Incentives, conditionality and collective action in payment for environmental services
Faculty Advisor
Date
2014
Keywords
commons, collective action, conditionality, Indonesia, Mexico, payment for ecosystem services, payment for environmental services
Abstract (summary)
As payment for environmental services (PES) initiatives spread to collectively managed natural resources, questions arise because the incentive structures that might be appropriate for individually managed resources will not necessarily promote the collective action required to manage the commons. Theory suggests challenges for cash payments to promote collective action, and for alternative payment types to facilitate conditionality. Possible ways to reconcile this disconnect involve conceiving of PES more broadly through the use of multiple forms of payment including non-cash incentives and placing greater focus on building institutions for collective action than on strict conditionality.
Publication Information
Kerr, John M., Mamta Vardhan, and Rohit Jindal. "Incentives, Conditionality and Collective Action in Payment for Environmental Services". International Journal of the Commons 8, no. 2 (2014): 595-616, http://www.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/ijc/article/view/438.
DOI
Notes
Item Type
Article
Language
English
Rights
Attribution (CC BY)
