war has passed or a decision to go to war has already been made. Thus, war is not
due to any decisions made in the post-crisis period. It also would not be very fruitful to examine
decisions made in the pre-crisis period. This is because, as noted in the James study cited in the
previous chapter, the majority of crises are initiated by states with zero or negative expected utility
(which usually means that the states have equal or lesser capability than the adversaries they are
challenging). These crises are initiated to bring about a change in the system. The initiating
country pursues an aggressive policy until its leaders perceive that there is a high probability of
war. This perception brings about a dramatic change in the decisions that are taken in many
crises. The result is that over 90% of such crises do not result in war. Thus, the outbreak of
war, or lack thereof, should not be traced to decisions made in the pre-crisis period. Decisions
made in the crisis period are crucial in determining whether or not a war breaks out. Thus, in the
next chapter, the hypotheses are tested during the crisis period for Pakistan and India.
The decision flow presented in the next chapter is limited in scope. First, apart from noting the international context, the crisis period of the decision flow for both Pakistan and India concentrates on those aspects of each state's behavior being tested by the hypotheses. Second, the pre-crisis period of the decision flow for both Pakistan and India is not presented as a detailed narrative. Since the hypotheses are to be tested during the crisis period, such a narrative is not necessary. Instead, the pre-crisis narrative for Pakistan and India will delineate those factors which triggered the change from the pre-crisis period (when only a threat to basic values is perceived by decision-makers) to the crisis period (when all three conditions of a crisis are perceived by decision-makers). Third, the decision flow terminates with December 3, 1971—the day marking the start of the Indo-Pakistani war over Bangla Desh. Fourth, only those major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China—which have had the most impact on South Asian politics since partition are included in the decision flow. Preliminary research had indicated that, despite the last two limits on the scope of the decision flow, it would be possible to determine whether or not evidence exists to test the hypotheses. This, in fact, turned out to be the case.

There are three major types of experimetal work in political science: case studies; data-based aggregate studies; and comparative studies. The most common type is the case study, in which a great deal of information can be generated about one particular actor. However, case studies are of the ideographic mode. Thus it is very difficult to generalize from them. Data-based studies are of the nomothetic mode and, since a large number of cases are analyzed at one time, such studies are generalizable. However, the researcher is constrained to utilizing only those theoretical ideas which can be operationalized for data-based use. Furthermore, data-based studies lack the details of policy initiatives and their intended consequences. The comparative study, which is also of the nomothetic mode, attempts to minimize the drawbacks of case studies and data-based approaches while combining their benefits. Comparative studies examine a small number of actors in depth. Normally, less information is generated on any given actor in a comparative study than in a case study. It also is true that the findings from a comparative study are less generalizable than a data-based study. On the other hand, comparative studies usually yield a significant amount of in-depth data on several actors. In comparative studies, the researcher is not constrained to utilizing only those theoretical concepts which can be operationalized for data-based use. The intent of decision-makers and the outcome of the policy choices are outlined as well.57

This thesis is a comparative study of the two states which experienced a foreign policy crisis in 1971 over Bangla Desh. A comparative study was deemed necessary for two reasons.
First, the hypotheses themselves are comparative in nature. The behavior of states within the following two broad categories are being compared: i) states with positive power discrepancy; and ii) states with negative power discrepancy. Thus, it is necessary to study states in both categories to determine if there is support for the hypotheses in just one group, both groups, or neither group.

Second, the hypotheses being tested have not been tested before. A comparative study can specify those hypotheses which are supported by the evidence. It can also provide explanations, based on in-depth evidence for the lack of support of any given hypothesis. Thus, if a hypothesis lacks support, it will be possible to judge whether this is due to: a shortcoming in microeconomic theory; a problem in transferring microeconomic theory to political science; other factors specific to the actor; or some other reason.

A caveat about theories is necessary at this point. Theories, in the social sciences, cannot be definitively proven. Different methods of testing might yield different results. Even well-supported theories might not last over an extended period of time. Experimental results are permanent but theories come and go.58 This study is not designed to prove microeconomic theory but has the more modest aim of assessing whether the behavior of Pakistan and India during the Bangla Desh Crisis is consistent with the behavior postulated by microeconomic theory.
PART 2: MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS DECISIONS - APPLICATION TO THE BANGLA DESH CRISIS
CHAPTER 4: PAKISTAN AND INDIA DURING THE BANGLA DESH CRISIS--DECISION FLOW

In this chapter, hypotheses based on microeconomic theory are tested with evidence from the behavior of Pakistan and India during the Bangla Desh Crisis. There are four sections. The first presents the international context. The second examines the capability of Pakistan and India relative to each other during the Bangla Desh Crisis. The ten hypotheses are reworked specifically for the two South Asian states. In the third section, the background events leading to the crisis are discussed. These three sections set the global, regional, and domestic context of the Crisis. In the final section, a decision flow of Pakistan and India during the Bangla Desh Crisis is developed.

THE SETTING

In 1947, a South Asian regional subsystem emerged with India and Pakistan as relatively equal powers. India and Pakistan had developed a pattern of interaction that was characterized by mistrust, verbal hostility, and periodic outbreaks of warfare (in 1947-48 over Kashmir and in 1965-66 over the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir). The Bangla Desh Crisis shifted the focus of Indo-Pakistani hostilities to the north-east part of the subcontinent.

The partition of British India was hastily devised and extremely sloppy which resulted in the Governments of India and Pakistan being left with a host of complex territorial disputes. Of these the most critical were disagreements over three princely states: Kashmir; Junagadh; and Hyderabad (the latter two were contiguous to India but not to Pakistan). Both Junagadh and Hyderabad were militarily incorporated into India shortly after partition--actions which Pakistan did not militarily challenge because it did not have the capability to do so. Kashmir, however, was contiguous to both India and Pakistan. Historically, culturally, and economically, Kashmir was closer to Pakistan than to India. The population of Kashmir was overwhelmingly Muslim. Kashmir's natural lines of communication and rivers also linked it to Pakistan. However, the ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, was Hindu. He chose to accede to India. This led in 1948 to the first Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir. In 1949, through the auspices of the United Nations, India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire in the disputed region. The cease-fire line left India in control of two-thirds of Kashmir. The one-third of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan gave that country a land link to the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China). Although the United Nations halted the fighting, it did not resolve the dispute. The struggle for Kashmir assumed a
major symbolic role for both the Indian and Pakistani governments and has continued to plague relations between the two states since then.\(^2\)

India, between 1947 and 1971, consistently argued for bilateral solutions to disputes with other South Asian states. Thus, New Delhi sought to exclude, as much as possible, major nonregional powers from exerting a significant influence in South Asian affairs. When it was not possible to exclude the major powers—for example, in 1949 over the Kashmir dispute, in 1960 over the Indus Valley Development Project, and in 1966 at the Tashkent Conference—India attempted to manipulate their involvement in South Asia to achieve its own objectives.\(^3\)

In the early post-independence period, India's nonalignment policy was viewed with suspicion by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Stalin had a simple two camp view of the world. Thus, India's nonalignment was seen as favouring the West. On the other hand, India was distrusted and misunderstood in Washington because of New Delhi's failure to denounce communism unequivocally. India's nonalignment implied that it would not be a bulwark of America's policy of containing communism.\(^4\)

New Delhi's relationship with China was more successful in the early post-independence period. India was the second noncommunist country (after Burma) to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949. Various economic and cultural exchange programs were set up between China and India during the early 1950s. In 1954, New Delhi and Beijing signed an agreement settling their dispute over the status of Tibet. This was the high-water mark of Sino-Indian relations. The relationship between the two countries began to deteriorate shortly thereafter. Beijing considered the McMahon Line, which demarcates the border between Tibet and north-east India, to be a product of imperialism. Moreover, China had taken over control of the Aksai Chin region of Kashmir. New Delhi considered this an aggressive action. China was willing to recognize the McMahon Line if India would recognize Chinese control of the Aksai Chin. Nehru was unwilling to accept this exchange. These differences between New Delhi and Beijing were exacerbated by an uprising in Tibet in 1959. India gave political asylum to the Dalai Lama and expressed sympathy for the Tibetan people. As will be discussed below, relations continued to deteriorate between China and India resulting in a war between the two countries in 1962.\(^5\)

Pakistan's foreign policy between 1947 and 1971 was based on the assumption that external powers were needed as a counterforce to India. In the early post-independence period, Pakistan turned to Islamic states of south-west Asia—Iraq, Turkey, and Iran—for support. Political
divisions among these states, however, led to the collapse of this policy in 1950. Thus, Pakistan began to search elsewhere for support.6

Pakistan was open-minded in its search for allies during the 1950s but its choices were limited. The Soviet Union made hostile gestures toward Iraq, Turkey, and Iran in the early 1950s. These were Pakistan's most important south-west Asia neighbors. Thus, the Pakistanis regarded the Soviets as the principal extraregional threat. Pakistan also considered China to be an unfriendly power in the 1950s. The 1954 Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet was considered by Islamabad as a tacit Sino-Indian alliance. Beijing's carefully worded statements on Kashmir until 1959, when the Sino-Indian dispute over Tibet broke out, also seemingly backed India. Furthermore, both Moscow and Beijing had been extremely critical of the Pakistani government and were supporting, at least at the rhetorical level, "revolutionary" forces in Pakistan. Thus, during the 1950s, both the Soviet Union and China were ruled out by Islamabad as possible allies against India.7

Pakistan came to the conclusion in the early 1950s that the United States was its only reliable external ally. The U.S. policy of containment directed at the Soviet Union and China served Pakistani interests for reasons discussed above. Moreover, by becoming America's major ally in the region, Pakistan was provided with a military option (which it would not have had otherwise) against its two main regional antagonists: India and Afghanistan. For its part, during the 1950s, the United States considered Pakistan's role in containment to be of higher priority than the maintenance of good relations with either New Delhi or Kabul.8

In 1962, the long-standing border dispute between China and India erupted into open warfare. Chinese forces routed the Indian army in both Kashmir and in the North East Frontier Agency, the eastern sector. As will be discussed later, China's actions in the 1962 war, combined with its subsequent behavior during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, had a considerable impact on New Delhi's strategic considerations.9

The 1962 Sino-Indian War changed the relationships that Pakistan and India had with China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, respectively. China and Pakistan grew closer together. In 1963, China and Pakistan settled their border dispute over Kashmir and entered into a number of treaties. The following year, Chou En-lai openly expressed China's support for Pakistan's claims in Kashmir vis-a-vis India. The 1962 war also resulted in the United States altering its pro-Pakistan stance in favour of a more balanced policy in South Asia. Washington was primarily concerned with containing Chinese influence. Toward this end, the U.S. commenced a
military assistance program to India while at the same time scaling down military aid to Pakistan. Moscow also changed its policy after the 1962 war. It tilted less toward India and, like the U.S., also pursued a more balanced South Asian policy. The Soviet Union continued its various aid programs to India. At the same time, Moscow attempted to compete with China for influence in Pakistan. In 1963, barter and air agreements were signed between Moscow and Islamabad. The following year, the Soviets dropped their earlier unqualified support for India’s position on Kashmir in the Security Council. Thus, following the 1962 war, there were dramatic changes in power alignments in the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{10}

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War broke out partly as a consequence of these changed relationships. Due to the increase in military aid to India from the West as a result of the 1962 war, the strategic balance in South Asia was shifting in India’s favour. In 1965, there was a perception in Islamabad that Pakistan would have to act quickly or face a \textit{fait accompli} over Kashmir.\textsuperscript{11} The second war over Kashmir was fought in September and October 1965 in what was Pakistan’s final effort to resolve the dispute through the use of military force. The outcome of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War was a stalemate.\textsuperscript{12}

China’s position on the Indo-Pakistani dispute continued to shift increasingly in Pakistan’s favour. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, China issued several \textit{ultimata} to India which included calls for: India to dismantle its military structures along the China-Sikkim border; the withdrawal of Indian troops (allegedly on the Chinese side of the border); and the cessation of all provocative acts against China along the Sino-Indian border. Beijing declared that New Delhi would have to bear grave consequences if the warnings went unheeded. It is not clear how helpful China’s actions were to Pakistan. In any event, India and Pakistan stopped fighting before any Chinese military intervention took place. Between the early 1960s and 1971, Pakistan came increasingly to regard China as a potentially important ally against India although Islamabad probably read more into the friendship than was actually warranted.\textsuperscript{13}

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War led to the curtailment of American economic and military aid to both India and Pakistan. After the war, economic aid was renewed to both countries on a reduced scale but military aid was given only on a limited “one-time” basis under specific conditions. Thus, the close Pakistani-American relationship of the 1950s underwent several alterations between the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the start of the Bangla Desh Crisis.\textsuperscript{14}

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War did not affect the balanced policy of the Soviet Union in South Asia. After the 1965 war, the Soviet Union, with U.S. endorsement, offered to act as a
mediator between the two South Asian countries. Both India and Pakistan accepted the Soviet offer and a conference was held in January 1966 at Tashkent. India and Pakistan, after considerable prodding from the Soviet Union, agreed to a restoration of the 1949 cease-fire line. Following the Tashkent Conference, the Soviet Union, while continuing its various aid programs to India, also inaugurated a major economic assistance program to Pakistan. In 1968, the Soviet Union commenced small-scale military assistance to Pakistan. Moscow's policy of containing China evolved into a call in 1969 for both India and Pakistan to join a Soviet-sponsored Asian Mutual Security Pact. The extent to which India and Pakistan were willing to act in accordance with Soviet objectives would eventually determine Moscow's policy toward those two countries.15

Although New Delhi's and Moscow's policies toward Pakistan ran along divergent lines, there was an Indo-Soviet consensus that Chinese influence in South Asia should be limited as far as possible. In contrast, Islamabad refused to moderate its close relationship with China even while accepting Soviet aid. Given this situation, Moscow made the following offer to New Delhi in the late 1960s: the Soviet Union would terminate, or at least reduce, its military aid to Pakistan if India would sign a treaty with the Soviet Union. Moscow considered such a treaty an important first step in the direction of Indian endorsement of the Soviet's Mutual Asian Security proposal. In 1969, New Delhi accepted the Soviet offer and a broad agreement on the proposed treaty was reached in the last half of that year. The treaty probably would have been signed in 1970 except for the domestic political situation in India (the background to the treaty will be discussed further in Chapter 5). For its part, the Soviet Union informed India that military aid to Pakistan had been suspended in April 1970 although in reality some arms shipments reached Pakistan more than a year later. It should be noted, however, that the negotiations on the Indo-Soviet treaty were conducted in secret. Publicly, the Soviet Union maintained its balanced policy in South Asia and, in fact, economic aid to Pakistan was expanded. Moscow had not given up on its efforts to attain greater influence in Pakistan but the Soviet tilt toward India was reemerging by late 1970.16

It was in this international setting that the Bangla Desh Crisis erupted in 1971. On most global and regional issues, Indian and Pakistani foreign policies were running directly counter to each other. As events were to show, the ability—or willingness—of Beijing, Washington, and Moscow to impose a "peaceful" solution on their "client states" during the Bangla Desh Crisis was quite limited. Thus, the dynamics of the hostile Indo-Pakistani relationship would once again lead to war in the subcontinent.

39
HYPOTHESES

The two sides at the start of the Bangla Desh Crisis were unequal in capability. Prior to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Pakistan had been able to maintain a military balance in South Asia by becoming America's most important ally in the region. Due the commencement of American and Western aid to India after that war, however, the strategic balance in the region had shifted steadily in favour of India. The termination of American military aid to the region in the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War also affected Pakistan more than India. The Indians, because of their earlier and closer relationship with the Soviet Union, were less reliant on American military assistance.

At the start of the Bangla Desh Crisis, India held the edge in four of the six resources defined as making up a state's potential power. India had greater human, geographic, economic, and military resources. Pakistan held a slight edge in diplomatic resources. Neither side had nuclear weapons, though India was far more advanced in nuclear technology. Thus, in terms of capability, India was relatively stronger than Pakistan at the start of the Bangla Desh Crisis. Thus, the hypotheses to be tested for Pakistan are

HYPOTHESIS 1: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution of a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 2: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to secure U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 3: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

HYPOTHESIS 4: A weaker crisis actor will not mobilize its military forces.

HYPOTHESIS 5: A weaker crisis actor will try to maintain (or restore) the political, territorial, and economic status quo ante.

The hypotheses to be tested for India are:

HYPOTHESIS 6: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to avoid any contact with the adversary which might lead to a peaceful resolution of a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 7: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to block or circumvent U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 8: A stronger crisis actor will not attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers

HYPOTHESIS 9: A stronger crisis actor will mobilize its military forces.
HYPOTHESIS 10: A stronger crisis actor will seek to change the international system until the expected costs of further political, territorial, and/or economic expansion are equal to or greater than the expected benefits.

BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS

The root causes of the Bangla Desh Crisis lay within Pakistan itself. Even though East Pakistan contained 54% of the population, it was politically and economically dominated by the western wing. Approximately 84% of the central civil service consisted of West Pakistanis. The army was 95% West Pakistani. Approximately two-thirds of the central government's revenue expenditure went on defence of which more than 90% was in West Pakistan. In the two decades preceding the crisis, East Pakistan's shares of imports was in the 25-30% range although it had 50-70% of Pakistan's export earnings. This had resulted in a net transfer of $2.6 billion from East to West Pakistan over the period 1948-49 to 1968-69. This political and economic domination provided the long-term background to the Bangla Desh Crisis.

It was with this background of East Pakistani frustration that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (known as Mujib), articulated the Awami League's Six Point Plan in early 1966. The plan, basically, spelled out the following ideas:

1) Pakistan's government was to be federal and parliamentary, with representation in the federal legislature based upon population;

2) the federal government was to be responsible for only defence and foreign affairs;

3) there were to be two separate currencies freely convertible in each wing or one single currency subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system which would prevent the flight of capital from one region to another;

4) the federating units were to be responsible for fiscal policy and were to provide the federal government with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defence and foreign affairs;

5) a) the regional governments were to have power under the constitution to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the country, which was to be the responsibility of the federal government; b) constitutional provisions were to be made to enable separate accounts to be maintained for the foreign exchange earnings of
each of the federating units, under the control of their respective governments; and
c) constitutional provisions were to be made for the foreign exchange requirement of the
federal government to be met by the federating units; and

6) the governments of the federating units were to be empowered to maintain a militia or
para-military force in order to contribute effectively towards national security.19

The Six Point Plan did not imply that the Awami League was committed to the reorganization of
the social structure of East Pakistan. The Awami League was seeking the perquisites of office
which the West Pakistani elite had denied to the Bengali elite. The Six Point Plan was designed
to gain the vote of the frustrated East Pakistani electorate.20

By the late 1960s, pressure was mounting in both wings of Pakistan for the military
government to give way to civilian rule. The massive opposition forced President Ayub Khan,
who had been the head of the military government since 1958, to resign in 1969. His successor,
General Yahya Khan, was compelled to announce on November 28, 1969 that general elections
would be held at the end of the following year.21

The guidelines for the transfer to civilian rule were set out in the Legal Framework Order,
1970 (L.F.O.) issued by Yahya in his capacity as President on March 28, 1970. The National
Assembly, which was to be elected at the end of the year, was given power by the L F.O. to frame
the constitution which was to embody certain “fundamental principles,” most notably that.

Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan in which the Provinces and other territories which are now and may
hereinafter be included in it. Pakistan shall be so united in a federation that the
independence, the territorial integrity and the national solidarity of Pakistan are
ensured and that the unity of the Federation is not in any manner impaired....

All powers including legislative, administrative, and financial, shall be so
distributed between the Federal Government and Provinces that the Provinces
shall have maximum autonomy.

It shall be ensured that:

within a specified period, economic and all other disparities between the
Provinces and between different areas in a Province are removed by the
adoption of statutory and other measures.22

Due to pressure in East Pakistan, the L.F.O. replaced the mid-1950s system of parity (both wings
getting an equal number of seats in the national legislative body) with representation by
population. Thus, the eastern wing was given 169 out of 313 seats. Until the constitution came into force, the L.F.O. made the President the final legal authority in Pakistan. The President also was given power to: summon the Assembly on the date of his choosing; dissolve the Assembly if it did not frame the constitution within 120 days; see a draft copy of the constitution before it was presented to the Assembly; and to authenticate the Constitution Bill on pain of dissolution of the National Assembly if he did not find the Bill satisfactory.23

Pakistan's army had two central concerns. The first was that the territorial integrity of Pakistan should be maintained under a strong central government. This concern was thought to have been satisfied by the "fundamental principles" in the L.F.O. which were to order the new constitution. The second concern was for the autonomy of the armed forces from political interference and the maintenance of the military budget at pre-election levels. These critical matters had not been stipulated in the L.F.O. Islamabad, however, had been informed by its intelligence services that the elections were going to be inconclusive. In such a situation, the military authorities would hold the balance of power and could take a political initiative to protect their interests.24

The Awami League was allowed to contest the 1970 election on the Six Point platform. Yahya probably did not see this decision as presenting a danger to Pakistani unity. First, he overestimated the ability of the army to impose its will on the politicians and populace if this became necessary. Second, there is evidence to indicate that Yahya had been assured that the Six Point Plan was for political consumption and that the Awami League would move away from it after the elections. Mujib might have said the Plan was negotiable because he, himself, did not anticipate that his party would have an absolute majority and, thus, he would have to negotiate with the other parties.25

The results of the general elections, which were held on December 7, 1970, surprised all concerned. The Awami League won 160 seats (and seven more in subsequent elections for women). Thus, the Awami League had an unanticipated absolute majority in the National Assembly.26

The Awami League's absolute majority opened up the possibility of an implementation of the Six Point Plan in its entirety—a situation that Islamabad had not foreseen. Full implementation of the Awami League's program threatened the Martial Law Administration in several ways. The authorities in Islamabad had no way of knowing the level of resources that the "federating units" would allot to the armed forces. Mujib also favoured friendlier relations with India. The
implementation of the League's program also meant, in the economic sphere, a radically
decentralized Pakistan. This threatened elements of the West Pakistani establishment--the civil
and military bureaucracy as well as business and industrial entrepreneurs--from which the army
 garnered much of its support. 27 It should be noted, however, that in the immediate post-election
 period, Islamabad was unclear about the substance of the Six Point Plan and had not thought
 through the consequences of its implementation 28

Thus, although the military had misgivings about the Six Point Plan, there still was not a
 perception of crisis in mid-December. It was obvious from the mounting opposition which the
 army had faced in the late 1960s that there would have to be some deviation from the status quo.
 That is why the L.F.O. called for "maximum autonomy" for the provinces and the ending of
 economic disparity between the two wings. Therefore, despite the election results, there was still
 a consensus within the military elite that power should be transferred to civilians. 29

The Martial Law Administration was primarily interested in moderating the degree of
 change so that the army would be able to maintain an important position for itself; and Pakistan's
 unity would be safeguarded. In pursuing this objective, Islamabad sought to bring about
 negotiations on the broad outlines of the constitution before the first sitting of the National
 Assembly. Thus, the army tried at various times to bring about discussions between the Awami
 League on the one hand and, on the other, itself and/or political parties based in the West--
especially, for reasons discussed below, the Pakistan People's Party. This was Islamabad's
 principal strategy between the the time election results were known and March 23, 1971 at which
 time, for reasons discussed at a later point in this chapter, the military government no longer
 perceived that there was any possibility of coming to an agreement with the Awami League on
 terms acceptable to the army. 30

In mid-December, Yahya made his first attempt to bring the Awami League to the
 negotiating table. Yahya endeavoured to bring about a meeting between the leaders of the
 Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party (P.P.P.), which won 88 out of 144 seats in West
 Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the P.P.P., enjoyed an amicable personal relationship
 with Yahya and other members of the ruling junta. During the elections, the P.P.P. ran on a
 platform of "Islamic Socialism" and a "thousand years war" with India. Thus, although Bhutto
 stood for the reduction in power of the West Pakistani establishment, he also favoured a strong
 central government and a powerful military capability for the country--thus, addressing the army's
 two central concerns in a manner that was acceptable to Islamabad. Immediately after the
 elections, Bhutto had proposed that the Awami League and the P.P.P., as the largest parties in
East and West Pakistan, respectively, agree on the broad outlines of the constitution. In apparent agreement with Bhutto's idea, Yahya sent an emissary to both party leaders a few days later to arrange a meeting between them. Mujib declined Yahya's invitation. The military had expected negotiations to take place between political leaders as a matter of course. Thus, Mujib's response was as unexpected as it was unwelcome.31

Bengali political opinion, both inside and outside the Awami League, wanted a full implementation of the League's program since it had received the overwhelming endorsement of the East Pakistani electorate. Mujib, for his part, made it quite clear in his post-election speeches that he would not compromise. In late December, he declared that the Six Point Plan would form the basis of the constitution. In early January, he had the elected Awami League members of the National Assembly swear an oath not to modify the Six Point Plan.32 Mujib also called upon the "awakening masses" of West Pakistan to join their Bengali brethren in an effort to realize their common aspirations but he refrained from calling upon the P.P.P. for cooperation.33

It was with this background that, in mid-January, Yahya again attempted to bring the Awami League to the negotiating table. Yahya visited Dhaka from January 12-14, 1971 in order to hold meetings with Mujib. On the day of its arrival, the presidential party requested a copy of the Six Point Plan for the upcoming meetings.34 For Islamabad, the start of the crisis—that is, the commencement of the pre-crisis period—can be directly traced to those mid-January meetings in Dhaka.

DEcision Flow

Subheadings are used in the decision flow developed below, their sole purpose being to demarcate the crisis period for Pakistan and India during the Bangla Desh Crisis. It is during the crisis period that the hypotheses listed earlier in this chapter are to be tested. The pre-crisis period and crisis period for Pakistan and India is demarcated as follows:

Pakistan's pre-crisis period (mid-January to April 9, 1971)

Pakistan's crisis period (April 10 to December 3, 1971)

India's pre-crisis period (late April to late July, 1971)—(Because the Pakistani crisis period is still in progress, the narrative following this subheading focuses on both Indian and Pakistani behavior).

India's crisis period (late July to December 3, 1971)—(Because the Pakistani crisis period is still in progress, the narrative following this subheading focuses on both Indian and Pakistani behavior).
The rationale for selecting these particular demarcation points is provided within the decision flow itself. Although the crisis period for both Pakistan and India extended beyond December 3—the start of the war—that part of the Bangla Desh Crisis is beyond the scope of the decision flow constructed here.

Pakistan’s Pre-Crisis Period (mid-January to April 9)

Two factors triggered the pre-crisis period for Islamabad. First, during the Government-Awami League meetings in mid-January, government officials became more fully apprised of the Awami League program and the potential consequences to the armed forces if it was fully implemented. Second, Sheikh Mujib did not give the necessary assurances to allay the Government’s concerns over the Awami League’s program.

First, Islamabad began to realize that the Awami League’s assumption of power would have serious consequences for the army. An Awami League government raised the possibility of: enforced expansion and promotion of Bengalis in the officer corps to eliminate inequities; an accommodative stance toward India; limits on defence spending; and a reduced stature for the military with the expansion of the provincial militias specified in the Six Points. Thus, after more than a decade of protection under Ayub, the spectre of political interference in the military was raised.

Second, the assurances given by Mujib proved insufficient in allaying the concerns of the army. At a meeting held on January 14 between government officials and the Awami League ‘High Command’, Mujib made the following promises: not to base the constitution rigidly on the Six Points; to meet with West Pakistani leaders several days before the first sitting of the National Assembly in order to incorporate their ideas into a draft constitution; not to dismiss anyone from West Pakistan in the civil or military bureaucracy, and to make Yahya the next “elected” President of Pakistan. Government officials, however, had built up a latent skepticism and distrust of Mujib. The Governor of East Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan, intimated at this meeting that the Awami League could force a constitution through the National Assembly regardless of assurances given in the privacy of meetings. What might have satisfied the military is a Mujib agreement to work closely with the P.P.P.. Yahya specifically pressed Mujib to do so. Mujib, however, would not make any specific commitments in this regard.
After this meeting, Yahya and other government officials perceived a significant increase in the threat posed by an Awami League federal government to the position of the army and a unified Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan, however, did not move against the Awami League at this point. This might have been because of the promises Mujib had made to protect West Pakistani and army interests. It seems that the government was willing to let the situation develop before deciding what course of action to follow.

In early February, Mujib put increasing pressure on Islamabad to summon the National Assembly. Mujib publicly declared that the Assembly should meet on February 15 and proclaimed it a day of “direct action” to press the government to agree to this. However, the East Pakistan Assembly Hall—Mujib’s preferred location for the National Assembly—would not have been ready until almost the end of February at the earliest. Upon being informed of this, Mujib indicated he could accept a late February or early March meeting if the announcement of a date was made before February 15. On February 13, Yahya announced that the National Assembly would meet on March 3. It was primarily a perception of time constraints, brought on by Mujib’s pressure tactics, that led to this announcement by Yahya.

It also is likely that another factor played a significant role in Yahya’s decision to summon the National Assembly. In early February, Mujib had accepted an invitation from Yahya to come to Islamabad to discuss the political situation. It is not clear whether government officials had the impression that an acceptable arrangement could be worked out with the Awami League. It seems, however, that the military authorities were willing to speak to Mujib before deciding what to do.

Because of Mujib’s promises at the January 14 meeting, the army high command also expected that negotiations would take place between the Awami League and West Pakistani-based political parties. As noted, Islamabad was hoping that a constitutional consensus would develop between the Awami League and the P.P.P. It is not clear whether Islamabad thought such a consensus was likely but government officials had adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

Within days of the February 13 announcement summoning the National Assembly, however, the public debate between the Awami League and the P.P.P. became acrimonious. On February 15, Mujib declared that the Six Points were public property not susceptible to adjustment and expansion. Also on February 15, Bhutto made it clear that, unless there were prior negotiations on the constitution, the P.P.P. would boycott the National Assembly. On February 17, Bhutto declared that there was no room to negotiate with the Awami League.
went on to add that a National Assembly meeting in Dhaka would be a "slaughter house" for him. After Bhutto's February 17 speech, Mujib cancelled his visit to West Pakistan. It seems that, at this point, the situation had developed sufficiently for Islamabad to choose its next course of action.

There was a perception in Islamabad at this time that convening the National Assembly would severely diminish the army's control over the eastern wing and also place the future of the armed forces in a precarious position. At a meeting of the military government on February 20, it was decided that to deal with the situation in East Pakistan the government needed to give serious consideration to other options, including the limited use of military force. Two days later, a meeting of governors, martial law administrators, and the heads of the military and civilian secret services was called to discuss the crisis in East Pakistan. At this meeting, Yahya noted that the P.P.P. was unwilling to attend the National Assembly because of the Awami League's "rigid" stand on the Six Points. Yahya opined, therefore, that no useful purpose would be served by a meeting of the National Assembly. After this meeting, Yahya informed the Governor of East Pakistan that on March 1 he intended to postpone the first session of the National Assembly in order to give the parties more time to settle their differences. It seems that a few days after this meeting, the military government began the secret reinforcement of troops in East Pakistan. Thus, by late February, greater emphasis came to be placed on a military solution in East Pakistan.

On March 1, a message was read out over Pakistan radio which announced that the National Assembly was being postponed sine die. The military government expected Major General Yaqub Khan, who had been appointed to act as both Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan on March 1, to quell any Bengali opposition to the announcement. There was a perception in Islamabad that the average Bengali could be frightened into following the government line through a show of force. As for the Awami League leadership, they were thought to be brave in front of a mob but when faced with tanks were expected to quickly disperse into their communities.

The scale of the Bengali reaction to the announcement on March 1 and the inability of the military authorities in the East to contain it came as a surprise to the decision-makers in Islamabad. Hostility, long simmering, was unleashed at an unprecedented level against people from the western wing and non-Bengali Urdu-speaking "Biharis" who had settled as refugees in East Pakistan after partition. Units of the Pakistani army in the East became increasingly constrained in their movements and in their procurement of supplies. Despite the occurrence of these events,
there was a perception in Islamabad that only a lack of will or mismanagement could account for the difficulties of the military authorities in the East. On March 3, a highly successful non-cooperation movement was launched by Mujib in response to the postponement of the National Assembly. It also was announced on March 3 that Mujib would speak at the Dhaka racecourse on the 7th, when it was widely expected that the independence of Bangla Desh would be proclaimed. Despite the pleas of Mujib, violence between Bengalis and non-Bengalis continued to increase. There were several deaths attributed to the military when it reacted to civil disobedience. This increased the pressure on Mujib to secede from Pakistan.

The military government continued in its efforts to bring about negotiations between the Awami League and other political parties in the drafting of the constitution. On March 3, Yahya called for a round table conference of all party leaders to be held on March 10 in Dhaka. Mujib responded negatively to Yahya's invitation.

At this time, government leaders felt they were losing control of the situation. The postponement of the National Assembly only served to augment the power of the Awami League in East Pakistan. In Islamabad, the perceived threat to the unity of Pakistan and the future position of the army increased dramatically after March 1. Government leaders also perceived that they would have to act quickly before the army's position in East Pakistan deteriorated even further. Thus, on March 6, Yahya personally announced that the National Assembly's first meeting had been rescheduled for March 25. In the interim, the buildup of Pakistani armed forces continued in the East. It also was announced that Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, who had previously won a reputation for toughness in situations of civil disorder in Baluchistan, would replace Major General Yaqub as Martial Law Administrator and Governor of East Pakistan. In this way, Islamabad was leaving open the possibility of taking greater military action at some future point if such action was deemed necessary.

The Awami League leadership did not move to secession at this time. Mujib, during his March 7 speech at the Dhaka racecourse, stated that the Awami League would participate in the National Assembly provided there was an immediate "transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people." This implied that the President would no longer have the power given to him by the L.F.O. to call the Assembly into session at a date of his choosing, to authenticate the constitution, and to set a time-limit on the framing of the constitution by the Assembly. At the March 7 rally, Mujib also announced ten "directives" to Bengalis concerning the...
conduct of their public, business, and private affairs. These directives were intended to demonstrate Bengali solidarity and give substance to the threat of an Awami League administration as the government of an independent state.

The challenge to the central government's authority continued to escalate. It was announced on March 9 that Yahya would visit East Pakistan in the near future so that preparations could be made for the meeting of the National Assembly. The Pakistani government issued a series of Martial Law Orders which imposed heavy penalties for compliance with the Awami League's directives. A further thirty-five directives were issued when Yahya arrived in Dhaka on March 15. Thus, the new round of talks between Yahya and Mujib began in an atmosphere of increasing confrontation.

It seems that the army intended to use these discussions, between March 15 and March 25, either to bring about a split between different elements in the Awami League or to win time to complete preparations for military action against the Awami League and its supporters. On the other hand, it would have been difficult for the Awami League leadership to accept a settlement which fell far short of the Six Points because of the pressure that had been built up in East Pakistan. After much deliberation, Yahya's team of negotiators indicated that a formula for the immediate transfer of power by proclamation would be acceptable to the President. A draft proclamation was drawn up by the government team on March 19 to serve as the basis of further negotiations. It was agreed on March 22 that the National Assembly again should be postponed so that a final version of the proclamation could be prepared. At this point, Islamabad still was willing to give serious consideration to a political resolution of the crisis.

The turning point toward a military solution came on March 23, "Pakistan Day," which had been renamed "Resistance Day" by the Awami League. On this day there were demands for independence at demonstrations and parades throughout East Pakistan. Students, marching in military formation under the Bangla Desh flag, called for armed resistance. The Bangla Desh flag was hoisted on buildings throughout East Pakistan. As for the Pakistani flag, either it was seen behind armed guards at military installations or it was seen being trampled on the streets.

It also was on March 23 that the Awami League met with government representatives to discuss amendments to the presidential draft proclamation which they wanted made. The draft proclamation, as amended by the Awami League, referred to Pakistan as a "confederation." Such an arrangement had not even been intimated before. As government representatives pointed out, a confederation is in essence an agreement between two sovereign states. Not only did a
call for the "Confederation of Pakistan" violate the L.F.O. but it also violated the first point of the Awami League's own Six Point Plan.61

The events of March 23 confirmed the suspicions of the army high command that Mujib could not be trusted to uphold the unity of Pakistan nor to protect the future position of the military. Unless preemptive action were taken, the military command feared that, at best, the forces in East Pakistan would become prisoners in their cantonments before being forced to leave the eastern wing; or, at worst, the troops in the East would have to fight a civil war while lacking resupply capability against Bengali police, troops, and guerrillas. Thus, on March 23, the army high command decided to take military action against what was termed a rebellion.62

The army set March 25 as the date on which it would take military action in the East. In order not to arouse suspicion, the military continued to negotiate with the Awami League on and after March 23. Yahya, as planned, suddenly left Dhaka on March 25 without explanation. Despite Islamabad's best efforts at secrecy, the Awami League's leadership was aware that the army was about to move against them.63

After Yahya landed in Karachi, Islamabad ordered its troops in East Pakistan to move against the Awami League and other centres of anticipated resistance. In the month that Pakistani troops had been reinforced in the eastern wing, their numbers had doubled from 20,000 to 40,000.64 Most of the Awami League leadership had already gone into hiding. Mujib stayed behind and was arrested early on the morning of March 26. West Pakistani units of the army moved against the Bengali police, the East Pakistan Rifles, the East Bengal Regiment, and the para-military ansars. Units of the army also were sent to the student halls in the university area. Offices of the opposition newspapers were seized. There were thirty-five foreign journalists in Dhaka who were confined to the Intercontinental Hotel. They were deported on March 27.65 The actions of the Pakistani army on March 25 marked the beginning of an attempt to impose a military solution on East Pakistan.

Most of the Awami League leadership started fleeing to Calcutta from March 25 onwards. About 20,000 others belonging to the military, para-military and police also managed to cross the border. The General Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Awami League, Tajuddin Ahmed, declared the independence of Bangla Desh on April 10 from Calcutta. With Indian assistance, a Provisional Government-in-Exile was set up in Calcutta on April 14 with Tajuddin Ahmed as Prime Minister. India also helped set up the rudiments of a military structure under a former officer in the Pakistani army, Colonel A.G. Osmani. This military force was known as the Mukti Fauj (People's
Army). Thus, from mid-April onwards, the East Pakistanis in the forefront of the Bangla Desh struggle were politically and militarily organizing themselves with Indian assistance to confront the Government of Pakistan.66

Pakistan's Crisis Period (April 10 to December 3)

Bangla Desh's declaration of independence was an internal verbal challenge to the military regime of Pakistan, triggering the crisis period for Pakistan's decision-makers. The creation of the Bangla Desh Government-in-Exile and the Mukti Fauj greatly increased their perceived threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Bengali resistance had never before reached such a level. In mid-April, Islamabad controlled only a small part of East Pakistan. It would have been possible to traverse the province from East to West without encountering any central government authorities. Thus, there was pressure on government forces to retake control of the eastern wing as quickly as possible in order to limit any support the Government-in-Exile and the Mukti Fauj might be able to garner in the province. The creation of the Mukti Fauj also led to the perception that the central government was going to face not only disparate guerrilla bands, assisted on occasion by Indian Border Security Forces but prolonged guerrilla warfare against Bengalis being trained and given material support by the Government of India. This was unprecedented. There also was a perception of a significant increase in--if not a high probability of--war with India. In March 1970, Indian Border Security Forces adjacent to East Pakistan had been reinforced and Indian armed forces had been sent to West Bengal. According to the Indian government, this had been done to counter political terrorist activity in the region. There was a perception among Pakistani officials, however, that these troop movements were part of a military buildup for offensive action in East Pakistan if the opportunity were to present itself.67 Thus, April 10 marked the Pakistan's entry into the crisis period of the Bangla Desh Crisis.

During the first month of its crisis period, the Government of Pakistan made two specific decisions which relate to the hypotheses being tested. First, Pakistan sought military commitments from China. Second, the military government continued with its efforts to restore the territorial and political status quo ante of East Pakistan. Each of these decisions will be looked at in turn.

Throughout April, Pakistan tried to secure military commitments from China in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war. A series of letters were exchanged between Islamabad and Beijing concerning this matter. In this correspondence, China explicitly stated that it would support Pakistan politically in the latter's dispute with India. Beijing went on to add, however, that China
would not intervene militarily in another Indo-Pakistani war. Thus, Pakistan's first attempt to get military commitments from a major power were frustrated.

The public line taken by the Pakistanis and Chinese was quite different. On April 13, the Government of Pakistan published a letter in which Chou En-lai assured Yahya that: "should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence." However, according to authoritative sources (including a former member of the Pakistani Foreign Service), there was one part of the letter which was not made public in which Chou wrote: "the question of East Pakistan should be settled according to the wishes of the people of East Pakistan." Islamabad suppressed this sentence in order to give the impression that Pakistan would have China's unqualified support in any future conflict with India. By mid-April, however, the core group in the Yahya Khan government did not expect Chinese military intervention in the event of a war with India and acted accordingly thereafter.

The Government of Pakistan tried to restore the territorial status quo ante in East Pakistan throughout the crisis. Most of the province was outside government control at the time that the crisis period started. By late April, Pakistani troops had recaptured almost all of the province and there was a perception among Pakistani decision-makers that the crisis was diminishing. When Cox's Bazar was retaken on May 10, it marked the reestablishment of Pakistani control over the eastern wing. For most of the time under consideration in this study, the Government of Pakistan would be able to maintain relatively tight control of the urban areas and a tenuous grip over almost all of the East Pakistani countryside.

From the March 25 crackdown onwards, Islamabad tried to maintain the political-diplomatic status quo ante in East Pakistan: that is, Islamabad tried to secure international recognition that what was happening in East Pakistan was a matter strictly within Pakistan's domestic jurisdiction. Islamabad wanted any future political settlement in East Pakistan to be strictly on the Government of Pakistan's terms. Starting in late March, Islamabad issued a hail of protests against "interference" by India in the "internal affairs" of Pakistan. U Thant offered assistance from the United Nations in notes sent to the Pakistani government on April 5 and 22. In the April 22 note, the Secretary-General stated his belief that: "the United Nations and its specialized agencies have a most useful role to play, with the consent of your government, in providing emergency assistance." Yahya responded on April 29 that: "international assistance, if and when required, will be administered by Pakistani relief agencies." Most countries, including the U.S., Soviet
Union, and China had publicly or privately expressed the view by late April that the situation in East Pakistan must be regarded as the internal affair of Pakistan despite the fact that there were over 500,000 refugees in India by that time.77

India's Pre-Crisis Period (late April to late July)

After March 25, there was mounting public pressure in India for immediate military intervention but Indira Gandhi's government78 did not wish to commit the country to a military course of action at that time. The Chief of Army Staff, General Manekshaw, advanced three reasons why India should not undertake action in late March: 1) while Tibetan passes were still open, India ran a greater than normal risk of temporarily losing territory to the Chinese; 2) the campaign would have to end by the monsoon season (which usually starts in mid-June) because otherwise the Indian army would be impeded; and 3) India did not have sufficient numerical superiority on the East Pakistan border for immediate action (despite the build-up of troops in the area).79 Therefore, the Indian army would have to wait until mid-October for the ground to dry in East Pakistan after the monsoon. The mountain passes between India and China usually did not receive snowfall before November. It was shortly after March 25 that India started formulating plans to re-equip, re-train, and transfer its forces from the Chinese border to positions close to East Pakistan in case it was decided that military action was feasible at some future date.80

Early in April, the Indian government made the decision to: 1) register refugees from East Pakistan as foreigners; and 2) have the majority of refugees settled in camps close to the India-East Pakistan border. In previous exchanges of population with Pakistan, refugees coming to India had been given the status of citizens. The reason for the Indian decision was that, unlike previous refugees, the majority of refugees coming to India in late March 1971 were Muslim.81 This decision had a profound impact on the crisis.

The actions of Pakistan's army in the East in late March upset the equilibrium of relations between India and Pakistan but did not mark the beginning of a crisis for New Delhi. Refugees had fled to India on previous occasions and this had not necessarily led to outbreaks of foreign policy crises. The situation developed into a crisis for India by late April, however, because of three factors. First, after mid-April, there was a sudden surge of refugees with no signs of a slowdown in the influx. The economic costs of looking after the refugees was a great burden on India. Second, since mid-April, a greatly increasing proportion of the refugees entering India were Hindu. Pakistani authorities had blamed much of the turmoil in their country on the Hindu population of East Pakistan. Indian decision-makers, after mid-April, became increasingly
concerned that Islamabad intended to expel much of the Hindu population from East Pakistan. India's decision-makers perceived such an expulsion would have a dramatic effect on India's politics, society, and economy. The third reason that the situation developed into a crisis was that Indian decision-makers perceived an increasing military threat from Pakistan because Islamabad might retaliate against India because of India's assistance to the Bengalis.

Throughout India's pre-crisis and crisis periods, one of New Delhi's major objectives was to bring about a negotiated political settlement between the Government of Pakistan and the Awami League. Until late May, India's primary strategy was to try to persuade external powers to bring pressure to bear on Islamabad to partake in such negotiations. The Indians recognized that their strategy probably would not be successful. New Delhi, however, was not ready to act on its own at this point.

In late April, Islamabad sought to restore the political-administrative status quo ante in East Pakistan. An attempt was made to recreate the civil bureaucracy, which had dissolved in March, for the province. An attempt also was made to reorganize and reconstitute police and other internal security forces at this time. The personnel recruited to fill these vacancies were normally either West Pakistanis on temporary duty or East Pakistanis whose allegiance was in doubt. For this reason, although the Pakistani government was able to reassert military control over almost all of the province for most the crisis, it was never able to reassert administrative control outside of the urban areas.

The Government of Pakistan placed greater emphasis on restoring the political and territorial status quo ante than in reconstituting East Pakistan's economy. Repressive military action and punitive measures were used against the civilian population. This led to widespread damage to property and a continued dislocation of the economy. Islamabad's repressive policies in the eastern wing, however, began to have an effect on the policies of other countries toward Pakistan.

In early May, the U.S. government announced that, although its existing development projects would continue, future development assistance would depend upon whether Pakistan cooperated with internationally supervised relief efforts in East Pakistan. The American position probably played a large part in Islamabad's announcement that Pakistan would be willing to accept U.N. aid in East Pakistan provided it was "coordinated" by Pakistani officials. This marked the first time that Pakistan acquiesced in U.N. intervention although it was not for the purpose of defusing the crisis.
The continued flight of refugees from East Pakistan was placing a tremendous burden on the Indian economy and exacerbating social tensions. According to the Indian Labour and Rehabilitation Minister, the number of refugees in India increased from 1,251,544 on May 1 to 3,435,243 on May 21. In almost every country there was an increase in sympathy towards India and hostility towards Pakistan as international concern for the plight of the refugees grew. In a speech to the Lok Sabha on May 24, Indira Gandhi asserted that: "what was claimed to be a problem of Pakistan has become an internal problem of India." The central theme of Indian diplomacy became that Pakistan was responsible for creating conditions which would facilitate the return of the refugees. Thus, Pakistan had to give "credible guarantees for their future safety and well-being." The Prime Minister went on to say, "If the world does not take heed, we shall be constrained to take all measures to ensure our security and the preservation and developments of the structure of our social and economic life." 

By late May, there was a perception among Indian decision-makers that international pressure alone would probably not bring about negotiations between Islamabad and the Awami League. The Government of India concluded that, with some assistance and encouragement, the Mukti Fauj could be sustained to the point where the price Islamabad had to pay would become too high and a negotiated settlement with the Awami League might appear the better alternative. Thus, in early June, the Indian army began a more concerted effort to train Mukti Fauj personnel. New Delhi did not view a war between India and Pakistan as inevitable, or even likely, at that time.

New Delhi became increasingly dissatisfied with the support India was receiving from the international community in June. India perceived that most of the world's capitals thought that Islamabad was using excessive force. Yet, the events in East Pakistan were considered the internal affair of Pakistan. By the end of June, India made four decisions. First, all refugees, including the very quickly escalating number of Bengali Hindus, were to be returned. Previously, Hindu refugees had been allowed to stay in India. Second, India would support a transfer of power in Pakistan to the moderate elements of the Awami League. Whether this transfer took place within a Pakistani federation or in an independent state did not concern Indian decision-makers. Third, force would be used to achieve Indian objectives. Initially, the force to be used was to be indirect, namely, giving increased support to the Bangla Desh fighters. If necessary, direct Indian intervention would occur at an appropriate time if the Bengali guerrillas could not bring about an acceptable solution on their own. Fourth, India would make greater efforts to mobilize international public opinion in support of Indian objectives.
Pakistan approached the United Nations in June--this time to seek assistance in the repatriation of refugees from India. In early June, it was announced that a Pakistani intergovernmental committee and a special U.N. group would work together closely in planning relief work for East Pakistan. A report was prepared on the rehabilitation needs of East Pakistan by Ismat T. Kittani, the U.N. Under Secretary-General for inter-agency affairs. India became concerned in June, however, about the political implications of a U.N. role when the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin, allegedly blamed the liberation movement for the problem of displaced persons. The Indians were concerned that Yahya might use the U.N. as a shield. Yahya probably wanted cooperation with the U.N. for this reason.91

The major development in July was the Sino-American rapprochement which largely was due to the efforts of the Pakistanis. On July 15, President Nixon announced he would visit China at some point before May 1972. The rapprochement signalled the coming together of Pakistan's closest allies.92

India's Crisis Period (late July to December 3)

The crisis period for Indian decision-makers commenced in late July. The Sino-American rapprochement signalled the failure of India's policy of forcing Pakistan to come to terms with the Awami League through diplomatic pressure. It was thought in New Delhi that the Chinese would induce the U.S. to maintain American support of Pakistan. From New Delhi's perspective, American pressure was essential to make the Pakistanis move in a direction favourable to India.93 By late July, the Indian government concluded that India would not be able to mobilize sufficient pressure from other members of the international community to bring about a change in the Pakistani policy.94 The refugee problem had worsened for India since the crisis began in late April. There were 7 million refugees, the vast majority of them Hindu.95 The refugees were not likely to go back to East Pakistan unless the Pakistani army was evicted. Thus, the political, social, economic, and military threat faced by India because of the refugees had increased dramatically since late April. In order to avert the multi-faceted threat posed by the refugees, India had to act within a finite period of time before the situation exploded. The Mukti Bahini (it changed its name from the Mukt Eau; in mid-July to mark the advent of the navy and the air force) had done well in its monsoon offensive but it had become obvious that the Pakistani army could not be defeated by the guerrillas alone. There was an increasing perception among Indian decision-makers that India probably would have to go to war before the crisis resolved itself.96 Thus, late July marks the beginning of the crisis period for India.
There were several critical factors which influenced New Delhi's policies during the remainder of the crisis. The saliency of these factors continued to increase as the crisis ran its course.

First, there was the refugee issue. Before the resolution of the crisis, nearly 10 million refugees would cross over into India from East Pakistan. Refugees, however, had emigrated to India before. If the number of refugees had been the only contentious issue, it is unlikely that there would have been a war on the subcontinent in 1971.97

There was, second, the destabilization of Indian states on the East Pakistan border. There had been leftist insurgencies in these states in the near past to which the central government had responded by deploying the Indian military. This political turmoil reflected the ethnic and communal divisions within these states. The Bengali refugees exacerbated these divisions over the course of the crisis.98

Third, there was the perception in New Delhi of the necessity of a government coming to power in a federated East Pakistan or an independent Bangla Desh that was both democratic and moderate—with heavy emphasis on the moderate. A radical government in Dhaka could create problems for New Delhi in two ways. First, a leftist government could develop ties with "extremist" leftist groups in northeastern India. Second, a leftist government in Dhaka could carry out internal policies (for example, land reform) which might lead to another outpouring of refugees to India. In the past, there had been problems in the northeastern Indian states between indigenous communities and outsiders. The Indians were concerned about a prolonged Pakistani civil war in which leftist forces in the Bangla Desh movement eventually gained control. New Delhi wanted a Mujib-led Awami League government in Dhaka preferably due to negotiations between Yahya and the Awami League but, if necessary, installed through the use of Indian force.99

It was at this time that the Government of India assessed the extent to which India could politically, territorially, and economically expand through a war with Pakistan before the costs outweighed the benefits. There was a perception among decision-makers that, in the case of war in East Pakistan, victory would be relatively easy for India and humiliating for Pakistan. There was a perception that China and the United States would definitely not intervene to support the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. A victory in East Pakistan was viewed as increasing India's political-diplomatic status. India would be the undisputed dominant power in the region. Indira Gandhi wanted India to be seen as an Asian power and not just a South Asian power. The Indians
also concluded that the costs probably outweighed the benefits of trying to inflict an overwhelming military defeat on the Pakistani army based in the western wing. There was no perception that a war in west Pakistan would be easy. New Delhi was not certain that China would stay out of a war if Pakistan's forces were being badly beaten in West Pakistan. Furthermore, India also was not sure how the United States would react if Pakistani forces were being routed in the western wing. Pakistan was a northern tier state and a member of C.E.N.T.O. For these reasons, New Delhi decided to fight basically a defensive war on its western front designed to gain a few strategic points in Kashmir. This was thought to be the best way to keep outside powers from coming to the aid of Pakistan.\(^\text{100}\)

The Pakistani authorities tried to contact India to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis in East Pakistan throughout July and August. On July 12, Yahya started making attempts to meet Gandhi but, as he said a few days later, "the lady said no."\(^\text{101}\) Yahya continued to try and arrange a meeting with Indian representatives but was unsuccessful. New Delhi's position was laid out on September 28 by the Indian Foreign Minister at the United Nations General Assembly. He stated that what was happening in East Pakistan was not an India-Pakistan problem. It was a problem that had to be resolved between the Awami League and Islamabad. Thus, there was no scope for talks between India and Pakistan on the crisis in East Pakistan. It also was on September 28 that the Shah of Iran publicly declared that the Indian government had spurned his efforts at mediation. The Shah said, therefore, he was abandoning future attempts at such mediation.\(^\text{102}\)

Pakistan attempted to secure U.N. intervention to help defuse the crisis in July. Islamabad urged the U.N. to send "observers" or "representatives" to the East Pakistan border to assist in the creation of favourable conditions for refugees to return from India. On July 19, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant made an attempt to have U.N. personnel intervene in the crisis. The Secretary-General sent an aide memoire to New Delhi and Islamabad asking to have United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.) "representatives" stationed along the Indo-East Pakistani border. If only "representatives" (as opposed to "observers") were sent, then an initiative of the Security Council was not required. On July 20, U Thant took the unusual step of presenting a memorandum to the President and members of the Security Council. The memorandum described the dangers of the situation in East Pakistan and recommended the stationing of U.N.H.C.R. representatives on the border. The Secretary-General asked the Security Council to reach an agreement as to what measures should be taken to relieve the situation. U Thant's initiatives were immediately welcomed in Pakistan.\(^\text{103}\) The Indian Foreign Minister officially rejected U Thant's proposal on August 3 stating that "representatives" alone
could not create the necessary feeling of confidence among the refugees but would only create a facade of action as a cover up for the continuation of present policies of the military rulers of Pakistan, and further aggravate the suffering of the people of Bangla Desh.\textsuperscript{104} Less charitably, the Indians might have been convinced that the U.N. might see the support being given to the secessionist movement by New Delhi. Furthermore, if the Security Council agreed on steps to be taken to defuse the situation on the subcontinent, India would have to defy the Security Council if New Delhi decided that Indian interests were best served by war.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, by July, U.N. intervention opened up the prospect of a shield being provided to Pakistan and big-power pressure being put on India.

The Sino-American\textsuperscript{a} rapprochement\textsuperscript{a} and increasing pressure from the U.N. for a role in East Pakistan provided the immediate background for the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty was concluded on August 9, 1971 at the urging of the Indians. The public "line" used by New Delhi was that Indian security faced a threat from Pakistan, the U.S., and China which required a counterforce—that is, the U.S.S.R. Thus, the theme of Chinese-Pakistani collusion was revived. Such a theme had seemingly been discredited when China did not intervene under far more advantageous circumstances during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. Added to the Pakistani-Chinese collusion theme were the possible negative effects on India due to the Chinese-American\textsuperscript{a} rapprochement\textsuperscript{a} on July 15. Henry Kissinger had visited both New Delhi and Islamabad on his way to Beijing in mid-July. Through carefully contrived Indian leaks, Kissinger, during his visit to New Delhi, was alleged to have told an Indian official that New Delhi could no longer count on American commitments (made in the context of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war) to India in case of a Chinese attack. This allegation, in some sections of the Indian press, was transformed into a Pakistan-U.S.-China alliance directed against India which could only be countered by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{106}

The Indian government clearly understood that the public line used to justify the treaty had little basis in fact. New Delhi was so confident that China would not intervene that in late July (that is, before the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty), orders were sent to the army commander on the northeastern section of the Chinese frontier to transfer 3 of his 6 divisions to the East Pakistani front. There is evidence to indicate that by this time, and probably much earlier, copies of letters exchanged between Islamabad and Beijing in April had been obtained by the Indian government.\textsuperscript{107} In these letters, Beijing had explicitly stated that it would support Pakistan politically in the emerging dispute with India but the military forces of China would not intervene in another Indo-Pakistani war. The Indians did not emphasize this because New Delhi wanted to play up the theme of Pakistan-Chinese collusion. Authoritative sources in India also say that Kissinger
did not make the comments attributed to him in mid-July concerning American commitments in the event of a Chinese attack. After Kissinger's return to Washington, he did inform L.K. Jha, the Indian Ambassador to the U.S., that American commitments applied only in the case of a Chinese attack and not under circumstances in which military action was initiated by India against Pakistan. The Indian government's public line was accepted by most of the press, opposition leaders, and the political public. 108

The Indian government's decision to press for the treaty in early August was influenced by several factors. The Indian bureaucracy had become demoralized over its inability to attract international support for India's stand by late July. The Indian government hoped to bolster the morale of the bureaucracy by signing the treaty. In domestic political terms, the timing was right to implement publicly the decision made in 1970 to conclude a treaty with Moscow. Any criticism of the treaty by the media or the opposition would be muted because of the growing crisis with Pakistan. By mid-July, the Indian government already thought that it was very likely that Indian military forces would have to be used in East Pakistan to bring the crisis to a conclusion. The U.S.-China rapprochement was viewed by New Delhi as greatly diminishing the possibility of the U.S. serving as a mediator in the East Pakistan crisis. The Indian leaders felt that Pakistani decision-makers would view the rapprochement as having a deterrent effect on India. Thus, without some external pressure, Islamabad would not feel compelled to come to an agreement with the Awami League that met India's requirements. By early August, the Indian government moved to have the treaty with the Soviet Union formally signed as quickly as possible. 109

When India approached the Soviet Union about signing the treaty in mid-1971, the Soviets were very hesitant. Moscow was under the impression that New Delhi wanted the Soviets to intervene if India was attacked by China. The Indians had to assure the Soviets that New Delhi was not trying to gain military commitments from Moscow. Once Moscow recognized this, an agreement was quickly concluded. 110

New Delhi also viewed the treaty as a way for the Soviet Union to further clarify its position on Indo-Pakistani relations. Thus, New Delhi asked for the inclusion of a clause that was not part of the draft treaty of 1970. The new clause is Article 9 in the Indo-Soviet Treaty in which both sides agree "to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party." This article was seen by New Delhi as having a deterrent effect on Moscow reviving military aid to Pakistan. The Soviets were reluctant to agree to the new article. They did eventually acquiesce without too much argument. New Delhi stated its strong conviction to Moscow that it was a virtual certainty that no solution to the crisis could be found without an
Indo-Pakistani war. Thus, New Delhi pressured Moscow to support the Indian position politically in the event of hostilities. In the meantime, New Delhi asked Moscow to provide certain military equipment that the Indian armed forces required as quickly as possible. There were several "unofficial" leaks to the press in India which implied that Moscow had verbally extended guarantees during the negotiation of the treaty to counter any possible Chinese intervention in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war (which was not true). In the U.N. Security Council, however, where India needed Soviet support the most, Moscow's support for New Delhi was unflinching almost to the end of the war which was to eventually break out.111

The signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation opened a new phase in the crisis for Islamabad. It greatly increased the stress felt by Pakistani decision-makers. They tried to put the best face on the treaty from Pakistan's perspective. Pakistan's decision-makers became more cognizant of the threat facing them.112

Pakistan again tried to gain U.N. intervention in East Pakistan to defuse the crisis. The Pakistani Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Agha Shahi, wrote to the President of the Security Council on August 11. Shahi proposed that the border of India and Pakistan should be visited by a "good offices" team of the Council to "defuse the tense situation there."113 On August 18, India rejected the idea of U.N. "observers" or "good offices" teams being sent to the Indo-Pakistani border. The Indians were backed up in the U.N. by the Soviet Union. The Secretary-General of the U.N. was informed on August 20 by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union that his country was opposed to any Security Council meeting to discuss the problems in East Pakistan.114 Thus, Pakistan's efforts to gain U.N. intervention were frustrated again.

Soviet relations with Pakistan became openly hostile in August. In mid-August, the proposed visit to Moscow by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary was postponed.115 On August 17, there was an acrimonious exchange between Yahya and the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. A.A. Rodinov. Although some discussions about economic aid took place between the two countries in August and September, Soviet actions as a whole were detrimental to Pakistan's interests.116

Throughout September, the Pakistani authorities continued trying to get the U.N. Secretary-General and the Security Council to intervene in order to defuse the crisis. Islamabad tried to get world opinion on its side. The Pakistanis argued that "in violation of its solemn obligations under the Charter of the United Nations India not only refuses to honour its commitments with regard to peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes between Pakistan and
itself, but it is also interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan." The Indians responded that the situation in East Pakistan was not an India-Pakistan problem (it was a problem to be resolved between Islamabad and the Awami League, in the Indian view) and consequently, there was no scope for either the U.N. to act or for India and Pakistan to have bilateral discussions that had been sought by Yahya in July and August. The Soviet Union again backed India at the U.N.117

There were contacts between the Bangla Desh Government-in-Exile and the American consulate in Calcutta at various points during the crisis. It is not clear if the Indians were aware of these contacts when they began at an informal level in May. In any event, Indian authorities had become aware of these contacts by September. In early September, the Indian government instructed the Bangla Desh Government-in-Exile to terminate all contacts with American officials. India publicly maintained that the crisis in South Asia could only be defused by talks between the Government of Pakistan and the Awami League. New Delhi's actions in early September to stop the Awami League from speaking to American officials, however, curtailed the possibility of indirect talks between Pakistan and the Awami League through the Americans.118

The pressure on Indian decision-makers to take action increased. By September, there were between 8 and 9 million refugees in India--a tremendous financial burden. Economic development funds were being diverted to refugee assistance programs and additional taxes were being levied on the Indian population. Commodities like fuel, sugar and rice had virtually doubled in price between July and August for the ordinary Indian. The refugees often were maintained at a higher level than the resident Indian peasant. The refugees also, quite often, were willing to do agricultural work for half the wages of resident Indians. Further complicating matters for the Indian government was a perceptible leftward shift in the leadership of the guerrilla movement. The potential for social unrest was great. Thus, the refugees posed problems that the Indian decision-makers would have to resolve in the not-too-distant future.119

The possibility of leftists capturing control of the Bangla Desh movement had been a prime concern of the Indian government since the beginning of the crisis. Leftist insurgencies had erupted in the north-east part of India in the past. State governments in the area had been removed because of their leftist bent and on occasion the Indian military had to combat guerrilla forces. Although the Indian government closely monitored and controlled the activities of the provisional Bangla Desh government and the Mukti Bahini, there were some leftist groups outside of India's control. This was the major reason why India had been giving obsolete arms to the Bengali guerrillas.
The Indian government wanted the Bangla Desh Government-in-Exile to stop its practice of excluding non-Awami Leaguers. Due to enormous pressure from New Delhi, the provisional Bangla Desh government agreed to the formation of a five-party committee (with leftist members) which would advise the provisional government. Indian decision-makers did not merely desire an independent Bangla Desh. It was important to New Delhi that whatever government came to power in Dhaka was moderate to keep the potential for trouble in north-east India to a minimum.120

The Indian army began to work more closely with the Mukti Bahini in late September. Reportedly, there were Indian and/or Mukti Bahini forces battling Pakistani forces in the Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Chandpur, Tura-Mymensingh, Pachagarh-Rangpur, and Jessore districts. These Indian-Mukti Bahini operations began to take an increasing toll on the Pakistani army.121

There was a perception in Islamabad in September and October that the military situation in East Pakistan was considerably different than in the months before. Apart from the increased Indian-Mukti Bahini activity, Pakistani intelligence reported that General Manekshaw had received orders to prepare for military action in East Pakistan. Reportedly, Indian troop movements to the East Pakistani border became more pronounced in September. Thus, by early October, an escalation in the level of violence had occurred in the view of Pakistani leaders.122

Although the internal pressure on India to act was great because of the financial and social burden of the refugees, the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of detente with the United States. Thus, the Soviet Union pressed India not to act with haste and to give Islamabad a chance to negotiate with Mujib. This Soviet pressure led to the declaration by Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on October 8 that India was not committed to any particular solution of the Bangla Desh Crisis so long as the elected representatives agreed to it.

Yahya missed the opportunity afforded him by the Soviet Union. The Pakistani army had started moving into forward positions on both borders before the end of September. From this point forward, the Pakistanis wanted to dramatize the threat of war in the hopes of stimulating intervention by the major powers (as occurred in 1948-49 and 1965). Thus, after a television address on October 12 by Yahya calling for mutual troop withdrawals and U N. intervention to defuse the tense situation, the Pakistani army rapidly completed movement to the borders.123 The Pakistani mobilization surprised Indian decision-makers. On the other hand, the Pakistani mobilization allowed India to mobilize its forces without looking like an aggressor. According to the India's timetable, its troops were to be mobilized a few weeks later.124 Indira Gandhi stated on
October 14 that Swaran Singh had been misquoted when he said that India would accept a political solution "even within the framework of Pakistan." Thus, the Indian decision-makers were able to circumvent the pressure from the Soviet Union to stop the drift towards confrontation.

Throughout the rest of October, Yahya repeatedly attempted to bring about a mutual Indo-Pakistani withdrawal of troops from the border areas. On October 12, 15, 17, and 21, Yahya proposed a mutual troop withdrawal to the Indian government. Yahya's proposals were initially rejected on October 17 by the Indian Defence Minister. On October 19, Prime Minister Gandhi, herself, rejected Yahya's proposals citing the fact that Indian bases (unlike Pakistani bases) were far from the border and it was Pakistan which had escalated the crisis.

Tension along the Indo-Pakistani borders continued to escalate. On October 17, Islamabad announced that India had started shelling East Pakistan with medium guns instead of just the field guns and mortars to which the Indians had limited themselves in earlier incidents. On October 22, New Delhi began calling up its reservists. In an action described by an Indian spokesman as the "first of its kind," Indian troops moved to silence guns in the Kamalpur area on October 30-31. Between mid-October and the time open warfare broke out in December, there was an increasing number of complaints from both sides of alleged shellings, violations of air space and the construction of fortifications along the Kashmir cease-fire line.

As tensions increased, U Thant tried to get a role in the crisis for the U.N.. In identical memoranda sent on October 20 to Yahya, Gandhi and their ambassadors at the U.N., U Thant took up Yahya's call for a mutual troop withdrawal and placed the facilities of the U.N. at their disposal. Yahya immediately welcomed U Thant's proposal to help defuse the crisis and expressed his hope that U Thant would be able to visit the subcontinent in the near future. On October 28, Prime Minister Gandhi rejected U Thant's proposal. Thus, the U.N. was unable to intervene.

By late October, it became exceedingly clear to the leaders of the Soviet Union that India's hard-line position would leave them with no alternative but to make a choice between India and Pakistan. On October 22, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin arrived in New Delhi for consultations under the provision of Article 9 in the treaty. According to an official Indian source, by the time of Firyubin's departure on October 25, the two sides were fully in accord with each other concerning the assessment of the situation. Soviet Air Marshal P.S. Khoutakhov arrived in New Delhi on October 28 to negotiate the shipment of armaments that had been requested by the Indian army. By this time New Delhi had concluded that it could count on the
"total support" of the U.S.S.R. This assessment by India was correct. In early November, special shipments of arms requested by India began to arrive by air. From this point onwards, Moscow's position was one of broad support towards New Delhi both publicly and privately up to and through the 1971 war.128

Indira Gandhi toured several major capitals between October 24 and November 13 to gain acceptance, if approval was not possible, for Indian policy on Bangla Desh. She tried to bring home to public opinion in the West the size of the refugee problem and the justice of India's case. Gandhi tried to demonstrate that the Indo-Soviet Treaty did not mean that relations between India and the West would have to be impeded. The Pakistani government was unable to fully counter the effects of this trip.129

The Indian Prime Minister, on her tour of major capitals, maintained that India would not meet with Pakistani representatives. She reiterated that the crisis in East Pakistan was not an India-Pakistan problem. She repeatedly stated that a resolution to the problem could only be found if Yahya were to negotiate with Sheikh Mujib and/or the Awami League. Thus, there was no scope for either U.N. action or Indo-Pakistani talks 130

Throughout her tour, Gandhi repeated the Indian line of why there should not be a mutual withdrawal of troops. First, she said the crisis in Pakistan's eastern wing was the doing of the Government of Pakistan. Second, Pakistan had mobilized first and India was defending itself because the Indians could not be sure of Pakistani intentions. Third, Gandhi pointed out that India had twice been attacked by Pakistan and once by China. She would not permit India to be unprepared for any Pakistani actions. Fourth, and finally, Gandhi stated that the Indian army would face great logistical problems in remobilizing (problems that Pakistan did not have) in case of an attack. Thus, Indian security concerns would not permit India to agree to mutual troop withdrawals from the borders.131 Indeed, there was no mutual troop withdrawal until after the war.

The Pakistanis again tried to gain military commitments from China in early November. Bhutto, who was thought to have a special relationship with the Chinese, was sent to Beijing at the head of a special delegation to ascertain the exact Chinese commitment to Pakistan and to engage the Chinese more deeply. The Pakistanis wanted a Chinese commitment to the "national unity" and "territorial integrity" of Pakistan. Although the Pakistani delegation was greeted by Chou En-lai, himself, the results were disappointing. No joint communiqué was issued at the end of the talks on November 7. Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei reiterated the Chinese position of April 13 committing China to defend Pakistan's "state sovereignty" and "national
independence. This implied that the Chinese would only become involved if West Pakistan was threatened. The Pakistanis were left to put the best face on the situation. Bhutto said that there was no need for a joint communiqué because there was complete agreement.

The Indians and Mukti Bahini were not deterred by the Chinese. On November 10, Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh declared that there was no indication China would help defend Pakistan if war were to break out. Shellings and other border incidents intensified as Indian army and Mukti Bahini attacks grew in strength.

It was widely expected that Indira Gandhi’s return on November 13 from Europe and America would be the signal for all-out war to be waged on Pakistan. Upon her return, she signalled a “military solution according to plan.” According to the Indian timetable, the all-out offensive on Dhaka was to begin on December 6.

The drift to war accelerated after November 20. The fighting reached a new intensity on November 21 at Boyra. Indian tanks crossed the border. Pakistan lost 13 Chafee tanks and 3 Sabre Jets. In the build-up to the invasion, after November 21, India started to capture East Pakistani territory and hold on to it rather than withdraw. On November 24, an Indian spokesman stated that, if necessary, Indian forces would cross the border to stop Pakistan’s offensive manoeuvres. On November 29, there was a major incident at Hilli. On the same day, the Mukti Bahini took Chaugacha and the provisional Bangla Desh government made plans to move there.

In mid-November, Pakistan again tried to obtain U.N. intervention. On November 17, Pakistan and the U.N. announced that an agreement had been reached allowing relief workers freedom of access throughout East Pakistan. On November 18, there was an announcement that the Government of Pakistan had asked the Secretary-General to investigate the “false allegations” concerning the “continued movement of displaced persons into India.” The Pakistani government’s hope underlying these efforts was that as the situation moved closer to open warfare, the reluctance of the great powers to restrain India would be overcome.

After November 21, the situation started getting out of hand for the Pakistanis. The Pakistani government declared a State of Emergency on November 23. On November 23, Yahya also sent a stream of letters to U Thant, the President of the Security Council, and various Heads of State and governments informing them of the situation along the borders. Yahya continued trying to obtain a U.N. presence to help defuse the crisis. Yahya wrote to U Thant on November
29 proposing that U.N. observers be posted on the East Pakistani side of the border to report on border violations. Both the Indian government and the provisional government of Bangla Desh condemned this as an attempt to protect Pakistan's military regime.137

The Pakistanis, at the end of November, again tried to get a deeper commitment from China in case of war with India. On November 29, the Chinese did release a statement that the problems in East Pakistan were due to foreign aggression but they did not alter their commitment. On November 30, Yahya ordered the Karakoram highway closed to foreigners to give the impression that China was giving assistance.

These events did not alter the Indian view that China would not help defend Pakistan if war broke out. The Indian press exhaustively analyzed every Chinese reference to the subcontinent and found them to be much less biting than Chinese references during the 1965 crisis. Despite the closing of the Karakoram highway, several of India's Himalayan divisions were in a position to attack East Pakistan when war finally did break out in December 138

The Pakistani government tried to obtain an official military commitment from the U.S. on December 2 to help Pakistan if attacked. Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Raza delivered a letter from Yahya to Nixon invoking Article 1 of the 1959 bilateral agreement as the basis of U.S. aid to Pakistan. The Pakistanis had previously approached the Americans informally about American assistance. With war rapidly approaching, the Pakistanis wanted to ascertain the exact level of American commitment. The U.S. State Department argued that no binding obligation existed. It was pointed out that Article 1 spoke only of "appropriate action" subject to American constitutional procedures. It did not specify what action should be taken. The State Department further argued that the obligation was undertaken within a Middle East context intended to exclude an Indo-Pakistani war. Thus, the Pakistanis were not able to get the commitment they were seeking from the Americans.139

The actions of the Pakistani government in early December were based on the proposition that the eastern wing could only be defended by action in the West. This was Pakistan's established defensive strategy. On December 3, the Pakistani government reacted to the increasing pressure in the East by launching an air attack from the western wing. The third Indo-Pakistani war was underway.140
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

HYPOTHESIS 1: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution to a crisis.

Pakistani behavior supports HYPOTHESIS 1. Yahya first attempted to contact Gandhi on July 12 in order to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Yahya, after being rebuffed, continued trying to arrange a meeting with Indira and/or other Indian representatives throughout the rest of July and August. The Shah of Iran attempted to act as a mediator between India and Pakistan. On September 28, he abandoned his attempts because the Indians had spurned his efforts. Thus, Pakistan made repeated efforts to contact the other side to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. This is how Pakistan should have been expected to behave, given its weaker position, if microeconomic theory is applied to foreign policy crisis situations.

HYPOTHESIS 2: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to secure U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis.

Pakistani behavior supports HYPOTHESIS 2. The first time Pakistan indicated it would accept U.N. involvement in the crisis was on May 17. Pakistan stated that it would be willing to accept U.N. aid if it was coordinated by Pakistani officials. In June, Pakistan approached the U.N. for assistance with relief work and for assistance in repatriating refugees that had fled to India. In July, Pakistan urged the U.N. to send "observers" or "representatives" to the East Pakistan border to assist in the creation of favourable conditions for refugees to return from India. Pakistan also welcomed two initiatives by U Thant: 1) on July 19, the Secretary-General sent an aide memoire to New Delhi and Islamabad asking for U.N.H.C.R. "representatives" to be stationed on the Indo-East Pakistani border; and 2) on July 20, the Secretary-General sent a memorandum to the President and members of the Security Council asking them to reach an agreement on what measures should be taken to defuse the crisis in South Asia. On August 11, Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Agha Shahi, wrote to the President of the Security Council proposing that Indo-Pakistani border areas should be visited by the "good offices" team of the Council to defuse the tense situation. Throughout September, the Pakistanis attempted to defuse the crisis either through the Secretary-General or the Security Council by invoking the Charter of the United Nations. In a television address, on October 12, Yahya called for U.N. intervention to defuse the tense situation on the subcontinent. On October 20, U Thant called for India and Pakistan to withdraw their troops from forward positions and placed the facilities of the U.N. at the disposal of the two countries. Yahya welcomed U Thant's proposal. On November 17, an agreement was reached between Pakistan and the U.N. to permit relief workers freedom of
access throughout East Pakistan. The following day, Pakistan asked the Secretary-General to investigate the movement of displaced persons into India. On November 23, Yahya sent letters to U Thant and the President of the Security Council informing them of the situation along the borders. On November 29, Yahya wrote to U Thant proposing that UN "observers" be posted on the East Pakistani side of the border to report on border violations. If microeconomic theory is applied to foreign policy crises, this is how Pakistan should have been expected to act during the Bangladesh Crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 3: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

Pakistani behavior supports HYPOTHESIS 3. In early-to-mid-April, when Pakistan perceived a significant increase in the likelihood of war with India, it not a high probability, Islamabad approached China for military commitments. Then, as the probability of war increased in October and November, Pakistan again approached China. Early in November, a delegation headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went to Beijing in an attempt to gain military commitments for Pakistan from China. Then, later in the month, Islamabad again contacted China in an attempt to deepen its commitment to Pakistan. In early December, just before war broke out, Pakistan tried to use a previous bilateral arrangement to invoke American assistance. A state with weaker relative capability would be expected to act in the above manner if microeconomic theory is applied to foreign policy crises.

HYPOTHESIS 4: A weaker crisis actor will not mobilize its military forces.

Pakistani behavior does not support HYPOTHESIS 4. The lack of support demonstrates a weakness in microeconomic theory and the realist paradigm. This point will be discussed further in the next chapter.

HYPOTHESIS 5: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to maintain (or restore) the political, territorial, and economic status quo ante.

Pakistan's behavior supports two-thirds of HYPOTHESIS 5. Pakistan set about restoring the territorial and political-diplomatic status quo ante. Once this was done, more or less, Pakistan commenced restoring the political-administrative status quo ante. Pakistan, for the time period under consideration, was far more interested in security than the Bengali economy. Thus, at the time, it did not make a major effort to restore the economic status quo ante. Given its weaker
position, Pakistan's behavior corresponds roughly with the behavior posited by microeconomic theory.

HYPOTHESIS 6: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to avoid any contact with the adversary which might lead to a peaceful resolution of a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 6 is supported by India's behavior. On July 12, Yahya made his first attempt to contact the Indians to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Indians refused to meet with him. Yahya made repeated efforts throughout July and August to meet with Indian officials. The Indian position was laid down at the United Nations on September 28 by the Indian Foreign Minister. He stated that negotiations should take place between the Government of Pakistan and the Awami League—not Pakistan and India. The Government of India also refused mediation efforts of the Shah of Iran in September. India cut off contacts between the Bangla Desh Government-in-Exile and the U.S. Consulate in Calcutta in September as well. Thus, the possibility of indirect talks, through the Americans, between the Awami League and Islamabad was ended by the Indians. Indira Gandhi reiterated the Indian position that New Delhi would not speak to Islamabad throughout her tour of major capitals in October and November. This is how India should have been expected to behave according to microeconomic theory.

HYPOTHESIS 7. A stronger crisis actor will attempt to block or circumvent U.N. intervention to defuse a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 7 is supported by India's actions. On July 19, U Thant asked both India and Pakistan to permit the stationing of U.N.H.C.R representatives along the Indo-East Pakistani border. The next day, U Thant presented a memorandum to the President of the Security Council recommending that U.N.H.C.R. representatives be stationed along the Indo-East Pakistani border. U Thant also asked the Security Council to come to an agreement about what should be done to defuse the tense situation in the subcontinent. On August 3, the Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, rejected the U.N. mediation offers. Singh argued that the U.N. actions would serve only as a facade while the Pakistani government maintained its rule in East Pakistan.

On August 11, Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.N., Mr. Agha Shahi, asked for U.N. "good offices" teams to be sent to the border to defuse the situation. India, on August 18, rejected this effort to involve the U.N. in the crisis. This time, the Indians were backed in their efforts by the Soviet Union (the two countries had signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation less than two weeks earlier). On October 20, U Thant sent identical memoranda to Pakistan and India asking the two states to withdraw their troops from border areas. U Thant also placed the U.N.'s
facilities at the disposal of the two countries. This proposal was rejected on October 28 by Prime Minister Gandhi. During her trip to major capitals in October and November, Gandhi reiterated the Indian line that the crisis in South Asia could only be defused by direct talks between the Government of Pakistan and the Awami League. Thus, there was no scope for U.N. involvement. India, given its stronger position, should be expected to act in the above manner if microeconomic theory is applied to foreign policy crises.

HYPOTHESIS 8: A stronger crisis actor will not attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

HYPOTHESIS 8 is supported by Indian actions. When India approached the Soviet Union in mid-1971 to sign the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, a crisis situation already existed in South Asia. Moscow was very concerned that by signing such a treaty, the Soviet Union would be committed to helping India militarily if the latter were attacked by China. Thus, the Soviet Union was very hesitant about signing such a treaty. New Delhi had to make it explicitly clear to Moscow that it was not trying to gain a military commitment from the Soviet Union. Once the Soviets understood this, the treaty was signed in short order.

It is important to note the context in which the treaty was signed. India and the Soviet Union agreed to the broad outlines of a treaty in 1969. The treaty would have been signed in 1970 except that Indira Gandhi was at the head of a minority government with elections scheduled for the following year. Signing a treaty with the Soviet Union could have been portrayed as a transgression of India's sacrosanct principle of nonalignment. Thus, Indira would have opened herself up to a great deal of criticism. The Bangla Desh Crisis, however, provided the Indian government with an opportunity to have any domestic criticisms of becoming more closely involved with a superpower greatly muted. Furthermore, the treaty provided a way to: 1) remove any ambiguity in Soviet policy concerning South Asia, 2) bolster the morale of the Indian bureaucracy which had not been able to attract the level of support hoped for by New Delhi for its position in the crisis vis-a-vis Pakistan; 3) press Pakistan to come to an agreement with the Awami League; and 4) block U.N. intervention so that Pakistan could not use the U.N. as a shield. Thus, India did not sign the treaty to gain a military commitment from the Soviet Union to come to India's defence in case of attack. India's behavior is again consistent with the behavior postulated by microeconomic theory for a stronger crisis actor.
HYPOTHESIS 9: A stronger crisis actor will mobilize its military forces.

India’s actions support HYPOTHESIS 9. In mid-October, Indian forces were mobilized. Ostensibly, this was done in response to the Pakistani mobilization. In fact, the Pakistani mobilization was a pleasant surprise for India’s decision-makers. According to New Delhi’s plan, India would have mobilized its forces a few weeks later in any event. Thus, Pakistan’s actions allowed India to mobilize and not appear as the aggressor.

India also rejected all calls for a mutual withdrawal of troops. Yahya called repeatedly for mutual troop withdrawals on October 12, 15, 17, and 21. On October 20, U Thant made a similar call. India rejected each of these calls. During her tour of the major capitals in October and November, Gandhi stated that Indian demobilization was out of the question. She had two reasons for this: 1) India having been twice attacked by Pakistan was not exactly prepared to trust its subcontinental neighbor; and 2) if India were indeed to demobilize, it would have a much harder time mobilizing again if required to do so. If microeconomic theory is applied to foreign policy crises, this is how India should have been expected to act.

HYPOTHESIS 10: A stronger state seeks to change the international system until the expected costs of further political, territorial, and/or economic expansion are equal to or greater than expected benefits.

India’s behavior during the Bangla Desh Crisis supports HYPOTHESIS 10. Indian decision-makers made their choice of ejecting Pakistani troops only from East Pakistan because this was expected to generate the least amount of international opposition. Furthermore, a relatively easy victory over Pakistani forces in the eastern wing was expected by New Delhi. India’s decision-makers were uncertain what reaction an invasion of West Pakistan might engender from China or the U.S.A.. Furthermore, an easy victory was not expected against the Pakistani forces deployed in the western wing. Therefore, New Delhi decided to invade East Pakistan while fighting a defensive war on the western front. At this point, benefits were perceived to outweigh costs. New Delhi was not certain if benefits would outweigh costs if India went beyond this. By limiting itself to a victory in the East, there was a perception in New Delhi that India’s political-diplomatic status would be expanded. Indian decision-makers also perceived that, as long as it appeared to the outside world that West Pakistan was not in danger of being overrun, India could territorially expand into certain strategic areas of Kashmir. This, ultimately, was the strategy followed by India during the 1971 war. This is how India should have been expected to behave if microeconomic theory is applied to foreign policy crisis situations.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The findings from this thesis illustrate both the strength and weakness of microeconomic theory and, by extension, the realist approach to the study of international relations. The basic question to be asked about the use of microeconomic theory in the study of international relations is whether or not, by its application, more is known about the substantive issues within this particular field of political science. This study was designed to assess whether the behavior of Pakistan and India during the Bangla Desh Crisis was consistent with the behavior postulated for the two states by microeconomic theory. Ten hypotheses were tested. The behavior of Pakistan and India was consistent with nine of the hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS 1: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to contact the adversary to negotiate a peaceful resolution to a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 2: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to secure U N intervention to defuse a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 3: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

HYPOTHESIS 5: A weaker crisis actor will attempt to maintain (or restore) the political, territorial, and economic status quo ante. (This hypothesis was supported in part by Pakistani behavior during the Bangla Desh Crisis.)

HYPOTHESIS 6: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to avoid any contact with the adversary which might lead to a peaceful resolution of a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 7: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to block or circumvent U N intervention to defuse a crisis.

HYPOTHESIS 8: A stronger crisis actor will not attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers.

HYPOTHESIS 9: A stronger crisis actor will mobilize its military forces.

HYPOTHESIS 10: A stronger crisis actor will attempt to change the international system until the expected costs of further political, territorial, and/or economic expansion are equal to or greater than the expected benefits.

Thus, the results of this study suggest that knowledge about at least one aspect of international relations--specifically, foreign policy crises--can be broadened through the use of microeconomic theory. This illustrates the strength of microeconomic theory.

The weakness of microeconomic theory is illustrated by the one hypothesis that is not supported in this study:

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HYPOTHESIS 4. A weaker crisis actor will not mobilize its military forces.

In order to understand why Pakistani decision-makers did not behave as expected, the perceptions of Pakistani decision-makers have to be taken into account. There was a perception among them that the international community would intervene if war was to break out on the subcontinent. In order to play up the threat of war, the Pakistanis mobilized their forces in the hopes of invoking major power intervention even before an actual war broke out. Given their perception of the situation, the Pakistanis were acting rationally.

The term "rational" denotes behavior in a given situation that is appropriate to the specified objectives. If the background characteristics of the decision-makers are ignored, then it is possible to speak of an "objective" rationality—that is, behavior that can be judged objectively to be optimally adapted to the situation. On the other hand, if the background characteristics, the limitations of knowledge, and the calculating abilities of the decision-makers are taken into account, then it might be the case that decision-makers are incapable of making objectively optimal choices. This can be termed "bounded" rationality, that is, behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the capacities of the decision-makers and the external situation.

There is a fundamental difference between "objective" and "bounded" rationality. To deduce the "objective" rational choice in a given situation, it is necessary to know only the decision-makers' goals and the objective characteristics of the situation. To deduce the "bounded" rational choice in a given situation, it is necessary to know the decision-makers' goals, their conceptualization of the situation, and their ability to draw inferences from the information they possess. Within the framework of "bounded" rationality, the mere assumption of rationality provides little basis for the prediction of behavior. The rationality assumption must be supplemented by considerable empirical knowledge about the decision-makers in order to predict behavior.

Microeconomic theory and the realist paradigm are based on "objective" rationality. Thus, there is no room for perception or misperception within their framework. That is why the expectation that Pakistan would not mobilize its troops proved to be incorrect.

The Bangla Desh Crisis also pointed to what could potentially be a major problem with the model employed in this study. In Model 1, there is a causal arrow from the first intervening variable (relative capability) to the second intervening variable (specific decisions) but not vice-versa. This indicates that relative capability determines the specific decisions that are made. During the
Bangla Desh Crisis, India received important arms shipments from the Soviet Union. In this case, the arms shipments did not alter the status of the relatively stronger state and the relatively weaker state. It is possible, however, to envision a situation where a relatively weaker state becomes a relatively stronger one by becoming a tight alliance partner of a major power during the course of a crisis. If such a situation were to occur, relative capability would be affected by specific decisions. Model 1 does not take this possibility into account.

This alludes to a major problem with foreign policy crisis research in general. It is important to develop a dynamic measure of capability for crisis situations. The development of such a measure is outside the scope of this study. However, some of the factors which affect relative capability during a crisis are also the same factors which initiate what the I C B. Project refers to as an intra-war crisis (an environmental change during a state of war which generates an increase in the perceived threat to basic values, a finite time to respond, and a perceived adverse change in the military balance). Some of the factors which set off an intra-war crisis are: exit of a major power from a war; entry of a major actor into an ongoing war; technological escalation of a war; major escalation of a non-technological type, defeat in a significant battle, and internal deterioration leading to reduced capability to wage war. Since behavior seems to be affected dramatically by relative capability, as the James' study demonstrates, the development of a dynamic measure of capability would be a major advance in foreign policy crisis research.

There are two further propositions concerning foreign policy crisis decisions which can be deduced from Indian and Pakistani behavior during the Bangla Desh Crisis. Pakistani behavior indicates that a relatively weaker state might try to lessen the likelihood of war in the following way:

**PROPOSITION A:** After mobilization has occurred on both sides, a state with negative power discrepancy is more likely than a state with positive power discrepancy to attempt to bring about a mutual withdrawal of troops from forward positions.

The rationale underlying this proposition is that:
- a state with negative P.D. is less likely (than a state with positive P D ) to expect favourable terms of settlement at the conclusion of a war (the "expected" revenue in microeconomic terms);
- therefore, a state with negative P.D is more likely to try to defuse the situation by bringing about a mutual troop withdrawal.

Indian behavior indicates that a relatively stronger state might try to maintain its supremacy in relative capability in the following way:
PROPOSITION B: A state with positive power discrepancy is more likely than a state with negative power discrepancy to try to dissuade others from assisting the adversary or adversaries.

The rationale underlying this proposition is that:

- a state with negative P.D. is more likely (than a state with positive P.D.) to attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers (please see the rationale for HYPOTHESIS C in Chapter 3);

- therefore, states with positive P.D.'s are provided with more opportunities to dissuade major powers from assisting its adversary or adversaries.

- furthermore, a state with positive P.D. in a crisis situation has a powerful incentive to try to stop other states from assisting the adversary or adversaries as such assistance could affect the terms of settlement at the conclusion of a war.

These propositions, like the hypotheses, can be tested during the crisis period of a crisis. There is one further condition under which these hypotheses can be tested. The relative capability of the states being tested must not have changed since the commencement of the crisis. It simply is not clear how such a change would affect the specific decisions that a state's leaders will make.

In concluding, it should be noted that lack of reliable information and knowledge is an important factor in almost all real-life decision-making. Wherever such uncertainties are present, there is an enhanced opportunity for unconscious, or only partly conscious, wishes and drives to influence policy. Decision-makers are, at best, rational in terms of what they are aware of, and they can be aware of only small, disjointed facets of reality. 

Homo Psychologicus, however, has nothing even remotely comparable to the well-developed apparatus for rational decision-making of Homo Economicus. Until Homo Psychologicus is fleshed out by further research, this and other studies suggest that Homo Economicus can serve as an extremely valuable, although not perfect, guide in the analysis of foreign policy crisis decision-making.
FOOTNOTES

PART 1-MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS DECISIONS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Chapter 1: Introduction


4 Ibid., p. 16.

5 For a detailed discussion of the similarities between economic markets and international political systems, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory Of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 79-99.

6 Ibid., pp. 89-93.

7 Ibid., pp. 93-94.

8 Ibid., pp. 96-97.


10 Waltz, op. cit., pp. 81-89.

11 Ibid., pp. 105-106.

12 The type of oligopoly being discussed is a differentiated oligopoly. In a differentiated oligopoly, similar but not identical products are sold. This is distinguished from a pure oligopoly where identical products are sold. Source: Edwin Mansfield, Economics: Principles/Problems/Decisions, 6th ed., (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), p. 57.


Chapter 2: Survey of the Literature


7. For further discussion of the marxist paradigm, see Krasner, op. cit., pp. 20-26; and Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Keohane, op. cit., pp. 204-254.


9. Ibid., Chapters 1 and 6.


14Since the start of this study, the I.C.B. Project's dataset has expanded to encompass the period from the end of 1918 to the end of 1988. The number of foreign policy cases has increased to over 800.

15There are nine categories of triggers in the I.C.B. Project's dataset which have been collapsed into the four that have been listed: 1) verbal act; 2) political act; 3) economic act; 4) external change; 5) other non-violent act; 6) internal verbal or physical challenge to regime or elite; 7) non-violent military act; 8) indirect violent act; and 9) violent act. These have been collapsed into: 1) non-violent (categories 1-5); 2) internal challenge (category 6); 3) non-violent military (category 7); and 4) violent military (categories 8 and 9). Source: Brecher et al., op. cit., 2.48.

16Ibid., p. 50.


19James, op. cit., pp. 39-69.

20Ibid., pp. 69-70.

21Ibid., pp. 74-77.


28 Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," Daedalus 106 (Summer 1977): 44.

29 Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 3-9.

30 Ibid., pp. 13-25, 73-75.

31 Ibid., p. 155.

32 Ibid., p. 9.

33 Ibid., Parts 4-10.

34 Ibid., pp. 443-445.

35 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit.

36 Ibid., pp. 89-94.

37 Ibid., pp. 118, 126-127.

38 Ibid., p. 98.

39 Ibid., pp. 118-119.

40 Ibid., pp. 121-122.

41 For a critique of Waltz's framework, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," Chapter 6; Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," Chapter 7; Cox, Chapter 8; and Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," Chapter 9, in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, op. cit.


43 Russett, Economic Theories of International Politics, op. cit.

44 Ibid., pp. 341-342.

45 Bueno de Mesquita, op. cit.


48 Sisson and Rose, op. cit.
James, op. cit., Chapters 2.3. James used a revised version of Bueno de Mesquita's expected utility theory to examine the relationship between relative capability (measured by G.N.P.) of states and 1) the initiation of crises, and 2) the initiation of war. This study will be somewhat different from the work done by James. First, the microeconomic theory of the firm will be used. Second, this thesis will examine specific foreign policy crisis decisions.

Chapter 3: Research Design

1Brecher et al., op. cit., 1. 3.

2Michael Brecher with Benjamin Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), p. 1. Brecher later clarified the meaning of the third condition of a crisis—high probability of war. Theoretically, it is possible to perceive the probability of war as ranging from .001 to .999. It is possible, however, that a marked change (for example, from .1 to .3) in the probability of war might be just as salient as a move into the high probability range to decision-makers. This is especially so in those cases where a protracted conflict predisposes decision-makers to an expectation of crisis. What is crucial for the existence of a foreign policy crisis is the perception of high—or substantial rise in—likelihood of war. Source. Brecher with Geist, op. cit., p. 5.


4Brecher with Geist, op. cit., pp. 1-5.

5Brecher et al., op. cit., 1: 15.


10Ibid., p. 38.


14Organski and Kugler, *op. cit.*, p. 38

15*ibid.*, p. 37

16Brecher *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 2: 22.

17Please see.

-Brecher with Geist, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-398;

18The following are Israel's decisions during the 1967 Six Day War Crisis (brackets contain one of the five decisions being examined in this thesis). These decisions were made during the crisis period (as differentiated from the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods). Decisions 1 to 3 were made in the pre-crisis period.

I: Apprehension and Mobilization (17 May - 22 May)

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<th>Dec.</th>
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<td>4</td>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>Eshkol and Rabin decided on further mobilization. (Mobilization of military forces).</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>Eshkol, as Defence Minister, and the General Staff decided on large-scale mobilization. (Mobilization of military forces).</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>The General Staff decided to change the disposition of I.D.F. forces from a defensive posture to a build-up toward offensive capability. (Mobilization of military forces)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>The Cabinet approved the large-scale mobilization decision of 19 May. (Mobilization of military forces).</td>
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II: Delay and Diplomacy (23-28 May)

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<td>8</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>The Cabinet, acting as the Ministerial Committee on Defence, decided to postpone a decision on whether or not to go to war.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>The Cabinet, acting as the Ministerial Committee on Defence, approved Eban's journey to Washington to explore U.S. intentions. (Attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers).</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>Eshkol approved a move to warn the U.S. Administration, through Eban, that there was a danger of an imminent Egyptian attack. (Attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers).</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>The Cabinet, acting as the Ministerial Committee on Defence, decided to await Eban's return before taking a decision on the opening of the Straits.</td>
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12. 28 May The Cabinet decided to opt for further waiting, to leave time for action by the maritime states.

13. 28 May The Cabinet decided to keep the army on full alert. (Mobilization of military forces).

iii: Resolution (29 May to 4 June)

14. 30 May Eshkol, in consultation with other ministers and bureaucrats, decided to send Intelligence Head, Major-General Amit, to the U S to ascertain American intentions. (Attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers).

15. 1 June Eshkol accepted the formation of a National Unity Government with Dayan as Defence Minister.

16. 2 June Dayan approved military plans to strike along 3 lines of advance into Sinai, instead of one. (Mobilization of military forces).

17. 4 June The Cabinet decided to go to war (Mobilization of military forces)

Source: Brecher with Geist, op. cit., pp. 91-92

Thus, Israel made the following two decisions (of the five being examined) during the crisis period of the 1967 Six Day War Crisis:

- Attempt to gain or reaffirm military commitments from the major powers; and
- Mobilization of military forces.

Israel could have made the other decisions (being examined in this thesis) but chose not to do so. In the post-crisis period, however, Israel did get in contact with the Jordanian leadership, accepted U.N. involvement, and, also decided to take steps to defuse the crisis at a certain point.

"The I.C.B. Project, in two of its case studies, measures the perceived value of each decision at the time the decision is made. A five-point ordinal scale is used: 5-decisive; 4-significant; 3-important; 2-consequential; 1-marginal. Source: Michael Brecher with Benjamin Geist, op. cit., p. 380. The decisions being examined in this thesis are perceived to be among the most important—that is, primarily within categories 4 and 5. Please see:

- Brecher with Geist, op. cit., pp 379-398; and
- Dowty, op. cit., pp 356-361

There are three case studies which do not measure the value of decisions in the above mentioned quantitative manner. Even a cursory glance, however, at those sections dealing with the "crisis period" shows the importance of those decisions to the unfolding of a crisis. Please see:

- Dawisha, op. cit., pp. 93-316;
- Jukes, op. cit., pp. 95-147; and

There are two other studies that use the I.C.B. Project's model. The importance of the five decisions being examined in this thesis can be seen in the discussion of the "crisis period" of these two studies:


24 Examples of factors would be:

- Demonstrations by a strong ally of one side that it is ready to use force to maintain order;

- Concerns lead to the introduction of Great Power troops into the territory of one side;

and

- Close relations between the opposing parties are not encouraged by western countries (especially the U.S.).

Source: Ibid., pp. 39-42.

25 Ibid., p. 39.


27 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2 volumes (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

28 Ibid., 1: 636.

29 Richardson, op. cit., p. 5.

30 Ibid., pp. 73, 111-112.


32 Ferris, op. cit., p. 9

33 A case where the decision-makers of only one state perceived a crisis situation is the Aegean Sea crisis for Greece between August 7 and September 25, 1976. This dispute was over the rights to resources on the continental shelf of the Greek Aegean Islands. Greece claimed sole right to these resources. Turkey did not recognize Greece's claims. In mid-July, Greece became aware of the fact that Turkey was about to begin exploration in the disputed area. On July 19, Greece threatened Turkey with military reprisals if Turkey violated what it regarded as Greek jurisdiction. Turkey ignored this threat and dispatched a seismic ship to the disputed area. A crisis
for Greece was set off on August 7 when Greece learned that a Turkish research ship had entered an area claimed by the Greeks. Greece filed a complaint with Turkey. During the course of the crisis, a complaint also was registered with the Security Council and an appeal was made to the International Court of Justice. On August 12, Greece declared a state of alert for all its troops along the Greek-Turkish border. Almost the entire Greek Air Force was moved to advance bases. The Greek Navy also began patrolling the eastern Aegean. The research ship stayed in the area until September 25. The Turkish decision-makers did not perceive a crisis situation and did not respond in any substantive manner to the Greek actions. Source: Brecher et al., op. cit., 1: 318.

34 The role of crisis in this thesis is greatly influenced by Edward Azar's work on the Normal Relations Range (N.R.R.) in a protracted social conflict. Although Azar's work deals primarily with protracted social conflict rather than crises, his ideas are useful in understanding how crises can escalate to wars. Azar postulates that the interaction of two states in a protracted social conflict remains within an N.R.R. with an upper critical threshold and a lower critical threshold. A mean intensity curve representing dyadic interaction can be drawn which would remain within the boundaries of the two thresholds for the vast majority of the time. Periodically, however, the dyadic interaction can become extraordinarily hostile. At this point, the mean intensity curve of the dyadic interaction can be pushed back above the critical threshold. If the mean intensity curve stays above the upper critical threshold for more than a very short period of time, a crisis has set in. Source: Edward E. Azar, Paul Jureidini and Ronald McLaunn, "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East," Journal of Palestine Studies 8 (Autumn 1978): 50-53.

35 Boulding, op. cit., p. 248. For a further discussion of the necessity of prudence in analogizing from economics to political science, see

-Boulding, op. cit., pp 248-276; and
-Russett, Economic Theories of International Politics, op. cit., pp. 7-10.


38 Lipsey et al., op. cit., p. 32; Miller and Meiners, op. cit., p. 234; and McCloskey, op. cit., pp. 237-238.


40 Lipsey et al., op. cit., p. 236, 236, Fn 7, Miller and Meiners, op. cit., p. 460; McCloskey, op. cit., p. 443; and Mansfield, op. cit., pp. 525-526.


42 Lipsey et al., op. cit., pp. 146-150, 160, 185 and 188; Miller and Meiners, op. cit., pp. 319-322; and McCloskey, op. cit., pp. 156-157

43 Lipsey et al., op. cit., p. 185, Miller and Meiners, op. cit., pp. 322-325; and McCloskey, op. cit., pp. 242-244.
44Lipsey et al., op. cit., pp. 157-162; Miller and Meiners, op. cit., pp. 322-325; and McCloskey, op. cit., pp. 242-244.

45It is future expectations which determine whether a firm will enter a market or escalate competition with its adversaries. Such future expectations also affect the behavior of states in crises. See Bueno de Mesquita, op. cit., Chapter 3.

46James, op. cit., pp. 69-70; and Bueno de Mesquita, op. cit., pp. 140-142

47One attempt to operationalize marginal costs and gains in war is


48The use of microeconomic theory to determine the point at which a state will stop trying to change the international system is based on an assumption used by Gilpin in his study of major power cycles in the international political economy; see Robert Gilpin, Crisis and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 106-110.

49These three works give excellent accounts of why the unitary actor assumption is not in line with reality:

-Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision, (Boston, MA: Little-Brown, 1971); and


52Waltz, Theory of International Politics, op. cit., pp 117-118.


54The decision flow is one part of the I.C.B. Project case studies. This thesis is not an attempt to emulate an I.C.B. case study. Rather the I.C.B. case study methodology is being dissected and the part that is most useful for a comparative study is being utilized. For a more detailed discussion on the decision flow, see Brecher with Geist, op. cit., p. 29.

55Ibid., pp. 23-25.

56James, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

PART 2--MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS DECISIONS:
APPLICATION TO THE BANGLA DESH CRISIS

Chapter 4: Pakistan and India During the Bangla Desh Crisis--Decision Flow


3 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., p. 46


6 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp. 46-47

7 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

8 Ibid., pp. 47-48; Jackson, op. cit., p. 106.


10 Rizvi, op. cit., pp 104-107.

11 Ibid., pp. 107-108.

12 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., p. 40.


14 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., p. 255; and Jackson, op. cit., p. 106.


17. For more detailed information on the capability of Pakistan and India, please consult I.C.B. datasets available from McGill University, the University of Maryland, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.


23. *Ibid.*, Appendix 'B.'


35. Pakistan was governed under the collective leadership of the "inner cabinet" of a military government. Although there was also an "outer cabinet," almost all the major decisions were made by the "inner cabinet." This situation prevailed throughout the Bangla Desh Crisis.

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Inner Cabinet

- General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan--Commander-in-Chief; Chief Martial Law Administrator; and President. He also held the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

- Lieutenant-General S.G.M.M. Pirzada--Principal Staff Officer to the President It was through Pirzada that the parallel civil and military administration flowed to the President

- Major General Umar--Chairman of the National Security Council. Umar presided over the civil and military intelligence services

- General Abdul Hamid Khan--Chief of Army Staff He was the number two man in the army after Yahya. He also was in charge of the Home Ministry.

- Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan--Governor of East Pakistan and later the Corps Commander in the Chamb-Sialkot district.

- Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan--Chief of the General Staff

- Major General Akbar Khan--Head of Inter-Services Intelligence.

Outer Cabinet

- The Martial Law Administrators of the five provinces.

- Air Marshal Rahim Khan--Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and Governor of West Pakistan.

Sources: Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, op. cit., pp. 50-81 (G.W. Choudhury was a member of Yahya's civilian cabinet. Even after the civilian cabinet was disbanded in February 1971, Choudhury kept in personal contact with members of the military government. Thus, he has inside knowledge about how the decision-making process operated in Pakistan during the Bangladesh Crisis); Jackson, op. cit., pp. 25-26; Mascarenhas, op. cit., pp. 83-84; and Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, *The Liberation War*, (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1972), p. 95.


37 Ibid., pp. 65-66.


40 Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

41 Mascarenhas, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-74


44 Sisson and Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 77

46 ibid., p. 81.
47 ibid., pp. 81-85, 109, and Jackson, op. cit., p 28
49 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., p 108
50 ibid., pp 91-95
51 Jackson, op. cit., pp.28-29
52 Mascarenhas, op. cit., pp 90-110
53 Jackson, op. cit., p. 29.
54 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., p 109
55 Jackson, op. cit., p 29
56 This was one of four conditions given by Mujib for participation in the National Assembly Source. Dawn, Karachi, March 8, 1971
57 Mascarenhas, op. cit., pp 101-102
58 Jackson, op. cit., p 30; and Mascarenhas, op. cit., p. 104
59 Mascarenhas, op. cit., pp 108-112
60 Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, op. cit., p. 171
61 White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, op. cit., Chapter 3 A copy of the Awami League draft proclamation is found in White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, op. cit., Appendix 'E.'
62 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp 122-123, 132-133
63 Mascarenhas, op. cit., pp 108-112
64 Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, op. cit., pp 112-113.
65 Mascarenhas, op. cit., pp. 110-120
66 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 40, 55-56
67 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp. 142-162
68 ibid., p. 199.
69 Pakistan Horizon 24 (Second Quarter, 1971) 154
70 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp. 199, 203, 303 Fn. 44
A small and homogenous coterie around Mrs. Gandhi was the core group in the decision-making process in India during the Bangla Desh Crisis. The final source of authority was Mrs. Gandhi. She depended extensively on her private secretariat (until July 1971 this was headed by P.N. Haksar and thereafter by P.N. Dhar) and a few other secretaries (G. Ramchandra, M. Malhotra, Sharada Prasad, and B N Tandon). The Prime Minister met almost daily with this group (which was sometimes supplemented by D.P. Dhar, Head of Policy Planning in the Ministry of External Affairs, and G. Parthasarathy, a former ambassador to China and close confidante of Mrs Gandhi).

There were several groups that Mrs Gandhi consulted, from time to time, during the Bangla Desh Crisis. The Political Affairs Committee (P.A.C.) of the Cabinet was composed of several key cabinet ministers: Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, and Finance Minister Y B. Chavan. Mrs. Gandhi met with these and various other ministers and secretaries when appropriate in terms of the subjects under discussion. Key Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S) officials made up another group that Mrs. Gandhi consulted from time to time. This group included V.W. Swaminathar (Cabinet Secretary), P.N. Haksar and, later, P.N. Dhar (Prime Minister's Secretary), K.B. Lal (Defence Secretary), I.G. Patel (Economic Affairs Secretary), and T. N. Kaul (Foreign Secretary). Mrs. Gandhi consulted other top bureaucrats. One or all of the military service chiefs occasionally would be invited to participate in the proceedings of the P.A.C. (usually when military matters were being discussed). The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Manekshaw, also had informal contacts with the Prime Minister, her secretariat, and D.P. Dhar. The service chiefs, however, had to depend on Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram the most to express their views to the other senior decision-makers. Given Ram's own strong views, he was not always considered a reliable channel by the military. The Joint Intelligence Committee also made some inputs into the decision-making process.

Thus, it was Mrs Gandhi and a small group around her that made the key Indian decisions during the Bangla Desh Crisis. There were inputs from other sources but these were ignored when judged inappropriate.

83 Chopra, op. cit., p. 94
84 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp. 151-152
85 ibid., pp. 163-165
86 Jackson, op. cit., p. 62
87 ibid., pp. 49-51
88 Singh et al., op. cit., 1 673-675
89 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp. 152, 184, 206.
90 ibid., p. 187
91 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 51-61
92 ibid., p. 65
93 ibid., p. 65
94 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., p. 188
95 Singh et al., op. cit., 1 446
96 Chopra, op. cit., pp. 81-94
97 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., p. 206
98 ibid., p. 206
99 ibid., pp. 206-207.
100 ibid., pp. 210-217; and Chopra, op. cit., pp. 96-101, 146-147
102 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 66, 73, 82, 82 Fn. 153
103 ibid., pp. 67-68.
104 Singh et al., op. cit., 1: 660-663.
105 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
106 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp. 197-198
107 ibid., p. 199, 303 Fn. 44
108 ibid., p. 198.
109 ibid., pp. 199-200, 203.

110 ibid., p. 242.

111 ibid., pp. 200-201.


113 Jackson, op. cit., p. 73.

114 ibid., pp. 73-74.

115 Pakistan Times, Lahore, August 16, 1971.

116 Jackson, op. cit., p. 73-74.

117 ibid., p. 82.


119 Ball, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

120 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp. 177-186.

121 ibid., p. 308 Fn. 12.

122 ibid., p. 225.


124 ibid., pp. 211-212.

125 Jackson, op. cit., p. 188.

126 ibid., p. 90.

127 ibid., p. 91.


129 ibid., p. 194; and Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 871-872.

130 Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 869-873.

131 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 79-82.


133 Jackson, op. cit., pp. 94-102.
Chapter 5: Pakistan and India During the Bangladesh Crisis: Summary of the Findings

1 Sisson and Rose, op. cit., pp 196-202

Chapter 6: Conclusion


2 Ibid., pp 294-295

3 Brecher et al., op. cit., 1: 80

4 Ibid., p. 80

5 Simon, op. cit., p 302

6 Charles A Powell, James W Dyson and Helen E. Purkitt, "Opening the 'Black Box:' Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision Making," in Hermann et al., op. cit., p. 214.

7 Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, op. cit., and James, op. cit.
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