Effect of detection by regulators on greenwashing: a differential game theoretic analysis
| dc.contributor.author | Mukherjee, Arka | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ghosh, Subhadip | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-31T17:12:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-01-31T17:12:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
| dc.description | Mukherjee, A., & Ghosh, S. (2024, April 2-5). Effect of Detection by Regulators on Greenwashing: A Differential Game Theoretic Analysis. Paper presented at 51st Annual Meeting of Western Decision Sciences Institute: WDSI 2024. http://wdsinet.org/Annual_Meetings/2024_Proceedings/papers.php | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates how environmental quality competition between a greenwashing firm and a genuinely eco-conscious one affects the two firms' quality choices and consumer perceptions of environmental quality. Using a differential game theoretical framework, it highlights the significance of early detection mechanisms and regulatory interventions in mitigating the adverse effects of greenwashing, thereby fostering a more conducive environment for genuine environmental stewardship. Furthermore, this study explores the potential trajectories for both firms’ post-exposure, addressing the implications for consumer perceptions, market dynamics, and the overall corporate environmental responsibility landscape. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14078/3774 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.rights | All Rights Reserved | |
| dc.subject | greenwashing | |
| dc.subject | environmental quality | |
| dc.title | Effect of detection by regulators on greenwashing: a differential game theoretic analysis | en |
| dc.type | Presentation |
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